Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFIn the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.” The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
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To Require Arbitration or Not To Require Arbitration
December 31, 2014 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsMany, if not most, construction contracts that I review during the course of my practice day include a mandatory arbitration clause. Most of these refer in a blanket manner to AAA Construction Industry Rules. The topic for this post is not whether such clauses are enforceable or whether they are one tool in the contracting tool box in a state where the contract is king. I picked the title of this post carefully because I wanted to discuss whether such clauses should be required as a routine part of all construction contracts and, if so, how those clauses can and should be written.
I have previously shared my thoughts on mandatory arbitration and its desirability in numerous spots here at Construction Law Musings (you can search arbitration or check out the ADR page for more). In short, my opinion is that arbitration was initially conceived with the purpose of streamlining the dispute resolution process and to correspondingly lower the costs associated with such dispute resolution. Arbitration, when used correctly, can, in certain very industry specific cases, help by using an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators that have some expertise in the particular area of the construction industry or the particular specialized issue that will turn the case one way or the other. All of these goals are good and I applaud them.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Fungi, Wet Rot, Dry Rot and "Virus": One of These Things is Not Like the Other
November 02, 2020 —
Hugh D. Hughes - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThe Hartford’s so-called virus exclusion in its commercial property forms is getting a workout, and policyholders now have an argument that may help their cases move past the pleadings stage. A U.S. District Court in Florida has deemed the exclusion ambiguous and denied an insurer’s motion to dismiss.1 The exclusion applies to “presence, growth, proliferation, spread, or any activity of ’fungi’, wet rot, dry rot, bacteria or virus.”2 The Court held that the parties did not necessarily intend to exclude a pandemic.
In Urogynecology, the plaintiff sought coverage for the loss of the usefulness and functionality of its business location due to the Florida Governor’s shutdown order. The policy contained a 'fungi', wet rot, dry rot, bacteria, or virus” exclusion.3 The carrier moved to dismiss, and the plaintiff argued that the exclusion only applied if COVID-19 was present on-site, which was not the case.
The Court addressed none of the issues regarding direct physical loss and instead decided the motion on the fungi exclusion. The Court held the exclusion ambiguous because the exclusion of virus “does not logically align with the grouping of the virus exclusion with other pollutants such that the Policy necessarily anticipated and intended to deny coverage for these kinds of business losses.”5 In addition, the Court stated that pollution case law was not on point because “none of the cases dealt with the unique circumstances of the effect COVID-19 has had on our society – a distinction this Court considers significant.”
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Hugh D. Hughes, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMr. Hughes may be contacted at
hdh@sdvlaw.com
Privacy In Pandemic: Senators Announce Covid-19 Data Privacy Bill
May 11, 2020 —
Kyle Janecek & Jeffrey Dennis – Newmeyer Dillion"Data! Data! Data!. . . I can't make bricks without clay." This classic statement from Sherlock Holmes in The Adventure of the Copper Beeches takes on a new meaning in the COVID-19 pandemic. With the plans to begin contact tracing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic slowly moving towards the forefront, a valid and important issue presents itself: how do we treat and protect the data we so desperately need to trace, track, and address the pandemic? U.S. Senators Wicker, Thune, Moran, and Blackburn introduced a possible solution to this problem with the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act, as announced on April 30, 2020. So what does the Act entail? What information is protected? What action would businesses need to take towards individuals, such as consumers or even employees, in order to comply with this new legislation?
WHAT IS THE COVID-19 CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The Act is meant to address the concern regarding data collection and privacy due to large companies, like Google and Apple, adjusting the software within their devices to facilitate digital contact tracing. The Act can be broken up into three parts - the treatment of information; the privacy notice requirements; and the transparency requirements.
First, the Act prohibits the collection, processing, or transfer of certain categories of data without notice and the affirmative express consent of the individual, in order to:
- Track the spread of COVID-19,
- Trace the spread of COVID-19 through contact tracing, or
- Determine compliance with social distancing guidelines without the requisite notice to individuals and their express consent.
