Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default

April 22, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it. An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:

Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.

Williams Building Company, supra.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

New Hampshire’s Statute of Repose for Improvements to Real Property Does Not Apply to Product Manufacturers

April 22, 2019 — Gus Sara - The Subrogation Strategist
In United Services Automobile Association v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, No. 218 2017 CV 01113, [1] the Superior Court of Rockingham County, New Hampshire recently considered whether the eight-year statute of repose for improvements to real property applied to the manufacturer of a ceiling ventilation fan that was installed in the property during its original construction. The court held that New Hampshire’s statute of repose did not apply to the manufacturer because it was not involved in incorporating its product into the property. In 2012, Chad St. Francis purchased a home in Northwood, New Hampshire. The home was originally constructed in 2008, at which time a Broan-Nutone ceiling ventilation fan was installed in the first-floor bathroom. In 2016, a fire occurred at the home. United Services Automobile Association (USAA) provided property casualty insurance for the home and paid Mr. St. Francis for the damage. In 2017, USAA filed a subrogation lawsuit against Broan-Nutone, alleging that its ceiling fan caused the fire due to a design defect within the product. Broan-Nutone filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that USAA’s action was barred by New Hampshire’s statute of repose for improvements to real property. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Gus Sara, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Sara may be contacted at sarag@whiteandwilliams.com

Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL

May 10, 2012 — CDJ STAFF

The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”

The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”

In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”

The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”

Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”

The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”

In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”

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OSHA Again Pushes Back Record-Keeping Rule Deadline

November 30, 2017 — Tom Ichniowski - Engineering News-Record
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration is extending again—this time, by two weeks—the compliance date for its rule requiring companies to file annual electronic reports of workplace injuries and illnesses. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tom Ichniowski, ENR
Mr. Ichniowski may be contacted at ichniowskit@enr.com

Insured's Lack of Knowledge of Tenant's Growing Marijuana Means Coverage Afforded for Fire Loss

August 17, 2020 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the insurer regarding a claim for fire loss. Mosley v. Pacific Sec. Ins, Co., 2020 Cal. App LEXIS (Cal. Ct. App, May 26, 2020). The Mosleys rented their property to Pedro Lopez. Six months later, the property was damaged by fire. Lopez had tapped a main power line into the attic to power his energy-intensive marijuana growing operation. The illegal power line caused the fire. Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (PSIC) insured the property under an HO-3 Standard Homeowners policy. Paragraph E of the policy provided,

The growing of plants; or
The manufacture, production, operation or processing of chemical, biological, animal or plant materials.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Governmental Immunity Waived for Independent Contractor - Lopez v. City of Grand Junction

September 17, 2018 — Frank Ingham - Colorado Construction Litigation Blog
On July 12, 2018, the Colorado Court of Appeals announced its decision in Lopez v. City of Grand Junction, 2018 WL 3384674 (Colo. App. 2018). The Court considered whether immunity is waived under Colorado’s Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”), pursuant to section C.R.S. § 24-10-106(1)(f), in situations where the public entity hired an independent contractor to perform the work. The Court held that if the public entity would have been liable under the CGIA for the conduct that caused the injury, had it performed the work itself, then it is liable for the work performed by its independent contractor. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Frank Ingham, Higgins Hopkins McClain & Roswell, LLC
Mr. Ingham may be contacted at ingham@hhmrlaw.com

Limitations on the Ability to Withdraw and De-Annex Property from a Common Interest Community

October 10, 2013 — Derek Lindenschmidt — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC.
On February 28, 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion with regard to the ability of an owner (and in this case, a real estate investment owner) to withdraw and de-annex lots from a common interest community. Specifically, in Vista Ridge Homeowners Ass’n., Inc. v. Arcadia Holdings at Vista Ridge, LLC, 300 P.3d 1004 (Colo. App. 2013), the Court denied Arcadia’s appeal of a lower Colorado District Court ruling which invalidated Arcadia’s attempt to withdraw and de-annex 70 single-family lots which it owned from the 94-lot Vista Ridge Filing No. 9. The applicable Declaration reserved the right to withdraw or de-annex any portion of the community in accordance with the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (CCIOA), and further limited such right to the extent that “no portion of the Property may be withdrawn or de-annexed after a Lot or Unit in that portion of the Property has been conveyed to an Owner other than a Declarant or a Builder.” The decision ultimately turned on the meaning of a “portion” of the property, as intended by CCIOA, and as applied to the specific language in the Vista Ridge Declaration. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Derek Lindenschmidt
Derek Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com

No Entitlement to Reimbursement of Pre-Tender Fees

April 28, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii determined that the insured was not entitled to pre-tender defense fees. The Hanover Ins. Co. v. Anova Food, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38947 (D. Haw. March 24, 2016). Anova sold and marketed fish. It was insured under policies issued by Hanover that covered claims of "personal and advertising injury." A patent infringement and false advertising case was filed against Anova in the District Court for the District of Hawaii.The underlying complaint alleged Anova falsely, misleadingly, and deceptively advertised, promoted, and sold fish. The allegations covered a period of time between 1999 and 2012, a portion of which time Anova was covered by the Hanover policies. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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