Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole

July 30, 2019 — Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation Strategist
Arkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4] In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com

Guilty Pleas Draw Renewed Interest In Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws

December 09, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

A report this week by David McGrath Schwarz of the Las Vegas Sun suggests that Nevada’s construction defect laws will be a point of much contention in upcoming legislative sessions. The report cites renewed interest in the state’s construction defect laws due to ongoing federal investigations of construction defect attorney Nancy Quon and construction company owner Leon Benzer. Guilty pleas have been entered by at least ten individuals including an attorney, property managers, straw purchasers, and former HOA board members.

The article suggests that Nevada’s Chapter 40 laws are easily manipulated to the detriment of Nevada’s homebuilding industry. Construction industry lobbyists have tried unsuccessfully to change the laws in past legislative sessions.

The Sun’s article speculates that the building industry might be able to gain legislative concessions due to the volume of guilty pleas and what it refers to as examples of Chapter 40 abuses. ”With federal authorities collecting guilty pleas, the construction industry has prime examples of the system being abused, and how lucrative it can be for attorneys.”

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Ohio Rejects the Majority Trend and Finds No Liability Coverage for a Subcontractor’s Faulty Work

December 11, 2018 — Shannon M. Warren - The Subrogation Strategist
In Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., 2018 Ohio LEXIS 2375 (No. 2017-0514, October 9, 2018), the Supreme Court of Ohio was recently called upon to determine if a general contractor’s Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policy provided coverage for defective work completed by its subcontractor. Rejecting the majority trend, the court held that, because the subcontractor’s faulty work was not an “occurrence” caused by an accident – i.e. a fortuitous event – within the meaning of the contractor’s CGL policy, the insurer did not have to defend or indemnify the contractor with respect to the plaintiff’s claims. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Shannon M. Warren, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Warren may be contacted at warrens@whiteandwilliams.com

Common Flood Insurance Myths and how Agents can Debunk Them

September 17, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Property Casualty 360 listed four common misconceptions that many homeowners have about flood insurance. First myth on the list was, “I don’t have to worry about flooding because I don’t live near a body of water.” The author pointed out recent floods in desert areas such as Arizona and Nevada. “I don't qualify for government flood insurance because my property isn’t located in a flood plain,” made number two on the list. According to Property Casualty 360, “NFIP can provide coverage available to any homeowner, regardless of their location.” Read the court decision
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California Supreme Court Clarifies Deadline to File Anti-SLAPP Motions in Light of Amended Pleadings

July 02, 2018 — Tony Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
California’s “anti-SLAPP” (“SLAPP” is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute—codified at California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 et seq.—is the primary vehicle for defending against any action involving petitioning or free speech. The statute was designed to provide an early and fast summary judgment-like procedure to allow defendants and cross-defendants to file a motion to dismiss either an entire complaint, specific causes of action, or even just portions of a cause of action, and to require the plaintiff to respond before conducting discovery. By facilitating an early challenge to a plaintiff or cross-complainant’s claims, the anti-SLAPP statute allows the responding party to avoid the costs and delay that chill the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(f), an anti-SLAPP motion must be filed “within 60 days of the service of the complaint . . . .” But what if the plaintiff files an ameded complaint? In Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, the California Supreme Court held that the 60-day timeline runs from the date a complaint is filed with the cause(s) of action challenged in the anti-SLAPP motion. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tony Carucci, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Carucci may be contacted at acarucci@swlaw.com

A Murder in Honduras Reveals the Dark Side of Clean Energy

October 12, 2020 — Monte Reel - Bloomberg
Berta Cáceres campaigned to stop a renewable energy project, and the long fight turned her into one of Central America’s most prominent environmentalists. She won a prestigious international prize known as the “Green Nobel” for protecting a river, using some of the award money to purchase a modest bungalow in La Esperanza, her hometown in central Honduras. Her activism is also what brought three gunmen to her back door. The men broke into her kitchen around 11:30 p.m. on March 2, 2016. Cáceres heard a noise and called out from her bedroom: “Who’s out there?” Within seconds, a gunman entered her room and shot her dead. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Monte Reel, Bloomberg

Georgia Supreme Court Addresses Anti-Indemnity Statute

October 21, 2019 — David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement Blog
In prior blog posts, we addressed Georgia’s anti-indemnity statute. One of the posts addressed the statute in the context of an electric utility easement near an airport. That case made its way to the Supreme Court Georgia, which provided some additional clarity to the statute. Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co., — Ga. –, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019). When a plane crashed and several passengers and crew died or were injured, their representatives sued several defendants, including a nearby plant owner, Milliken & Company (“Milliken”), based on claims that transmission lines on Milliken’s property were too close to the runways, were too high, and encroached on the airport easements. Milliken cross claimed against Georgia Power Company (“GPC”). Milliken’s claim was based on an easement it granted to GPC, which required GPC to indemnify it for any claims arising out of GPC’s construction or maintenance of the transmission lines. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the clause was unenforceable under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). In general, “a party may contract away liability to the other party for the consequences of his own negligence without contravening public policy, except when such agreement it prohibited by statute.” Id. at 113 citing Lanier at McEver v. Planners & Eng’rs Collaborative, 284 Ga. 204, 205 (2008). As one such statute, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) applies when an indemnification provision (i) “relates in some way to a contract for construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of certain property” and (ii) “promises to indemnify a party for damages arising from that own party’s sole negligence.” Id. at 114 (internal punctuation omitted). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com

Retaining Wall Contractor Not Responsible for Building Damage

July 20, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled on July 8 in the case of Rollander Enterprises, Inc. v. H.C. Nutting Co. Judge Baily wrote the opinion affirming the decision of the trial court.

The case involved an unfinished condominium complex, the Slopes of Greendale, in Greendale, Indiana. Rollander is a real estate development company incorporated in Ohio. One of the issues in the case was whether the case should be settled in the Indiana courts or be tried in Ohio. The project was owned by a special purpose entity limited liability corporation incorporated in Indiana.

Rollander hired Nutting to determine the geological composition of the site. Nutting’s report described the site as “a medium plastic clay containing pieces of shale and limestone.” The court summarized this as corresponding with “slope instability and landslides.” Rollander then hired Nutting to design the retaining walls, which were constructed by Scherziner Drilling.

After cracking was discovered on State Route 1, the walls were discovered to be inadequate. More dirt was brought in and a system of tie-backs was designed to anchor the walls. Not only were the tie-backs unsightly, local officials would not approve the complex for occupancy. Further, the failure of the wall below one building lead to damage of that building.

The court concluded that since almost all events occurred in Indiana, they rejected Rollander’s contention that the case should be tried in Ohio. Further, the court notes “the last event making Nutting potentially liable on both claims was an injury that occurred in Indiana and consequently, under the lex loci delicti analysis, Indiana law applies.”

Nor did the court find that Nutting was responsible for the damage to the rest of the project, citing an Indiana Supreme Court ruling, that “there is no liability in tort to the owner of a major construction project for pure economic loss caused unintentionally by contractors, subcontractors, engineers, design professionals, or others engaged in the project with whom the project owner, whether or not technically in privity of contract, is connected through a network or chain of contracts.”

The court concluded:

Because Rollander was in contractual privity with Nutting, and Indy was connected to Nutting through a chain of contracts and no exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes their recovery in tort. Damage to Building B was not damage to "other property," and the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule is inapplicable on these facts. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment on the evidence in favor of Nutting on the Appellants' negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.

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