To accomplish this, the Act also restricts entities in their ability to collect excessive information, stating that an entity cannot collect information beyond what is reasonably necessary to conduct any of the three COVID-19 related purposes listed in the statute. The entity must also provide reasonable administrative, technical, and physical data security policies and practices to protect the information collected. Furthermore, in the event that the entity stops using the information for any of the three COVID-19 purposes, it must delete or de-identify the information it has collected.
Next, the Act describes the requirements for notice to individuals. In order to legally collect, process or transfer the information, the entity needs to provide the consumer with prior notice of the purpose, processing, and transfer of the data through their privacy policy within 14 days of the enactment of the law. This policy would have to:
- Disclose the consumer's rights in a clear and conspicuous manner prior to or at the point of collection,
- Be available in a clear and conspicuous manner to the public,
- Include whether the entity will transfer any of the information it collects in order to track or trace COVID-19 or determine compliance with social distancing,
- Describe its data retention policy, and
- Generally describe its data security measures.
Notably, many of these are already requirements common to many privacy policies, including the disclosure regarding the transfer of an individual's information.
In addition, an individual must give their affirmative express consent to such collection, processing and transfer. In other words, an individual must "opt-in" to having their information collected. This would be done through a checked box or electronic signature, as the law prohibits entities from inferring consent through a failure by the individual to take an action stopping the collection. Furthermore, the individual would also need the ability to expressly withdraw their consent, with the entity then having to cease collection, processing, or transfer of the information within 14 days of the revocation. In essence, due to the restriction on transferal, this may result in businesses opting to delete or de-identify data upon a revocation.
Finally, the entity would have to abide by certain reporting and transparency requirements, namely a monthly public report stating how many individuals had information collected, processed or transferred, and describing the categories of the data collected, processed or transferred by the entity and why. This is akin to the California Consumer Privacy Act's treatment of categories of information, though it would require this information to be released on an ongoing, monthly basis.
WHAT DATA IS COVERED?
Notably, the Act only affects a very limited scope of data. The Act covers geolocation data (exact real-time locations), proximity data (approximated location data), and Personal Health Information (any genetic/diagnosis information that can identify someone). This could cover information like Bluetooth communication or real-time tracking based on a cell phone's geolocation features. Notably, Personal Health Information does not include any information that may be covered under HIPAA or the broader categorization of "Biometric" data (i.e. retinal scans, finger prints, etc). Furthermore, and more generally, "publicly available information" is excluded, which includes information from telephone books or online directories, the news media, "video, internet, or audio content" as well as "websites available to the general public on an unrestricted basis." The latter of which potentially would push any and all information made available through social media (i.e. Facebook or Twitter) into the definition of "publicly available information."
HOW IS IT ENFORCED?
Generally, the law would be enforced by the FTC, under the provisions regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices, similar to other enforcement actions arising out of privacy policies. Notwithstanding, state attorney generals may also bring actions to enforce compliance and obtain damages, civil penalties, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of the residents of the state.
WHAT SHOULD MY COMPANY DO?
If your entity plans on collecting information for tracking COVID-19, measuring social distancing compliance, or contact tracing, it is advisable to include language in your privacy policy now. This could be as simple as adding an additional provision within your privacy policy stating that the entity will retain information to conduct one of the three COVID-19 purposes as laid out in the statute. In addition, this also means that should the entity collect and use employee information for contact tracing, tracking the spread of COVID-19 or ensuring compliance with social distancing measures, it will need to disclose some of the specifics of that process to the employees and have them opt-in for the process. Finally, for contact tracing purposes, any individual that shares their diagnosis will have to opt-in for the entity to legally collect, process, and transfer that information to others.
