Guarantor’s Liability on Partially Secured Debts – The Impacts of Pay Down Provisions in Serpanok Construction Inc. v. Point Ruston, LLC et al.
October 24, 2021 —
Margarita Kutsin - Ahlers Cressman & SleightIn
Serpanok Construction, Inc. v. Point Ruston, LLC, Division Two of the Washington Court of Appeals decided an issue of first impression in Washington—whether a guarantor of a partially secured debt remains liable until the last dollar of the entire debt is paid off. After examining cases from other jurisdictions, the court held that that a guarantor is liable until the underlying debt is paid in full unless the agreement contains an express pay down provision. A pay down provision sets forth the guarantor’s right to reduce its obligation to the extent of any payment toward the debt, and it establishes that the guaranty applies only until an amount equivalent to the guaranteed amount is paid off.
The Serpanok decision addressed several other issues, but the published portion of this part-published case focused on whether an entity involved in a real estate development, Point Ruston LLC, was discharged from its guaranty obligation following a foreclosure sale where the proceeds did not cover the entire debt owed to a subcontractor. Point Ruston LLC, Point Ruston Phase II LLC (“Phase II”), and Century Condominiums (“Century”) were affiliated entities (collectively “Point Ruston parties”) that constructed retail and residential structures on a site in Point Ruston. Serpanok Construction Inc. (“Serpanok”) entered into subcontract agreements with Phase II and Century to perform concrete and steel work on a parking garage and movie theater for the project. Point Ruston LLC was not a party to either subcontract.
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Margarita Kutsin, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMs. Kutsin may be contacted at
margarita.kutsin@acslawyers.com
Serving Notice of Nonpayment Under Miller Act
January 20, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesUnder the federal Miller Act, if a claimant is NOT in privity with the prime contractor, it needs to serve a “notice of nonpayment” within 90 days of its final furnishing. In this manner, 40 U.S.C. 3133 (b)(2) states:
A person having a direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relationship, express or implied, with the contractor furnishing the payment bond may bring a civil action on the payment bond on giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the person did or performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the material for which the claim is made. The action must state with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the material was furnished or supplied or for whom the labor was done or performed. The notice shall be served–
(A) by any means that provides written, third-party verification of delivery to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or conducts business or at the contractor’s residence; or
(B) in any manner in which the United States marshal of the district in which the public improvement is situated by law may serve summons.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Construction Down in Twin Cities Area
October 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFAlthough the year has been better for the Minneapolis/St. Paul area, with a 9% increase since last year, this September saw 25% less construction spending than last September. Non-residential construction dropped even further, losing 36%.
Although September was a bad month, the year-to-date value of construction contracts is about $3.3 billion, exceeding last year’s $3.0 billion for the region.
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Sanctions of $1.6 Million Plus Imposed on Contractor for Fabricating Evidence
March 16, 2017 —
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.King County Superior Court issued sanctions of $1,641,721 in favor of Gefco and against Cascade Drilling, Inc. and its President, Bruce Niermeyer, composed of $1,394,435 in attorneys’ fees and $247,286 in expert fees. [i]
Cascade Drilling is a contractor. Gefco manufactures and sells large drilling machinery. The dispute centered around a project that began in 2008. Cascade was hired to drill a water well at a housing development in Wheeler Canyon, California. Cascade used a 50K drilling rig purchased from Gefco. The pump drive shafts on the drilling rig failed four times. After each failure, Cascade ordered a replacement pump drive shaft from Gefco.
In September 2008, Cascade ordered drilling equipment for an unrelated drilling rig from Gefco, but did not pay Gefco. Gefco then sued to collect. Cascade admitted not paying, but asserted counterclaims alleging that Gefco was indebted to Cascade for non-conforming and defective goods, including the replacement pump drive shafts purchased from Gefco for the Wheeler Canyon project.
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Paul R. Cressman, Jr., Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Cressman may be contacted at
pcressman@ah-lawyers.com
Expansion of Statutes of Limitations and Repose in K-12 and Municipal Construction Contracts
March 27, 2019 —
Henry Bangert - Colorado Construction LitigationThe purpose of this whitepaper is to bring attention to a trend in K-12 and municipal construction contracts, which expands the time periods for law suits against construction professionals.
