Class Actions Under California’s Right to Repair Act. Nope. Well . . . Nope.
January 15, 2019 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIt’s the holidays. A time when family and friends, and even neighbors, gather together.
And nothing brings neighbors closer together than class action residential construction defect litigation.
In Kohler Co. v. Superior Court, Case No. B288935 (November 14, 2018), the Second District Court of Appeal addressed whether neighbors can bring class action lawsuits under the Right to Repair Act. For those who are regular readers of the California Construction Law Blog you’re familiar with the Right to Repair Act codified at Civil Code sections 895 et seq.
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Garret Murai, Wendel RosenMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
With Historic Removal of Four Dams, Klamath River Flows Again Unhindered
October 21, 2024 —
Tim Newcomb - Engineering News-RecordIn a period of 16 months, four dams built between 1903 and 1962 came down as part of a monumental effort to clear 35 miles of the Klamath River spanning Oregon and California. The project owner, the Klamath River Renewal Corp., describes it as the largest dam removal effort in U.S.—and possibly world—history.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tim Newcomb, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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A Court-Side Seat: “Inholdings” Upheld, a Pecos Bill Come Due and Agency Actions Abound
January 25, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelHere are some significant environmental and regulatory rulings and administrative actions from December 2020.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Texas v. New Mexico
On December 14, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a water rights controversy involving sharing the water of the Pecos River. The 1949 Pecos River Compact provides for the equitable apportionment of the use of the Pecos River’s water by New Mexico and Texas, and a “River Master’s Manual,” approved by the Court in 1988, implements the Compact. These are very dry areas, and access to this water is very important. In 2014, a rare tropical storm drenched the Pecos River Basin, and Texas asked New Mexico to temporarily store the water that would otherwise flow into Texas. A few months later, New Mexico released the water to Texas, but the quantity was reduced because some of the water held by New Mexico had evaporated. The River Master awarded a delivery credit to New Mexico, and after Texas objected, Texas “in response” filed the Original Jurisdiction of the Court, suing New Mexico and seeking a review of the River Master’s determination. The Court held for New Mexico, deciding that this dispute was subject to and resolved by the Manual. This case is important because it highlights the high value the states place on the equitable apportionment of water that flows through different states.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
National Infrastructure Leaders Visit Dallas' Able Pump Station to Tout Benefits of Water Infrastructure Investment
September 25, 2023 —
American Society of Civil EngineersDALLAS, TX. — An award-winning pump station in south downtown Dallas that protects residents from the Trinity River today was showcased by the
national Engineering and Public Works Roadshow as an example of how infrastructure investment can improve the resilience of a community, protect residents, and encourage economic growth.
The Able Pump Station in downtown Dallas, Texas won awards from both the American Council of Engineering Companies and the American Society of Civil Engineers since its completion in 2019 and has been credited with providing 100-year flood protection to approximately three square miles of high-profile land that was historically vulnerable to severe flooding events from the Trinity River.
The Engineering and Public Works Roadshow is a joint project of the
American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC), the
American Public Works Association (APWA), and the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).
The properties adjacent to the previous Able sump complex had experienced frequent flooding. The sump complex included nine separate and interconnected ponds that store stormwater, as well as two existing pump stations, constructed in the 1930s and 1950s, with a combined capacity of 220,000 gallons per minute. To help prevent the loss of life as a result of flooding, the City of Dallas hired HDR to design the new Able Pump Station, which increases the pumping capacity nearly fourfold, to 875,000 gallons per minute. It also lowers the 100-year flood elevation from 399.0 to a design elevation of 392.5 feet.
As the federal government continues to implement this monumental legislation, the second year of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will not be fully realized without an expanded and robust workforce. It is imperative that students nationwide are educated on the rewarding careers of civil engineering and public works so that these professions have the necessary staffing to complete transformative projects.
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Former NYC Condo Empire Executive Arrested for Larceny, Tax Fraud
March 11, 2024 —
Ava Benny-Morrison - BloombergA former New York executive facing lawsuits over the collapse of real estate empire HFZ Capital Group has been arrested in Miami, charged with grand larceny and tax fraud.
Nir Meir, 48, was arrested Monday, a spokesperson for the Miami-Dade Police Department confirmed. Meir was detained on an out-of-state warrant, suggesting his arrest may be the result of an investigation by law enforcement in New York.
A spokesperson for the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. Meir’s attorney also didn’t immediately respond to an email.
Meir, the former managing principal of HFZ Capital Group, has been battling multiple lawsuits in New York over his involvement in the once-prominent real estate firm. He’s denied wrongdoing.
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Ava Benny-Morrison, Bloomberg
Construction Termination Issues for the Architect and Engineer: Part 1– Introduction to the Series
July 24, 2023 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaEarlier this year, I was asked to talk to other construction lawyers on the topic of termination. My first question was– whose termination are we talking about here– the architect / engineer? The contractor? Is someone wanting to “fire” the owner? The answer, as it turns out, is — yes. That is, yes, any and all of the above termination topics were on the table.
As you may have suspected, even the threat of a termination is bad, bad news. It is the “nuclear option” for a construction project. Everyone risks getting harmed. As the design professional administering a contract, you run a risk of being dragged into litigation no matter what you do. So, how should you proceed? Carefully.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale LiggettMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Hawaii Court of Appeals Finds Insured AOAO Not Liable for Securing Inadequate Insurance
March 04, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the trial court's finding that the insured Association of Apartment Owners (AOAO) was not liable for securing a policy with inadequate coverage. AOAO Queen Emma Gardens, et al v. Wa, 2023 Haw. App. LEXIS 400 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2023).
In October 2002, the Was purchased a condominium located in the Queen Emma Gardens Condominium. The AOAO's bylaws provided that it would procure and maintain insurance "to insure the Board, the Association, and each apartment owner against claims for personal injury, death, and property damage arising out of the condition of the property or activities thereon . . ." The AOAO secured a CGL policy from Insurance Association, Inc., with coverage limits for bodily injury at $1,000,000 and an umbrella policy providing an additional $5,000,000 of coverage. Each of the policies "insured each individual insurance owner of the insured condominium, but only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or repair of that portion of the premises which is not reserved for that unit owner's exclusive use or occupancy."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
