Loss of Use From Allegedly Improper Drainage System Triggers Defense Under CGL Policy
February 28, 2018 —
Katherine E. Miller and Michael S. Levine – Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogThe Eleventh Circuit, in
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Adams Homes of Northwest Florida, Inc., No. 17-12660, 2018 WL 834896, at * 3-4 (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2018) (per curiam), recently held under Florida law that a homebuilder’s alleged failure to implement a proper drainage system that allowed for neighborhood flooding triggered a general liability insurer’s duty to defend because the allegations involved a potentially covered loss of use of covered property.
Reprinted courtesy of
Katherine E. Miller, Hunton & Williams and
Michael S. Levine, Hunton & Williams
Ms. Miller may be contacted at kmiller@hunton.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@hunton.com
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Scaffolding Collapse Kills Workers at China Construction Site
November 30, 2016 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe New York Post reported that a scaffolding collapsed in Beijing, China, “sending iron pipes, steel bars and wooden planks tumbling down on about 70 workers in the country’s worst work-safety accident in over two years.” Out of seventy workers, sixty-seven are reported to have died in the accident, while two are injuried, and one worker is missing. The cause of the accident is still under investigation.
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Contractor Prevails on Summary Judgment To Establish Coverage under Subcontractor's Policy
June 07, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiWhen sued for construction defects caused by the subcontractor, the general contractor was granted summary judgment on the issue of coverage under the subcontractor's policy. Meritage Homes of Ga. v. Grange Ins. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84591 (N.D. Ga. March 23, 2021).
Meritage built a home for the owners. Easterwood Excavating, Inc. was the subcontractor for excavation and grading work. Meritage was named an additional insured under Easterwood's policy with Grange.
After construction was completed, the owners were experiencing severe flooding after rain storms purportedly due to defects in the grading, site preparation and excavation. The owners filed an arbitration against Meritage for damages. The owners alleged that Meritage improperly excavated and graded their lot, causing water to collect and pool in their yard. Meritage denied all liability and looked to Easterwood and Grange for defense and indemnification. Grange denied coverage, contending there was no occurrence which resulted in property damage. The arbitrator found that the folding of water was caused by Meritage's improper grading of the lot. A Final Award in the amount of $129,530.93 was issued against Meritage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Nevada Assembly Passes Construction Defect Bill
October 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Nevada Speaker says that AB401 gives contractors what they want, but a contractors’ group has asked a Senate committee to kill the bill. Supporters of AB 401 say that it clarifies what qualifies as a construction defect and shortens the statute of limitations.
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Contractual Assumption of Liability Does Not Bar Coverage
August 27, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the insurer's argument that coverage was barred for the insured's contractual assumption of liability of another. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am v. Peaker Serv., Inc., 2014 WL 3605680 (Mich. Ct. App. July 22, 2014).
The contractor was hired to install an "electronic over-speed system" at the University of Michigan. The hope was that the new system would prevent the steam turbines at the central power plant from turning too quickly. The parties' contract provided,
“Section 15.18. Supplier Damage to University Property. Without regard to any other section of the Agreement, Supplier shall be responsible for the costs to return to ‘as was’ condition from any damage caused to the building, grounds, or other equipment and furnishings caused in whole or part by Supplier Personnel while performing activities arising under this Agreement.”
The contractor improperly calibrated the system, causing one of the university's turbines to operate at twice the safe operational speed, causing significant damage to the generator equipment. The university sued the contractor for more than $3 million in damages. Travelers defended, but filed a declaratory judgment action, contending that coverage did not exist because the "contractual liability" exclusion applied. Section 15.18 of the contract purportedly constituted an "assumption" of the insured's own liability, and was therefore not covered under the CGL policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Chambers USA Names Peckar & Abramson to Band 1 Level in Construction Law; 29 P&A Lawyers Recognized as Leading Attorneys; Six Regions and Government Contracts Practice Recognized
July 08, 2024 —
Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Peckar & Abramson, P.C. (P&A) is pleased to announce that Chambers USA has recognized the firm at the Band 1 level nationwide in Construction Law. P&A stands alone in being named a Band 1 firm in Construction Law nationally and has been named in the position every year since Chambers USA began awarding the recognition. The firm was also recognized nationally in Government Contracts: Highly Regarded.
P&A’s offices in New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Texas were ranked Band 1 in Construction Law, and the Firm’s California, Illinois, and Washington, DC practices were also highly rated. Additionally, 29 of P&A’s construction lawyers were named leading construction lawyers in their respective jurisdictions – more than any other construction law practice in the country.
As demonstrated by its consistent Chambers USA Rankings, Peckar & Abramson has earned a national reputation for exceptional legal advocacy, representing construction industry members domestically and internationally.
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Language California Construction Direct Contractors Must Add to Subcontracts Beginning on January 1, 2022, Per Senate Bill 727
December 20, 2021 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupSenate Bill No. 727, Imposing Liability on Contractors for Wage Claims of Subcontractor Employees:
California Senate Bill 727 was approved by the Governor on September 27, 2021. The new Act amended Labor Code Section 218.7 and added a new section 218.8 to the Labor Code. Both Labor Code sections impose on “direct contractors” in the construction industry (defined by Civil Code 8018 as “a contractor that has a direct contractual relationship with an owner”) liability for the wage violations of their subcontractors and sub-subcontractors at any tier when working on California private construction projects.
Specifically, new Section 218.8 expands the liability of direct contractors for wage claims of the employees of subordinate subcontractors on projects for contracts executed beginning on January 1, 2022. The liability of the direct contractor under Labor Code 218.8 will include “any debt owed to a wage claimant or third party on the wage claimant’s behalf, incurred by a subcontractor at any tier acting under, by, or for the direct contractor.” Specifically included as listed liabilities of the direct contractor are: “any unpaid wage, fringe or other benefit payment or contribution, penalties or liquidated damages, and interest owed by the subcontractor on account of the performance of the labor.”
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
