A Duty to Design and Maintain Reasonably Safe Roadways Extends to All Persons. (WA)
February 25, 2014 —
Natasha Khachatourians – Scheer & Zehnder LLP Liability NewsletterCase: Lowman v. Wilbur, et al., 178 Wn.2d 165, 309 P.3d 3.87 (2013).
Issue: If a passenger’s injuries are in fact caused by the placement of a utility pole too close to a roadway, can the injuries be deemed too remote for purposes of legal causation? NO.
Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that lost control and collided with a utility pole that was 4.47 feet from the edge of the roadway. The vehicle’s driver was under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff sued the driver as well as the utility company and Skagit County for negligence. The trial court granted the utility company and Skagit County’s summary judgment motion, finding that the negligent placement of the utility pole was not a legal cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a negligently placed utility pole could be the legal cause of a resulting injury.
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Natasha Khachatourians, Scheer & Zehnder LLP Ms. Khachatourians may be contacted at
natashak@scheerlaw.com
Georgia Amends Anti-Indemnity Statute
June 02, 2016 —
David R. Cook Jr. – AHHC Construction Law BlogIn its most recent session, the Georgia General Assembly passed HB 943, which amends Georgia’s Anti-Indemnity Statute. The amendment expands the Anti-Indemnity Statute beyond construction contracts to include contracts for engineering, architectural, and land surveying services (“A/E Contracts”).
In a
prior post, we discussed
Georgia’s Anti-Indemnity Statute, which generally prohibits indemnity clauses in construction contracts that require one party (the “Indemnitor”) to indemnify another party (the “Indemnitee”) if property damage or bodily injury results from the Indemnitee’s sole negligence. The
prior post, discussed the Supreme Court of Georgia’s broad interpretation of the Anti-Indemnity Statute.
HB 943 adds subpart (c), which states:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement for engineering, architectural, or land surveying services purporting to require that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other named indemnitee, including its, his, or her officers, agents, or employees, against liability or claims for damages, losses, or expenses, including attorney fees, is against public policy and void and unenforceable, except for indemnification for damages, losses, or expenses to the extent caused by or resulting from the negligence, recklessness, or intentionally wrongful conduct of the indemnitor or other persons employed or utilized by the indemnitor in the performance of the contract. This subsection shall not affect any obligation under workers’ compensation or coverage or insurance specifically relating to workers’ compensation, nor shall this subsection apply to any requirement that one party to the contract purchase a project specific insurance policy or project specific policy endorsement.
(Emphasis added.)
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David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys
April 28, 2014 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).
In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Is a Violation of a COVID-19 Order the Basis For Civil Liability?
April 20, 2020 —
Robert Devine, James Burger & Douglas Weck - White and WilliamsThinking about ignoring your state or local COVID-19 shutdown orders? Think again. Social-distance measures may create a new source of liability for businesses operating during the COVID-19 pandemic. Infection-based litigation is normally limited to businesses operating in the healthcare sector. But, social-distancing measures to stop the spread of infection may expand that litigation to other sectors.
State and local governments across the country are taking extraordinary measures to combat the spread of COVID-19, a novel coronavirus that can cause life-threatening respiratory illness. Those measures encourage and even mandate “social distance” between people to limit physical transmission of the virus.
Hard-hit states like New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and California have been aggressive in their responses, shuttering businesses, confining people to their homes, and requiring people to stay six feet apart. Common mandates include: quarantines, business and school closures, stay-home orders, curfews, travel restrictions, occupancy limits and physical-distance mandates, among other things.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams attorneys
Robert Devine,
James Burger and
Douglas Weck
Mr. Devine may be contacted at deviner@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Burger may be contacted at burgerj@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Weck may be contacted at weckd@whiteandwilliams.com
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Broker Not Liable for Failure to Reveal Insurer's Insolvency After Policy Issued
March 28, 2012 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiFaced with an issue of first impression in California, the Court of Appeals held that a broker was not liable for failing to reveal the insurer's insolvency occurring after issuance of the policy. Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Serv. West, Inc., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 232 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012).
The developer for a construction project in downtown San Diego retained Aon as its broker to secure coverage. Aon procured a general liability policy for the project with Legion Indemnity Company. Legion was solvent when it issued the policy.
