SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Hybrid Contracts for The Sale of Goods and Services and the Predominant Factor Test

February 15, 2021 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code (also known as the UCC) applies to transactions for goods. “Goods” is defined by Article II of the UCC as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 678) and things in action.” Fla. Stat. s. 672.105(1). The UCC does NOT apply to transactions for services. Transactions for services are governed by common law. Oftentimes, transactions or contracts include BOTH goods and services. In this scenario, referred to as a hybrid contract, does the UCC or common law apply? In this scenario, courts apply the predominant factor test to determine whether the UCC or common law governs the transaction:

Whether the UCC or the common law applies to a particular hybrid contract depends on “whether the[ ] predominant factor, the [ ] thrust, the[ ] purpose [of the contract], reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).” In such instances, the determination whether the “predominant factor” in the contract is for goods or for services is a factual inquiry unless the court can determine that the contract is exclusively for goods or services as a matter of law. Allied Shelving & Equipment, Inc. v. National Deli, LLC, 154 So.3d 482, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted).

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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City Potentially Liable for Cost Overrun on Not-to-Exceed Public Works Contract

June 29, 2017 — David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLP
On a public works construction project, a contractor incurred additional costs and asserted a claim against the city. The city denied the claim because the contract had a not-to-exceed price, and the city council and mayor did not approve contract modifications to exceed that amount. City ordinances require approval for contract modifications and change orders exceeding ten percent of the original not-to-exceed amount. But the contractor argued that the ordinance did not apply because the excess costs did not result from a contract modification or change order. In addition, the contractor argued that, in refusing to approve an increase in the not-to-exceed amount, the city breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court concluded that these questions were factual issues for the jury to decide. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David R. Cook, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com

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Appropriation Bill Cuts Military Construction Spending

June 15, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The Hill reports that HR 2055, the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs (VA) and Related Agencies bill, has passed with only five votes in opposition. The bill cuts the budget for military construction spending by $2.6 billion due to anticipated base closures.



The bill includes $186 million for family housing construction by the Army, $100 million for family housing construction by the Navy and Marines, and $84 million for family construction by the Air Force, with an additional $50 million allocated for the DOD outside the military branches. By the act, these funds will remain available until September 30, 2016.



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When is Construction Put to Its “Intended Use”?

July 31, 2013 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Defining words and phrases in the law can be a tricky proposition. In everyday life one would presume to know what the phrase “intended use” would mean, but when it comes to litigation, oftentimes the definitions become much more nuanced. On March 12, 2013, in the Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., WL 950800 (D. Colo. 2013) case, Senior District Court Judge Wiley Y. Daniel denied Third-Party Defendant Canal Insurance Company’s (“Canal”) motion to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiff Hartford Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Hartford”) third-party complaint. The case arose out of a liability insurance coverage dispute related to an underlying construction defect lawsuit. In the construction defect suit, a plaintiff homeowner’s association brought a suit against a developer and a general contractor (“GC”) among others. While the underlying action was settled, a dispute remained between Bituminous Casualty Corporation, which insured the GC, and Hartford, which insured the developer. Hartford asserted third-party claims against Canal seeking a declaration of Canal’s obligations and contribution in the event Hartford owed any defense or indemnity obligations to the GC. Hartford’s claims are based on the premise that Canal owed a duty to defend and/or indemnify the GC in the underlying action. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio
Brady Iandiorio can be contacted at Iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com

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Changes to the Federal Rules – 2024

November 18, 2024 — William L. Doerler - The Subrogation Strategist
Unless Congress moves quickly, several amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence will take effect December 1, 2024. Below is a brief description of the amendments. Rules of Evidence Rule 107 is a new rule. This rule addresses illustrative aids, stating that, if such aid helps the trier of fact to understand the evidence or an argument, a party may use the aid if its utility is not substantially outweighed by the danger of, among other things, unfair prejudice. As noted under the discussion of Rule 1006, below, an illustrative aid - offered only to help the trier of fact understand the evidence - is generally not admissible into evidence. Rule 613 currently states that extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires. As amended, the court has the discretion to forego this requirement. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com

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Hawaii Federal District Court Remands Coverage Dispute

June 15, 2020 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Accepting the insured's amended complaint, the federal district court of Hawaii remanded the coverage action to state court. Hale v. Lloyd's, London, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9061 (D. Haw. Jan. 17, 2020). Hale purchased a policy for his home in Hilo, Hawaii, from Defendant Pyramid Insurance Centre. The policy was memorialized by a Lloyd's Certificate issued by Defendant Lloyd's. On September 19, 2017, Hale entered Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. Included in the bankruptcy proceeding was Hale's home and a secured home mortgage loan now owned by Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC. The Bankruptcy Court issued a discharge order on January 18, 2018. On May 9, 2018, Hale's home was destroyed, being covered with lava from the Kilauea volcano eruption. Hale filed a claim with Lloyd's based upon the loss of his home. The claim was denied. Subsequently, however, Lloyd's issued a check for the full amount of the policy. Both Hale and Specialized Loan were listed as payees on the check. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Florida trigger

May 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com

In Johnson-Graham-Malone, Inc. v. Austwood Enterprises, Inc., No. 16-2009-CA-005750-XXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Duval County, April 29, 2011), insured JGM was the general contractor for an apartment project completed in 1998. In 2007, the project owner sued JGM seeking damages for defective construction resulting in moisture penetration property damage. JGM tendered its defense to Amerisure. Amerisure denied a defense. JGM defended and settled the underlying suit and then filed suit against Amerisure seeking recovery of defense and settlement costs. The trial court granted JGM’s motion for partial summary judgment. The court first addressed Amerisure’s duty to defend. Applying Florida law, the court held that, although the underlying complaint alleged that the property damage was not discovered until after expiration of the Amerisure policies



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California Court Broadly Interprets Insurance Policy’s “Liability Arising Out of” Language

December 20, 2017 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
In McMillin Mgmt. Servs. v. Financial Pacific Ins. Co., Cal.Ct.App. (4th Dist.), Docket No. D069814 (filed 11/14/17), the California Court of Appeal held that the term “liability arising out of,” as used in an ongoing operations endorsement, does not require that the named insured’s liability arise while it is performing work on a construction project. In the McMillin case, the general contractor and developer (McMillin) contracted with various subcontractors, including a concrete subcontractor and stucco subcontractor insured by Lexington Insurance Company. Both subcontractors performed their work at the project prior to the sale of the units. The Lexington policies contained substantively identical additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to McMillin “for liability arising out of your [the named insured subcontractor’s] ongoing operations performed for [McMillin].” Several homeowners filed suit against McMillin, alleging that they had discovered various defective conditions arising out of the construction of their homes, including defects arising out of the work performed by Lexington’s insureds. Lexington argued that there was no potential for coverage in McMillin’s favor under the endorsements because there were no homeowners during the time that the subcontractors’ operations were performing work at the project (the homes closed escrow after the subcontractors had completed their work); thus, McMillin did not have any liability for property damage that took place while the subcontractors’ operations were ongoing. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rose Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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