Signs of a Slowdown in Luxury Condos
January 28, 2015 —
Prashant Gopal, Oshrat Carmiel and John Gittelsohn – BloombergManhattan real estate agent Lisa Gustin listed a four-bedroom Tribeca loft for $7.45 million in October, expecting a quick sale. Instead, she cut the price by $550,000 in January. “I thought for sure a foreign buyer would come in,” says Gustin, a broker at Brown Harris Stevens who is still marketing the 3,800-square-foot apartment. “So many new condos are coming up right now. They’ve been building them for the past few years, and now they’re really hurting the resales.”
New high-priced condominiums and mansions are hitting the market in New York, Miami, and Los Angeles just as international buyers, who helped fuel luxury demand in the three cities, are seeing their purchasing power wane with the strengthening dollar. Signs of a pullback may already be showing in Manhattan, where luxury-home sales have slowed amid a boom in the construction of towers aimed at U.S. millionaires and foreign investors. Sales of homes costing more than $2 million in the New York area rose 10 percent last year, compared with a 27 percent jump in 2013, according to CoreLogic DataQuick.
Reprinted courtesy of Bloomberg reporters
Prashant Gopal,
Oshrat Carmiel and
John Gittelsohn
Mr. Gittlesohn may be contacted at johngitt@bloomberg.net; Ms. Carmiel may be contacted at ocarmiel1@bloomberg.net; Mr. Gopal may be contacted at pgopal2@bloomberg.net
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CA Supreme Court Permits Insurers to Bring Direct Actions Seeking Reimbursement of Excessive Fees Against Cumis Counsel Under Limited Circumstances
August 19, 2015 —
David W. Evans & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThe California Supreme Court held in Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (Squire Sanders) (8/10/2015 - #S211645) that if Cumis counsel, operating under a court order which such counsel drafted and which expressly provided that the insurer would be able to recover excessive fees, sought and received fee payments from the insurer that were fraudulent or otherwise manifestly and objectively useless and wasteful when incurred, Cumis counsel have been unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense and the insurer will be permitted under such limited circumstances to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel.
Certain Hartford insureds who had been issued commercial general liability policies were sued in multiple proceedings for a variety of claims, including unfair competition, defamation and intentional misrepresentation. Hartford disclaimed a duty to defend or to indemnify the defendants on the grounds that the acts complained of occurred prior to Hartford’s policy, and that some of the defendants were not Hartford insureds. A coverage action was filed by some of the insureds against Hartford; they were represented by the Squire Sanders law firm. Although Hartford subsequently agreed to defend several of the defendants subject to a reservation of rights, it declined to pay defense expenses incurred prior to the date of such agreement. Some months later, the trial court entered a summary adjudication order, finding that Hartford had a duty to have defended the liability action on the date it was originally tendered; the order required Hartford to fund the insured’s defense with independent counsel (i.e., so-called “Cumis” counsel; see San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358). The insureds retained Squire Sanders as their Cumis counsel.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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New Florida Bill Shortens Time for Construction-Defect Lawsuits
September 06, 2023 —
Jessica Zelitt - Construction ExecutiveOn April 13, 2023, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis signed Senate Bill 360 into law. This legislation alters the time period for bringing forward construction-defect lawsuits, as well as modifies the current private right of action against a contractor for violation of the Florida Building Code.
First, SB 360 amends § 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, to reduce the statute of repose from 10 years to seven years for actions founded on latent construction defects. The legislation also changes the manner in which this time period is calculated under both the seven-year statute of repose and the four-year statute of limitations for construction-defect cases.
Under the prior statute, the time to commence an action began with the later of (i) the date of actual possession by the owner, (ii) the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy (CO), (iii) the date of abandonment of construction if not completed or (iv) the date of completion or termination of the contract.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jessica Zelitt, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Ms. Zelitt may be contacted at
jessica.zelitt@arlaw.com
Noncumulation Clause Limits Coverage to One Occurrence
January 07, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiInjury suffered by children of different families living at different times in the same apartment was limited to one occurrence under the policy's noncumulation clause. Nesmith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2014 N.Y. LEXIS 3350 (N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014).
The landlord had a liability policy issued by Allstate. The declarations page stated there was a $500,000 limit for "each occurrence." The policy contained the following noncumulation clause:
Regardless of the number of insured persons, injured persons, claims, claimants or policies involved, our total liability . . . for damages resulting from one accidental loss will not exceed the limit shown on the declarations page. All bodily injury . . . resulting from one accidental loss or from continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions is considered the result of one accidental loss.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Tacoma Construction Site Uncovers Gravestones
August 11, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Seattle Times reports that a transit construction project has uncovered about twenty-five gravestones. The area was historically sensitive, as it is in territory once occupied by the Puyallup Tribe. At current report, no human remains have been found and the article cites the project?s archeological consultant as describing the gravestones as “not historically significant.”
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New York Court Discusses Evidentiary Standards for Policy Rescission Based on Material Misrepresentation
August 10, 2020 —
Robert S. Nobel - Traub LiebermanOn July 27, 2020, in the case of Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. AKI Renovations Group, Inc., (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2020), Index No. 159421/2017 (unpublished), the trial court issued an Order granting summary judgment permitting rescission of a CGL policy based upon material misrepresentations in a policy application. The insured submitted an application in which it failed to disclose its demolition operations despite specific questions seeking this information. Mt. Hawley issued a primary and excess policy for the period of December 29, 2016 to December 29, 2017 (collectively, the policy).
Subsequently, the insured sought coverage for a claim in which it was alleged that the insured was acting as a general contractor for demolition of a three-story building when the plaintiff was injured. The insurer advised the defendants that it was rescinding the policy ab initio, and also returned defendants’ premium in its entirety. The insurer asserted that it would not have issued the policy had defendants disclosed their demolition operations, then filed the coverage action seeking a judicial declaration ratifying its rescission of the policy.
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Robert S. Nobel, Traub LiebermanMr. Nobel may be contacted at
rnobel@tlsslaw.com
Pa. Contractor Pleads No Contest to Prevailing-Wage Charges, Pays Workers $20.7M
September 20, 2021 —
Tom Ichniowski - Engineering News-RecordPennsylvania construction contractor Glenn O. Hawbaker Inc. has pleaded no contest to counts of theft of worker pay—in alleged violation of state prevailing-wage laws—and will pay 1,267 workers restitution of $20.7 million in unpaid wages, Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro said.
The company entered its plea to four felony counts of “theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received” on Aug. 3 before President Judge Pamela A. Ruest of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas in Bellefonte, Pa.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tom Ichniowski, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Ichniowski may be contacted at ichniowskit@enr.com
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Hybrid Contracts for The Sale of Goods and Services and the Predominant Factor Test
February 15, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida’s Uniform Commercial Code (also known as the UCC) applies to transactions for goods. “Goods” is defined by Article II of the UCC as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 678) and things in action.” Fla. Stat. s. 672.105(1).
The UCC does NOT apply to transactions for services. Transactions for services are governed by common law.
Oftentimes, transactions or contracts include BOTH goods and services. In this scenario, referred to as a hybrid contract, does the UCC or common law apply? In this scenario, courts apply the predominant factor test to determine whether the UCC or common law governs the transaction:
Whether the UCC or the common law applies to a particular hybrid contract depends on “whether the[ ] predominant factor, the [ ] thrust, the[ ] purpose [of the contract], reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).” In such instances, the determination whether the “predominant factor” in the contract is for goods or for services is a factual inquiry unless the court can determine that the contract is exclusively for goods or services as a matter of law.
Allied Shelving & Equipment, Inc. v. National Deli, LLC, 154 So.3d 482, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com