Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Do We Really Want Courts Deciding if Our Construction Contracts are Fair?
March 19, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAs I posted recently, the Virginia General Assembly has passed, and I can see no reason why the governor won’t sign, a bill that would
essentially invalidate preemptive contractual waivers of lien rights as they relate to subcontractors and material suppliers. It does not apply to General Contractors, but it is a step in what many (including those attorneys that represent subcontractors and suppliers) believe is the right direction.
Of course, as soon as I posted last week, my friend and colleague
Scott Wolfe (@scottwolfejr) commented on that post and then
gave his two cents worth at his Zlien blog. The gist of the comments here at Musings and the post over at his blog was essentially that these contractual provisions were inherently unfair and therefore should be abolished because of both a relative disparity in leverage between the Owner or GC and the Subcontractor when it comes to negotiations and the fact that subcontractors often don’t read their contracts or
discuss them with a construction attorney prior to signing them. I hear this first of his arguments often when I am reviewing a contract after the fact and a client or potential client acts surprised that a provision will be enforced and the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia will actually enforce them. As to Scott’s second reason, I have always warned here at Musings that
you should read your contracts carefully because they will be the law of your business relationship in the future.
The first of his two points is more interesting and in some ways more easily supported. However, where we are speaking of contracts between businesses where both sides are bound by the terms of the contract, it begs the question of whether in seeking to make contracts more “fair” we could add a layer of uncertainty that could cause more problems than it solves. Do we really want courts stepping in after the fact to renegotiate the terms of a deal that was struck months or possibly years before because one judge believes that the deal was too one sided? Do we really need such “Monday morning quarterbacking?” Is one person’s idea of “fair” better than another’s when both parties to the contract had the full ability to read, negotiate and possibly reject the deal long ago? Personally, I think that the answer to these questions is, in all but the most egregious cases or where the legislatures have stepped in adding certainty (whether to the good or bad), “No.”
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Construction Law Client Advisory: What The Recent Beacon Decision Means For Developers And General Contractors
August 20, 2014 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic and Whitney L. Stefko - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPOn July 3, 2014, the California Supreme Court (the “Court”) came out with its decision in Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al. The Beacon decision settled a long-standing dispute in California about whether design professionals such as architects and engineers owe a duty to non-client third parties. In finding that the plaintiffs in Beacon could state a claim against the architects of the Beacon project, the Court also sowed the seeds of change in the way contracts are structured between developers, architects, engineers, and even general contractors.
So, how will Beacon change the landscape for developers and general contractors? It is important to understand the factual background in Beacon to predict how the decision may alter the playing field. For a detailed analysis of the Amicus briefs in the Beacon matter from the AIA, the CBIA, and the Consumer Attorneys of California, please click here.
The Beacon case arose from a common development model in California: a developer conceives a multi-unit project, maps the project as a condo development but rents as apartments. Shortly after completion of the Beacon project, the developer sold the entire project and the new owner finalized the existing condominium map and placed the units on the market as condominiums. Although the architects always knew they had designed a residential structure, the project ultimately became a condominium development. The newly formed homeowners’ association filed a construction defect suit against the developers, general contractor, the subcontractors and the architects for design and construction defects.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Whitney L. Stefko, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com; Ms. Stefko may be contacted at wstefko@hbblaw.com
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Ohio Court Finds No Coverage for Construction Defect Claims
March 28, 2012 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiCharles and Valerie Myers hired Perry Miller to build their home. Myers v. United Ohio Ins. Co., 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 287 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012). After completion of the home, Miller was again hired to construct an addition which included a full basement, staircases, bathroom, bedroom, hallway and garage.
After the addition was completed, one of the basement walls began to crack and bow. Miller began to make repairs, but eventually stopped working on the project. Other contractors were hired to make repairs, but further problems developed. A second basement wall began to bow and crack, allowing water into the basement. The wall eventually had to be replaced. Subsequently, the roof over the addition began to leak in five or six places before the drywall could be painted. The leaks caused water stains on the drywall and caused it to separate and tear. It was discovered the roof needed to be replaced.
