US Proposes Energy Efficiency Standards for Federal Buildings
January 04, 2023 —
James Leggate - Engineering News-RecordThe U.S. government is looking to its own buildings as a source for cutting carbon emissions with a new energy and climate performance standard. Additionally, federal officials announced a proposed rule that would eliminate energy-related emissions from new and renovated federal buildings.
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James Leggate, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com
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What is a Subordination Agreement?
May 06, 2019 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPPut simply, a subordination agreement is a legal agreement which establishes one debt as ranking behind another debt in the priority for collecting repayment from a debtor. It is an arrangement that alters the lien position. Without a subordination clause, loans take chronological priority which means that a deed of trust recorded first will be considered senior to all deeds of trusts recorded after. As such, the oldest loan becomes the primary loan, with first call on any proceeds from a sale of a property. However, a subordination agreement acknowledges that one party’s claim or interest is inferior to that of another party in the event that the borrowing entity liquidates its assets. Further, shareholders are subordinate to all creditors.
The junior debt is referred to as a “subordinated debt”, and the debt which has a higher claim to any assets is the senior debt. Often, the borrower does not have enough funds to pay all debts, and lower priority debts may receive little or no repayment. For example, if a business has $400,000 in senior debt, $100,000 in subordinated debt, and a total asset value of $420,000, upon liquidation of the company, only the senior debtholder will be paid in full. The remaining $20,000 will be distributed among the subordinated debtholders. Subordinated debts are, therefore, riskier and lenders will require a higher interest rate as compensation.
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Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Restaurant Wants SCOTUS to Dust Off Eleventh Circuit’s “Physical Loss” Ruling
February 01, 2021 —
Michael S. Levine & Geoffrey B. Fehling - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogA South Florida restaurant has asked the US Supreme Court to overturn a federal district court’s ruling that the restaurant is not entitled to coverage under an “all risk” commercial property insurance policy for lost income and extra expenses resulting from nearby road construction. In the underlying coverage action, the policyholder, Mama Jo’s (operating as Berries in the Grove), sought coverage under its all-risk policy for business income losses and expenses caused by construction dust and debris that migrated into the restaurant. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari, the case will be closely watched by insurers and policyholders alike as an indicator of the scope of coverage available under all-risk policies and whether the principles pertinent to construction dust and debris (at issue in Mama Jo’s claim) have any application to the thousands of pending claims for COVID-19-related business interruption losses pending in the state and federal court systems.
As previously discussed on this blog, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision deviates from Florida precedent on the issue of “direct physical loss” and even its own understanding of that term as described in the August 18, 2020 decision now at issue before the Supreme Court. Mama Jo’s points to this in its petition along with several other errors arguing, for example, that the appellate court’s ruling renders entire areas of coverage nonexistent by requiring “tangible destruction” of property under all-risk policies that expressly afford coverage for types of clean-up costs required to remove debris from covered property.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com
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“Based On”… What Exactly? NJ Appellate Division Examines Phrase and Estops Insurer From Disclaiming Coverage for 20-Month Delay
August 20, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPOn May 28, 2019, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division examined the phrase “based on” in an assault-and-battery exclusion, finding that the phrase means “to make, form, or serve as the foundation of any claim, demand or suit.” C.M.S. Investment Ventures, Inc. v. American European Insurance Company, No. A-2056-17T3, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1215, at *8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 28, 2019) (CMS). The CMS case is also notable because the Appellate Division held that a 20-month delay in disclaiming coverage was unreasonable and therefore warranted estoppel.
In CMS, the insured was allegedly warned by its tenant about a faulty ground-floor window that failed to lock properly. Afterward, an intruder broke into the tenant’s apartment and sexually assaulted the tenant, who sued the insured on a premises liability claim. Before she filed suit, the tenant sought payment from the insured’s CGL insurer directly. The insurer denied coverage based on the assault-and-battery exclusion and closed the file, but never informed the insured. Later, the tenant sued the insured, which sought a defense and indemnity from its insurer, which again denied coverage based on the exclusion. The insured then sought a declaration of coverage on grounds that the exclusion was ambiguous, and the insurer “was estopped from denying coverage, because it waited [20] months to inform CMS of its coverage decision.” The trial court ruled in the insured’s favor which led to the appeal in CMS.
