Court Extends Insurer Rights to Equitable Contribution
October 28, 2015 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Underwriters of Interest v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co. (No. D066615; filed 10/23/15), a California appeals court refused to enforce an “escape” other insurance clause in an insurer versus insurer contribution action, refused to enforce a Contractors Special Conditions endorsement and found that equitable tolling applied to rule that a nondefending insurer was obligated to reimburse defense costs incurred defending the two insurers’ common insured.
Certain Underwriters provided CGL insurance to Pacific Trades Construction & Development in effect between October 23, 2001 and October 23, 2003. ProBuilders Specialty insured Pacific Trades from December 9, 2002 to December 9, 2004. When Pacific Trades was sued in construction defect actions arising out of the development and construction of single family homes, Underwriters provided a defense, while ProBuilders declined to participate. The case was ultimately settled and when Underwriters sued ProBuilders for contribution to the defense costs, the trial court granted summary judgment for ProBuilders, finding its other insurance clause precluded any obligation to contribute or reimburse Underwriters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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No Coverage for Construction Defect Claim Only Impacting Insured's Work
January 08, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn a coverage dispute between two insurers over a claim for damages caused by faulty workmanship, the court found there was no right to equitable contribution or indemnity. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Mallcraft, Inc., 2023 Cal. Super. LEXIS 67568 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2023).
Mallcraft was the general contractor for a building project and was sued for construction defects. Travelers was an additional insured under a policy issued to a subcontractor, KitCor. Travelers defended Mallcraft in an arbitration. Travelers sought equitable contribution and equitable indemnity from Hartford, Mallcraft's insurer.
Mallcraft and Travelers stiulated to a judgment agianst Mallcraft for all costs Travelers incurred in the arbitration. Travelers' insured, KitCor, was not implicated in the construction defect claims against Mallcraft. The judgment set forth findings, including the fact that the underlying plaintiff never made any claim that KitCor perfomred work on the project or casued property damage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Wilke Fleury Secures Bid Protest Denial
March 16, 2020 —
Wilke Fleury LLPAfter the City of Vacaville, following a sealed bid process, awarded a significant well drilling contract to Roadrunner Drilling & Pump Company, second-place bidder Nor-Cal Pump and Well Drilling filed a protest with the City on January 30, claiming that Roadrunner’s bid failed to meet certain requirements of the proposed contract. Roadrunner hired Wilke Fleury to defend the bid protest. After Wilke Fleury partner Dan Baxter transmitted a letter to the City explaining why the disgruntled bidder’s protest was factually and legally unsupported, the City—a mere nine days after receiving Dan’s letter—rejected the bid protest, and maintained its award of the project to Roadrunner as the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.
Wilke Fleury LLP
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Florida District Court Finds That “Unrelated” Design Errors Sufficient to Trigger “Related Claims” Provision in Architects & Engineers Policy
March 02, 2020 —
Jason Taylor - Traub LiebermanMost professional liability polices include some form of a “related claims” provision that generally provides where two or more claims or wrongful acts are causally or logically related, they will be deemed to constitute a single claim. Importantly, these provisions typically provide that those “claims” are then deemed to have been “first made” at the time the first claim or act was committed for purposes of the policy’s claims-made and reporting requirements. Understandably, these provisions provide insurers and insureds with some clarity over the number and timing of claims that could involve multiple errors or omissions, and potentially aggregate all related claims or acts into a single policy period. While reasonable in principle, application of such provisions, especially involving large scale design and construction projects, is not always so easy.
Nova Southeastern University, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 18-cv-61842 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2019), involved such an insurance coverage dispute with a design project gone wrong. DeRose Design Consultants, Inc. (“DeRose”) was hired as a structural engineer to design “ice tanks” to store and chill water for an energy efficient air conditioning facility constructed on the campus of Nova Southeastern University (“NSU”). An early water test on one of the tanks determined the walls of the ice tank deflected, leaked, and cracked when the tank was filled with water. DeRose later discovered that the problems with the ice tank were caused by a structural design error.
The first errors were discovered in early 2009, and reported under DeRose’s professional liability policy with Evanston. DeRose then created a remedial design to repair the tanks, which involved strengthening repairs. Additional leaking and an early indication of corrosion involving the Remedial Design arose as early as October 25, 2009. Several field investigation reports were prepared in 2011 and 2012 confirming these issues with the Remedial Design. A third report in February 2012, however, identified a new error involving the concrete slab under the ice tanks also designed by DeRose. The third report concluded that the concreate slab was overstressed and could not handle the loads of the ice tanks. The report also concluded, however, that the design defects in the concrete slab were “unrelated” to the original design defect of the ice tank walls or Remedial Design.
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Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
Senator Ray Scott Introduced a Bill to Reduce Colorado’s Statute of Repose for Construction Defect Actions to Four Years
January 21, 2015 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationFor those of you reading this blog who are familiar with Colorado’s law as it pertains to construction defect actions, which I assume to be anyone reading this blog as it does not seem to get much random traffic, you are probably aware that the statute of repose applicable to construction defect actions in Colorado is generally thought of as being six plus two years. Specifically, C.R.S. § 13-80-104 states, in pertinent part:
(1)(a) Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, all actions against any architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer, or inspector performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of construction of any improvement to real property shall be brought within the time provided in section 13-80-102 after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no case shall such an action be brought more than six years after the substantial completion of the improvement to the real property, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
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David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
In South Carolina, Insurer's Denial of Liability Does Not Waive Attorney-Client Privilege for Bad Faith Claim
October 14, 2019 —
Ashley L. Cooper & Bethany L. Barrese - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Determining the scope of discovery can be challenging, particularly when an insurance bad faith claim is involved. Courts often face the difficult decision of weighing the importance of preserving attorney-client privilege with the public policy rationale of protecting an insured against their insurer’s bad faith behavior. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently recognized this dilemma by rejecting a hardline approach to bad faith discovery disputes and adopting a case-by-case analysis.
The case, In re Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.,1 arose out of a construction defect claim. ContraVest Construction Company (“ContraVest”) constructed a development in South Carolina and was later sued for alleged defective construction. ContraVest sought coverage for the lawsuit from its insurers, including Mount Hawley Insurance Company (“Mount Hawley”), which had provided excess commercial liability insurance to ContraVest during the relevant timeframe. Mount Hawley denied the claim, which prompted ContraVest to sue it for bad faith, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ashley L. Cooper, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Bethany L. Barrese, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Cooper may be contacted at alc@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Barrese may be contacted at blb@sdvlaw.com
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Faulty Workmanship Causing Damage to Other Property Covered as Construction Defect
September 30, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn yet another recent construction defect case, the Illinois Court of Appeal found for coverage. See Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Ct. LEXIS 872 (Ill. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011).
Weather-Tite, Inc. hired Larson as a subcontractor to apply sealant to windows installed by Weather-Tite in a condominium building. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage. The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen alleging that, if it was liable to the association for breach of warranty, Larsen was liable for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Weather-Tite and Larsen both tendered defenses to Milwaukee Insurance. The tenders were denied and Milwaukee Insurance filed suit to determine rights under the policy.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by all parties. The trial court granted Milwaukee Insurance’s summary judgment motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion against Milwaukee Insurance.
On appeal, the appellate court considered whether the underlying pleadings alleged facts demonstrating "property damage" resulting from an "occurrence" within the terms of the policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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