SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Reservation of Rights Letter Merely Citing Policy Provisions Inadequate

February 14, 2023 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the insurers' reservation of rights letters did not provide a basis for denial of coverage. Stoneiedge At Lake Keowee Owners Ass'n Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2022 US. App. LEXIS 34292 (4th Dist. Dec. 13, 2022). The Stoneledge AOAO sued the general contractor Marlick Home Builders, LLC and other defendants after construction of 37 units. The complaint alleged construction defects that resulted in water intrusion and other physical damage. Marlick notified its insurers, Cincinnati Insurance Company and Builders Mutual. Various reservation of rights letter were sent by the insurers. In the underlying case, a judgment was entered against Marlick totalling approximately $1.6 million. As a judgment creditor of Marlickm, Stoneledge sued Cincinnati and Builders Mutual. The district court granted Stonelege's motion for summary judgment, primarily on the ground that the insurers failed to reserve the right to contest coverage. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

---

New York Appellate Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues

November 30, 2020 — Paul A. Briganti - Complex Insurance Coverage Reporter
On October 9, 2020, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decided an appeal from a trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising out of asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 396 CA 18-02292, Mem. & Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 4th Dep’t Oct. 9, 2020). The Fourth Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that, under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit as a matter of law. The parties agreed that, because the policy language at issue required personal injury to take place “during the policy period,” “the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, ‘which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). The Fourth Department concluded that, in resolving the issue, the trial court erred by relying on inapposite decisions in other cases where: (1) the parties had stipulated or otherwise not disputed that first exposure triggered coverage[1]; or (2) the issue had not been resolved on summary judgment, but rather at trial based on expert medical evidence[2]. The Fourth Department further explained that, even if plaintiffs here had met their initial burden on summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that asbestos-related injury actually begins upon first exposure, the defendant-insurer’s opposition – which included affidavits of medical experts contradicting that evidence and averring instead that “harm occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” – raised a triable issue of fact. Id. at 4. The Fourth Department also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant-insurer was collaterally estopped on the “trigger” issue by a California appellate court’s decision in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Fourth Department reasoned that the issues litigated in the two cases were not identical because, among other things, California and New York “apply different substantive law in determining when asbestos-related injury occurs.” Carrier, Mem. & Order at 4. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Briganti may be contacted at brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com

---

Construction Upturn in Silicon Valley

August 17, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

Work resumed after nearly three years on an office tower in Santa Clara, according to the San Jose Mercury News. Work had stalled on the building due to the economy, but now the developer is planning a second five-story building on the site. Other dormant projects in the area are also getting restarted. Santa Clara County saw the addition of 1,800 construction jobs in June.



A spokesperson for the Operating Engineers Local 3 in Alameda told the paper, “two years ago we had five thousand folks on the out-of-work list. It’s now down to about 1,700.”

Read the full story…

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Temporary Obstructions Are a Permanent Problem Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

March 12, 2015 — Max W. Gavron and Keith M. Rozanski – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Boxes, ladders, furniture or other objects commonly placed in aisles, walkways or paths may not be temporary obstructions and may be actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) according to a recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc. DBA Pier 1 Imports #1132, No. 12-16857 (filed March 5, 2015). Many property and business owners have long operated under the assumption that they are not violating ADA regulations requiring minimum clear widths for accessible routes (“[t]he minimum clear width of an accessible route shall be 36 in[ches]” (28 C.F.R. pg. 36, app. A, § 4.3.3)) when they place objects that can easily be removed in aisles or pathways such as trash cans, ladders, plants, signs and the like because temporary obstructions are not considered violations of the ADA (28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b)). Reprinted courtesy of Max W. Gavron, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Keith M. Rozanski, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Gavron may be contacted at mgavron@hbblaw.com Mr. Rozanski may be contacted at krozanski@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Library to Open with Roof Defect Lawsuit Pending

December 04, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
Repairs to the Medina County District Library in Lodi, Ohio should be complete next spring. The library’s lawsuit over the roof is just beginning. The library building was a $3 million project in 2005, but the building had to close in 2011 when it was determined that the roof was not structurally sound. The lawsuit names six defendants, including the contractor, the framing subcontractor, and the engineering firm. The library seeking damages, legal expenses, and attorney fees. The cost of replacing the roof was $1.5 million. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Loss of Use From Allegedly Improper Drainage System Triggers Defense Under CGL Policy

February 28, 2018 — Katherine E. Miller and Michael S. Levine – Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
The Eleventh Circuit, in Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Adams Homes of Northwest Florida, Inc., No. 17-12660, 2018 WL 834896, at * 3-4 (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2018) (per curiam), recently held under Florida law that a homebuilder’s alleged failure to implement a proper drainage system that allowed for neighborhood flooding triggered a general liability insurer’s duty to defend because the allegations involved a potentially covered loss of use of covered property. Reprinted courtesy of Katherine E. Miller, Hunton & Williams and Michael S. Levine, Hunton & Williams Ms. Miller may be contacted at kmiller@hunton.com Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@hunton.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Arkansas: Avoiding the "Made Whole" Doctrine Through Dépeçage

April 09, 2014 — Robert M. Caplan – White and Williams LLP
In Arkansas, a workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogated recovery is subject to a determination of whether the injured worker—or, as the case may be, the worker’s surviving beneficiaries—has been “made whole” by the worker’s recovery against the third party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Yancey v. B & B Supply, 213 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Ark. App. 2005) (“An insured’s right to be made whole takes precedence over an insurer’s right to subrogation, and an insured must be fully compensated before the insurer's right to subrogation arises.”) [1] More often than not, a “made whole” determination will completely eradicate the carrier’s lien. But under the right circumstances, a workers’ compensation carrier may be able to avoid the harsh outcome of “made whole” by intervening in a pending third party action and subsequently filing a motion for dépeçage—i.e., the conflict of laws principle requiring the court to conduct a separate choice of law analysis for discrete issues in a given case. A motion for dépeçage, in this sense, would demand that the court conduct a choice of law analysis to determine what state’s workers’ compensation subrogation law will apply on reimbursing a carrier’s lien. We recently exploited this often underutilized tactic—to avoid Arkansas’ made whole doctrine—in a case involving a fatal plane crash in Louisiana. In that case, the deceased worker and his beneficiaries were residents of Louisiana; the accident took place in Louisiana; the worker was officially employed in Louisiana; and the workers’ compensation insurance policy was governed by, and benefits were paid under, Louisiana law. The only “contact” with Arkansas [2], meanwhile, was that Arkansas was the defendant’s domicile. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Robert M. Caplan, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Caplan may be contacted at caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com

---

The End of Eroding Limits Policies in Nevada is Just the Beginning

August 28, 2023 — Payne & Fears LLP
On June 3, 2023, Nevada Gov. Joe Lombardo signed into law AB 398 (the Act) which modifies the Nevada insurance code by restricting the types of liability policies that can be offered in the state. The End of Eroding Limits Policies in Nevada First, the Act prohibits liability insurers from issuing “eroding limits” or “burning limits” policies. These are insurance policies under which defense costs decrease policy limits. Most professional liability policies are eroding limits policies. As of Oct. 1, 2023, insurers in Nevada may no longer issue or renew any policy where policy limits are eroded by defense costs. This change may result in higher premiums on these types of policies to compensate for the higher payouts they will now have to provide in Nevada. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Payne & Fears LLP

---