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Carroll, White and Williams LLP and
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
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Attorney-Client Privilege in the Age of Cyber Breaches
October 18, 2021 —
Shaia Araghi - Newmeyer DillionInvestigations and forensic reports relating to a cybersecurity breach may not always be protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product protection. Companies seeking such reports after a data breach must take caution to protect them from a possible waiver of privilege in the event of subsequent litigation relating to a data breach. The following recent cases highlight the potential waiver of privilege in light of the preparation of a forensic report.
- In re Capital One Consumer Data Security Breach Litigation, 2020 WL 3470261 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2020)
- After a data breach occurred, Capital One retained a law firm that later entered into an agreement with Mandiant for various cyber-related services (including incident remediation), which required that Mandiant provide deliverables to the firm, rather than to Capitol One. In re Capital One Consumer Data Security Breach Litigation, 2020 WL 2731238, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2020). Plaintiffs sought release of the report created by Mandiant (regarding the factors leading to the breach), arguing that it was prepared for business and regulatory purposes and therefore was not privileged, while Capital One argued that the report was privileged because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation. Ibid. The Court determined that Capital One did not carry its burden of establishing that the report was protected by the attorney work-product doctrine and ordered that Capital One produce the report. Id. at *7. In its reasoning, the Court stated that the fact that there is litigation does not, by itself, provide prepared materials with work-product protection. Ibid. The work-product protection applies when a party faces a claim following an event that may result in litigation, and the work product would not have been prepared in a substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation. Ibid.
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Shaia Araghi, Newmeyer DillionMs. Araghi may be contacted at
shaia.araghi@ndlf.com
DEP Plan to Deal with Noxious Landfill Fumes Met with Criticism
March 19, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFResidents of Roxbury, New Jersey have dealt with hydrogen sulfide fumes coming from the Fenimore landfill, which gives off a rotten-egg smell and many say have “made them or their children sick,” according to New Jersey Online. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) announced their plan to fix the situation, which is to “first dig more wells at Fenimore, to help feed noxious gasses into the oxidizer and scrubber system the agency has credited with radically reducing smells over the last several months.”
But no one seems to be satisfied with the plan, according to New Jersey Online: “Not state Sen. Anthony R. Bucco, who authored a bill to enable a state takeover of the site last year. Not the Roxbury Township Council. Not the activist group created to respond to Fenimore issues. Not one of the state's most vocal environmental organizations. And not the site's owner, who has been in multi-pronged litigation with the state for months.”
Roxbury’s mayor, Jim Rilee, stated, “The council and I will continue to demand that the DEP show us compelling data that supports its conclusions and that its plan is based only on what is best for Township residents," as quoted by New Jersey Online.
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In Florida, Exculpatory Clauses Do Not Need Express Language Referring to the Exculpated Party's Negligence
October 02, 2015 —
Edward Jaeger & William Doerler – White and Williams LLPIn Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256 (Fla. 2015), the Supreme Court of Florida considered whether a party to a contract, in order to be released from liability for its own negligence, needs to include an express reference to negligence in an exculpatory clause. The court held that, unlike an indemnification clause, so long as the language in an exculpatory clause is clear, the absence of the terms “negligence” or “negligent acts” in an exculpatory clause does not, for that reason alone, render the exculpatory clause ineffective.
Background
Give Kids the World, Inc. (“GKW”) is a non-profit organization that provides free vacations to seriously ill children and their families at GKW’s resort village. To use the resort, vacationers have to fill out an application. Stacy and Eric Sanislo filled out an application to bring their seriously ill child to the village for a vacation and GKW accepted their application. Upon arriving at the resort, the Sanislos filled out a liability release form.
Reprinted courtesy of
Edward Jaeger, White and Williams LLP and
William Doerler, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Jaeger may be contacted at jaegere@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
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The Privacy Shield Is Gone: How Do I Now Move Data from the EU to the US
February 08, 2021 —
Heather Whitehead - Newmeyer DillionFollowing the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) in case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (known as “Schrems II”), companies in the United States can no longer rely on the Privacy Shield, the framework developed by the US Department of Commerce, and the European Commission and Swiss Administration to promote transatlantic commerce while protecting personal data.
Schrems II Invalidated the Privacy Shield and Creates Uncertainty
Schrems II concluded that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework is no longer a valid mechanism to comply with EU data protection requirements when transferring personal data from the EU to the United States. Further, in a subsequent decision, the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner concluded that the data protection of the Privacy Shield does not provide an adequate level of protection for data transfer from Switzerland to the US pursuant to their Federal Act on Data Protection.
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Heather Whitehead, Newmeyer DillionMs. Whitehead may be contacted at
heather.whitehead@ndlf.com