The Pandemic, Proposed Federal Privacy Regulation and the CCPA
November 02, 2020 —
Heather Whitehead - Newmeyer DillionThe U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation met recently to discuss considerations for implementing federal privacy laws. Not surprisingly, the main impetus to reevaluate a federal framework is the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic with the greatly increased reliance on online working and school arrangements, as well as the need to share personal information for contact tracing and other efforts to weaken the pandemic.
While federal regulation of personal information has been proposed in the past, there are a few key issues that still remain unresolved. One is enforcement of the regulations. The issue is whether enforcement should be handled by the Federal Trade Commission or if the establishment of a new federal authority is needed to enforce privacy requirement violations. Other key outstanding issues include pre-emption of state rights and whether any regulations should include a private right of action.
Given that the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) is the most stringent state regulation addressing data privacy in the United States, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra participated as a witness in the recent Senate Hearing. He shared his opinions as to both federal pre-emption and the need for a private right of action. He recommended that the committee preclude federal regulation from pre-empting state laws, including the CCPA. He noted that individual states are in a better position to adapt and keep up with technological innovation, and that some states have also already implemented thorough privacy protections, such as Mississippi and Washington. With respect to the private right of action, he admitted his office can only do so much to enforce these regulations amongst California’s huge population of businesses and residents. His belief is that individual consumers need the ability to pursue their own remedies in court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Heather Whitehead, Newmeyer DillionMs. Whitehead may be contacted at
heather.whitehead@ndlf.com
Agree to Use your “Professional Best"? You may Lose Insurance Coverage! (Law Note)
March 01, 2017 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaYesterday, I was part of a panel at the NC Bar Association Construction Law Winter Meeting, discussing insurance issues for design professionals.
One topic we touched on was how to avoid invalidating your insurance. As most of you know, Errors & Omissions insurance (“E&O” coverage) is meant to provide coverage for mistakes you may make in performing your professional architecture or engineering services. E&O coverage is important to protect you in the event of a lawsuit because, as you know, no set of plans is perfect (nor is perfection the standard of care).
Be careful, though. Do not promise to provide a higher standard of care than the “professional standard“.
If you are asked to sign a contract that states you will use your “professional best,” “best efforts”, “highest care” or similar, you are being asked to sign something that could cost you your E&O coverage.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Pennsylvania “occurrence”
December 30, 2013 —
Scott Patterson — CDCoverageIn Indalex Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2013 WL 6237312 (Pa. Super. 2013), insured Indalex was sued in multiple underlying actions, filed in states other than Pennsylvania, alleging that Indalex defectively designed or manufactured windows and doors resulting in leaks causing damage beyond the Indalex product, including mold, wall cracks, and personal injuries. The complaints included strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and breach of contract causes of action. After Indalex’s primary CGL policies exhausted, Indalex filed a declaratory judgment action against its umbrella insurer National Union.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Scott PattersonScott Patterson can be contacted at cdcoverage.com
Federal District Court Finds Coverage Barred Because of Lack of Allegations of Damage During the Policy Period and Because of Late Notice
December 29, 2020 —
Robert Dennison - Traub LiebermanIn American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 2020 WL 5630017 (Sept. 21, 2020), the Northern District of California of the United States District Court had occasion to consider whether allegations in an underlying complaint triggered a duty to defend and a late notice defense to coverage.
The underlying actions were a suit against the City of Walnut Creek for damages from flooding allegedly caused by the City’s failure to develop and maintain its storm drains.The City settled the cases then sued its liability insurers who issued its coverage in the period 1968 to 1986 for indemnification of the amounts spent to defend and settle the cases.The published decision involved three Travelers’ policies issued to the City between 1968 and 1976, as to which Travelers sought summary judgment as to the lack of coverage in its policies.