Introduction and Background
Under Colorado statute, the period of time within which a legal action for construction defects may be brought against a construction professional in Colorado is two years from when the claimant (or its predecessor in interest) discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the physical manifestations of a defect (the “Statute of Limitations”), but in no case may an action be brought more than six years after substantial completion of the improvement, unless the claim arises in the fifth or sixth year after substantial completion, in which event the action may be brought within two years of such date, i.e., up to eight years after substantial completion (the “Statute of Repose”). See C.R.S. § 13-80-104. While the triggering events differ for the Statute of Limitations and Statue of Repose, the periods are intended to run concurrently to limit the period of time an action may be brought against construction professionals for construction defects to, at most, eight years after substantial completion. Importantly, these limitations periods may be expanded by agreement.
Prior to 1986, Colorado law provided for a 10-year Statute of Repose. However, in 1986, Colorado’s legislature shortened the Statute of Repose time limit to the current six (or up to eight) year period. In 1986, Colorado also redefined the date the claim arises from the date the defect was discovered or should have been discovered to the date the physical manifestation of a defect was discovered or should have been discovered. Therefore, after 1986, the two-year limitations period could begin to run when a claimant should have discovered the manifestation of a defect, even if the claimant did not recognize that a defect existed.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Proposition 65: OEHHA to Consider Adding and Delisting Certain Chemicals of Concern
September 03, 2015 —
Lee Marshall & Jeffrey A. Vinnick – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThe Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (“OEHHA”), which is responsible for determining the chemicals that are included on its list of chemicals known to be carcinogenic or to cause reproductive harm, thereby requiring businesses to comply with the rules accorded under California’s Proposition 65, has announced the beginning of a 45-day public comment period on five chemicals:
- Nickel
- Pentachlorophenol
- Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA)
- Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)
- Tetrachloroethylene
Reprinted courtesy of Lee Marshall, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Jeffrey A. Vinnick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Marshall may be contacted at lmarshall@hbblaw.com
Mr. Vinnick may be contacted at jvinnick@hbblaw.com
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Don’t Conspire to Build a Home…Wait…What?
June 08, 2020 — Ben Volpe - Colorado Construction Litigation Blog
In 1986, the Colorado General Assembly enacted the Pro Rata Liability Act, codified at C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5, which eliminated joint and several liability for defendants in favor of pro rata liability.[1] The statute was “designed to avoid holding defendants liable for an amount of compensatory damages reflecting more than their respective degrees of fault.”[2] However, the following year, the Colorado legislature carved out an exception to preserve joint liability for persons “who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.”[3] Because of this conspiracy exception, plaintiffs try to circumvent the general rule against joint and several liability by arguing that construction professionals defending construction defect cases were acting in concert, as co-conspirators. Plaintiffs argue that if they can prove that two or more construction professionals consciously conspired and deliberately pursued a common plan or design, i.e., to build a home or residential community, and such a plan results in the commission of a tort, i.e., negligence, the defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for all of the damages awarded.
Since 1986, Colorado courts have construed the “conspiracy” provision in § 13-21-111.5(4), but some have disagreed as to what constitutes a conspiracy for purposes of imposing joint liability.
Civil Conspiracy
In Colorado, the elements of civil conspiracy are that: “(1) two or more persons; (2) come to a meeting of the minds; (3) on an object to be accomplished or a course of action to be followed; (4) and one or more overt unlawful acts are performed; (5) with damages as the proximate result thereof.”[4] Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Benjamin Volpe, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Mr. Volpe may be contacted at volpe@hhmrlaw.com
Is the Event You Are Claiming as Unforeseeable Delay Really Unforeseeable?
September 26, 2022 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Is the item or event you are claiming as an unforeseeable, excusable delay really unforeseeable? This is not a trick question.
Just because your construction contract identifies items or events that constitute unforeseeable, excusable delay does not mean those items can be used as a blanket excuse or crutch for the contractor. That would be unfair.
For instance, it is not uncommon for a construction contract to list as unforeseeable, excusable delay the following events or items: “(i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) act of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers.” See, e.g., F.A.R. 52.249-10(b)(1). While the itemization of excusable delay may be worded differently, the point is there may be a listing as to what items or events constitute excusable delay. An excusable delay would justify additional time and, potentially, compensation to the contractor. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com