The developer hired Pacific Rim (“PacRim”) as one of several subcontractors on the project. The parties entered into a contract in which the developer agreed to provide PacRim with liability insurance through an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”). Aon was not a party to the contract and PacRim was never its client. PacRim, however, enrolled in the OCIP by contacting Aon and providing all necessary paperwork.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Cape Town Seeks World Cup Stadium Construction Collusion Damages
March 19, 2015 —
Janice Kew – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- The City of Cape Town filed a civil damages claim against builders Aveng Ltd., Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd. and Stefanutti Stocks Holdings Ltd. for colluding on a tender for a stadium built for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup.
The claim for at least 428 million rand ($35 million) will be heard in the North Gauteng High Court, Ian Neilson, Cape Town’s executive deputy mayor, said by phone on Monday. The amount claimed is subject to change, he said.
Antitrust authorities fined 15 builders, including the trio facing the Cape Town claim, a total of 1.5 billion rand in June 2013 for rigging contracts for projects including the construction of stadiums for the 2010 World Cup hosted by South Africa. Aveng was fined 307 million rand, WBHO 311 million rand and Stefanutti 307 million rand.
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Janice Kew, BloombergMs. Kew may be contacted at
jkew4@bloomberg.net
Proposed Law Protecting Tenants Amended: AB 828 Updated
June 08, 2020 —
Rhonda Kreger – Newmeyer DillionOn May 18, 2020, AB 828 was amended and is currently on its second reading in the Senate Rules Committee. This legislation proposes a temporary moratorium on foreclosures and unlawful detainers while Governor Newsom's COVID-19 emergency order is in effect. In addition to the moratorium, AB 828 also required landlords to reduce rent by 25% under certain circumstances. AB 828 was amended to remove the provision that required landlords to reduce rent by 25% for 12 months. The new provision requires landlords to allow tenant to remain in possession, and requires tenants to start paying rent the month following the end of the emergency order. Tenants must timely pay monthly rent plus 10% of any rent due and owing when the emergency order ended.
Under AB 828, a tenant may stipulate to the entry of an order in response to a residential unlawful detainer action filed by the landlord. Upon a hearing, the court determines if the tenant's inability to pay rent is the result of increased expenses or a reduction in income due to COVID-19. The court must also make a determination that there is no material economic hardship for the landlord. Upon making such determinations, the court will issue an order that permits the tenant to remain in possession, and requires tenant to commence rental payments the month following the end of the COVID-19 emergency order. Tenant's payment would include the monthly rent plus 10% of an unpaid rent during the COVID-19 emergency order, but excludes any late charges or other fees or charges. The tenant would be required to make timely payments, and if tenant fails to do so, after a 48 hour notice from landlord, the landlord can file for an immediate writ of possession in favor of the landlord and money judgment for any unpaid balance, court costs and attorneys' fees.
Newmeyer Dillion continues to follow COVID-19 and its impact on your business and our communities. Feel free to reach out to us at NDcovid19response@ndlf.com or visit us at www.newmeyerdillion.com/covid-19-multidisciplinary-task-force/.
Rhonda Kreger is Senior Counsel on Newmeyer Dillion's transactional team at our Newport Beach office. Her practice focuses on all aspects of commercial real estate law, with a particular emphasis on the representation of residential developers, merchant builders and institutional investors. You can reach Rhonda at rhonda.kreger@ndlf.com.
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Maybe Supervising Qualifies as Labor After All
May 22, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember back in 2021 when I
“mused” about Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland et al.? Remember how the Eastern District of Virginia held that mere supervision does not qualify as “labor” under the federal
Miller Act? Well, the 4th Circuit recently weighed in on the appeal of that case and had some interesting things to say about the definition of labor.
As a quick reminder, Plaintiff worked as a project manager on a project to repair and upgrade certain stairs at the Pentagon. Plaintiff subcontracted with prime contractor Forney Enterprises Inc. on this project. On Dec. 20, 2018, the prime contract was terminated. Plaintiff filed the Miller Act suit on Feb. 5, 2020. Dickson alleged that Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, or F&D, must pay him, pursuant to the Miller Act, the amount he is owed for the labor he performed on the project. Now before the district court were cross-motions for summary judgment. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claims, the district court examined the defendant’s claims that (1) Dickson’s work did not qualify as “Labor” under the Miller Act, and (2) that the suit was not timely filed. The Eastern District of Virginia court agreed with both arguments.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com