The district court first found that the definition of an “occurrence” in the policies, in one policy “an event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which causes injury to person or damage to property during the policy period” and in the other two “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results during the period this policy is in effect, in bodily injury or property damage,” fell within the rule of Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 645, that injury or damage during the policy period must occur in order for the policy to be triggered.The court agreed with Travelers that while there were allegations of flooding for many years, the only claims/allegations of property damage were for the period 2000 and later.Therefore the property damage coverage in the policies was never triggered.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Robert Dennison, Traub LiebermanMr. Dennison may be contacted at
rdennison@tlsslaw.com
Shifting the Risk of Delay by Having Float Go Your Way
July 05, 2021 —
Christopher J. Brasco & Matthew D. Baker - ConsensusDocsCritical path delay plays a central role in allocating responsibility for project delay. The interrelated concept of concurrency is also frequently determinative of entitlement on a range of claims including by owners for liquidated damages and by contractors for delay damages. What constitutes critical/concurrent delay, however, is hotly debated by scheduling experts. The lack of real consensus regarding how critical/concurrent delay should be determined and analyzed has created significant uncertainty in scheduling disputes. Indeed, courts have adopted differing and at times conflicting theories of concurrency that can produce divergent outcomes for the parties. In an effort to reduce uncertainty, stakeholders have increasingly adopted specialized contractual provisions and scheduling techniques which have significant implications for the evaluation of the companion concepts of criticality and concurrency. One such mechanism is float sequestration. Regardless of whether float sequestration is ultimately in the construction industry’s broader interest, stakeholders must be able to recognize its use and appreciate the implications for delay disputes on their projects.
Simply defined, float is the number of days an activity can be delayed before affecting the project’s critical path (i.e., the longest chain of activities which determines the project’s minimal duration). Typically, only delays affecting the critical path can produce concurrent delay. Consequently, the concept of float is integral to understanding and resolving issues of both criticality and concurrency.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher J. Brasco, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP and
Matthew D. Baker, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP
Mr. Brasco may be contacted at cbrasco@watttieder.com
Mr. Baker may be contacted at mbaker@watttieder.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Couple Perseveres to Build Green
August 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFMost homeowners don’t want to make their way through the mountain of paperwork required for LEED certification. But according to the Patriot News, Jens and Donna Damgaard aren’t most homeowners. The Damgaards set out to build a LEED-certified home, and struck with it to the end.
The Damgaards started out by assembling a team so there wouldn’t be any questions down the road. They also kept going green as a goal, no matter what. Don Park, their contractor, said that “it worked out well. There was never a cost issue.”
Jens Damgaas is an attorney in Harrisburg, and he put his skills as a lawyer to work in going through the paperwork, as if he were the projet’s LEED consultant. One further takeaway from the contractor, “everyone wants two-button toilets.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Electronic Signatures On Contracts: Are They Truly Compliant?
April 10, 2023 —
Rebecca S. Glos - ConsensusDocsElectronic Signatures On Contracts: Are They Truly Compliant
As companies move to work-from-home situations in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of whether electronic signatures are legally recognized becomes more relevant. For many platforms, an electronic signature merely requires logging in, clicking a button, or typing your name. This process, which replaces the mighty pen and quill, is so effortless that oftentimes an electronic signature may feel like it does not carry the same weight as a handwritten signature. Thus, the question that we should be asking ourselves is whether the law recognizes this type of signature as being valid? Additionally, if electronic signatures are, indeed, valid, are there exceptions on whether they can be used?
Difference Between “Electronic” And “Digital” Signatures
Before delving into this issue, an understanding of some related terms may be helpful. In basic terms, an electronic signature (or “e-signature”) is any signature created or captured through a computer or other electronic device. Electronic signatures can include touch-sensitive screens where you use your finger or a stylus to sign your name as you would on a paper document. Electronic signatures can also include forms where you merely type in your name and perhaps other identifying information, then check a box stating that you intend to sign the document. They cover the full range of technologies and solutions to create signatures electronically such as:
- Clicking “I Agree” on a website;
- Signing with your finger on a mobile device;
- Typing your name or PIN into an online form; or
- Using e-signature software
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Rebecca S. Glos, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Glos may be contacted at
rglos@watttieder.com