The Myers sued Miller and his insurer, United Ohio Insurance Company. The trial court ruled that the policy did not provide coverage for faulty workmanship, but did provide coverage for consequential damages caused by repeated exposure to the elements. United Ohio conceded liability in the amount of $2,000 to repair water damage to the drywall. United Ohio was also found liable for $51,576, which included $31,000 to repair the roof and ceiling and $18,576 to replace the basement wall.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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With Wildfires at a Peak, “Firetech” Is Joining Smart City Lineups
October 21, 2024 —
James P. Bobotek - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe
threat of extreme wildfires has doubled in the past 20 years, with almost 20,000 fires blazing across the United States in 2024 alone. These high-intensity fires can be deadly, expensive, and create lingering health and environmental consequences. While we are used to seeing firefighters on the frontlines, researchers hope that next-generation smart technology, augmented by artificial intelligence (AI), will also play a key role in battling these conflagrations. Many municipalities, particularly those near wildfire-prone forests, are beginning to incorporate fire-focused advances (or “firetech”) into their smart city ecosystems.
“Smart cities” are urban centers enhanced by utilities, emergency services,
traffic signals and more that are linked through information and communications technology. Though the concept can spark cybersecurity-related concerns, many locales are gradually implementing many different kinds of smart tech. Following the 2023 wildfire that devastated Maui, for example, Hawaii installed a network of
cloud-based fire and wind sensors that use AI to detect wildfires in real time. Smart tools like these can aid in predicting and discovering fires, streamlining emergency alert protocols, calculating vital analytics and improving firefighter safety. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is
actively studying these innovations, particularly in terms of environmental (smart buildings or robotics), operational (communications) and personnel (PPE sensors or biometrics). Below are a few of the key technologies to watch in this emerging field:
- Smart Sensors. A total of 80 sensors (64 wildfire sensors and 16 wind sensors) were placed throughout Hawaii starting in March of 2024. Attached to existing utility poles, they detect heat in the air, and then engage AI and smart learning to distinguish smoke particles and gases produced by fires from those commonly found in Hawaii’s atmosphere—such as volcanic ash and ocean salt. Positioned in “strings,” the sensors “talk” to each other and send text messages to officials when they find a problem.
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James P. Bobotek, PillsburyMr. Bobotek may be contacted at
james.bobotek@pillsburylaw.com
Contractors Admit Involvement in Kickbacks
December 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFTwo New Jersey contractors have pleaded guilty to charges that they made false representations for a government contract in a case related to kickbacks for construction work done in two school districts. New Jersey is recommending that the two men, Martin Starr and Stephen Gallagher, will each pay $50,000 in penalties, serve up to a year in jail, and be unable to accept public contracts for five years.
Last month, another individual in the case, Kenneth Disko, who had been the engineer for the school district, pleaded guilty on a similar charge. In addition to a $50,000 penalty, he will be serving three to five years in prison. A fourth conspirator, Robert Berman, the former business administrator for one of the school districts, has to pay a $13,000 fine and cooperate with the investigation. He is also barred from public employment in New Jersey and has been terminated from his position.
Starr admitted to preparing fictitious quotes which appeared to be from other contractors in order that his firm would seem to be the lowest bidder. Gallagher helped in preparing the fictitious bids and also provided cash kickbacks to Disko.
Read the full story…
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English v. RKK. . . The Rest of the Story
December 04, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsBack in February, I discussed a case relating to indemnity and ambiguity. The opinion in that case, W.C. English, Inc. v. Rummel, Klepper & Kahl, LLP et al., allowed a breach of contract and indemnity claim to move forward despite the fact that conflicting term sheets between the plaintiff and defendant could have been read to violate Virginia law by requiring indemnity for English’s own negligence. In other words, the ambiguity worked in English’s favor (though that is not something to count on). The Court did not however address whether there was any negligence on English’s part and if there was, what was the contractual effect.
I’ll bet you were wondering what happened later in that case. Well, here’s the answer. In a subsequent opinion, the Court looked at the same ambiguous and conflicting term sheets between and among those defendants that were required to provide quality assurance services for the construction of a bridge in western Virginia. For the full procedural and factual analysis, be sure to read the full memorandum opinion linked above.
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Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Will COVID-19 Permanently Shift the Balance between Work from Home and the Workplace?
April 13, 2020 —
Adam Weaver - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogOn March 15, 2020, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued formal guidance to combat the spread of the coronavirus by recommending against gatherings of 50 or more people for the next eight weeks (CDC guidance), which includes nearly every office building in America. Thus, began the most significant work from home experiment this country has ever seen.
With the majority of the workforce working from home, many employees see this as an opportunity to finally prove that, “yes, that meeting could have been an email.” However, while workers will not be distracted by constant (and potentially unnecessary) meetings, a number of issues and questions arise with working from home.
Most importantly, is this working from home experiment a temporary opportunity for businesses to test remote work ideas or is this the new normal? And how will this affect commercial real estate moving forward?
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Adam Weaver, PillsburyMr. Weaver may be contacted at
adam.weaver@pillsburylaw.com