While the time to reach compliance is unknown, it is more important than ever to form a compliance plan for privacy legislation if you do not already have a plan in place. If you decide to prepare with us, our firm has created a 90 day California Consumer Privacy Act compliance program (which can be expedited) where our team will collaborate with you to determine a scalable, practical, and reasonable way for you to meet your needs, and we will provide a free initial consultation. For further inquiries or questions related to COVID-19, you can consult with a Task Force attorney by emailing NDCovid19Response@ndlf.com or contacting our office directly at 949-854-7000.
Kyle Janecek is an associate in the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice, and supports the team in advising clients on cyber related matters, including policies and procedures that can protect their day-to-day operations. For more information on how Kyle can help, contact him at kyle.janecek@ndlf.com.
Jeff Dennis (CIPP/US) is the Head of the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice. Jeff works with the firm's clients on cyber-related issues, including contractual and insurance opportunities to lessen their risk. For more information on how Jeff can help, contact him at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com.
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Judge Who Oversees Mass. Asbestos Docket Takes New Role As Chief Justice of Superior Court
January 02, 2024 —
Lewis Brisbois NewsroomBoston, Mass. (December 13, 2023) - Judge Michael Ricciuti, who presides over the Massachusetts state asbestos litigation docket, has been appointed to a new role as Chief Justice of Massachusetts Superior Court, effective December 22, 2023. The appointment is expected to result in the end of his tenure overseeing the state asbestos litigation.
Judge Ricciuti was appointed by Governor Charlie Baker to the Superior Court in 2017. He has served in five counties and serves six-month rotations in the Business Litigation Session, in addition to his role overseeing the Massachusetts Asbestos Litigation docket. His current committee participation includes serving on the Superior Court Judicial Education Committee and the Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law. He also serves as a judicial mentor.
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Lewis Brisbois
No Duty to Defend Under Renter's Policy
May 03, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court agreed that the insurer had no potential liability under a policy where the insured allegedly concealed facts and made misrepresentations regarding the condition of the property it sold. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. TFG Enterprises, LLC, 2021 Neb. LEXIS 27 (Neb. Feb. 19, 2021).
TFG sold a house to Jeffrey Barkhurst. Thereafter, Barkhurst filed suit alleging that TFG failed to disclose and actively concealed several defects, including water intrusion, the presence of mold, substandard repairs and structural issues. State Farm agreed to TFG defend under a reservation of rights. State Farm then filed a declaratory judgment action to determine its obligations under the policy.
State Farm relied upon various exclusions in the rental policy issued to TFG. The exclusions provided there would be no liability coverage for "property damage to property owned by an insured"; "property damage to property rented to, occupied or used by or in the care of the insured"; or "property damage to premises the insured sells. . . if the property damage arises out of these premises."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurance Litigation Roundup: “Post No Bills!”
April 02, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA company which is in the business of posting “advertising signs on temporary construction sites on behalf of clients” was “sued for trespass, conversion, and other torts” when it entered a site to remove posters. The company sought to have its insurance carrier cover the cost of its defense but was refused. A federal court lawsuit in California against the insurer ensued. The insurer prevailed on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, and the insured appealed.
At issue: had an “occurrence” under the CGL policy taken place – that is, an “accident,” an “unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from either a known or unknown cause?” The appellate court noted that the company’s contractor “intended” to enter the work site and remove posters, which gave rise to the trespass claim. For its part, the company urged that the contractor’s actions “were based on erroneous information… [a] mistaken belief that it had the right or duty to enter the site and remove the posters….”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
EPA Can't Evade Enviro Firm's $2.7M Cleanup Site Pay Claim, US Court Says
January 25, 2021 —
Mary B. Powers - Engineering News-RecordA Richmond, Va., federal appeals court has restored an environmental consultant's legal fight for $2.7 million in federal funds to cover work at a Superfund cleanup site it managed, rejecting a lower court’s dismissal of its claim over a technicality.
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Mary B. Powers, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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