Loss Ensuing from Faulty Workmanship Covered
April 28, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found coverage for damage resulting from faulty workmanship. Drury Co. v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Counsel, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 319 (Mo. Ct. App. March 25, 2014).
The School District entered a contract with general contractor, Penzel Construction Company, Inc., to build an addition to a high school. Under the prime contract, the School District was to purchase property insurance, including builder's risk "all-risk" coverage. The policy was to cover the interests of the owner, the contractor, subcontractors and sub-subcontractors in the project.
The School District obtained a policy from Missouri United School Insurance Counsel (MUSIC). Exclusions in the all-risk policy included loss due to faulty workmanship or materials, "unless loss by a peril not otherwise excluded ensues and then MUSIC shall be liable only for such ensuing loss."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Five Issues to Consider in Government Contracting (Or Any Contracting!)
September 02, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe appeal of Appeals of – Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Services, LLC, ASBCA 62797, 2024 WL 2698011 (May 7, 2024) raises interesting, but important, issues that should be considered. In this case, the government (in a supply contract) procured four portal cranes from the claimant. After an initial test of one of the cranes failed, the government refused to accept delivery even after the issue was addressed by the claimant. The government did not accept the manner in which the claimant addressed the issue and would only accept cranes if the claimant employed “an unnecessary alternative solution [that] caused further delay and increased [claimant’s] costs.” On appeal, it was determined the government’s decision to delay delivery based on its demand for the alternative solution was not justified, i.e., constituted a breach of contract. Below are five issues of consideration in government contracting, or, for that matter, any contracting.
Issue #1- Patently Ambiguous Specifications
The government argued that the specifications were patently ambiguous and because the claimant failed to inquire regarding the ambiguous specifications prior to performance, its interpretation of the ambiguous specifications should govern. The contractor countered that the specifications were unambiguous and it met the specifications.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Business Interruption Claim Granted in Part, Denied in Part
February 16, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court granted portions of the business interruption claim, while denying other portions. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Infogroup, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162810 (S. D. Iowa Nov. 30, 2015).
Phoenix insured Infogroup's business buildings and personal business property, including data and data processing equipment. In late May 2011, warnings were issued of possible flooding from the Missouri River. On June 1, 2011, Infogroup moved and relocated its business operations and data centers away from the river and did not intend to return to the facilities. On July 19, 2011, Phoenix advanced $500,000 to Infogroup for anticipated claims under the policy. On August 22, 2011, heavy rain left surface water in the parking lot at Infogroup's facilities. Infogroup claimed that it suffered minor property damage during July and August, 2011, including damage to an uninterruptable power source and damage to a server.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Remediation Work Caused by Installation of Defective Tiles Not Covered
August 19, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court applied California law to find there was no coverage when the subcontractor was sued for broken tiles on a project. Am. Home Assur. Co. v. SMG Stone Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75910 (N. D. Cal. June 11, 2015).
The subcontractor installed stone floor tiles at the project. The developer discovered fractures in some of the tiles. The fractured tiles were removed and replaced. This remediation process required the removal and replacement of portions of drywall and concrete subfloor installed by other subcontractors. The developer sued the subcontractor, who tendered the defense to its insurer.
The insurer denied coverage and filed for a declaratory judgment that there was no coverage for the floor tile fracture claims.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Herman Russell's Big Hustle
May 20, 2024 —
Maggie Murphy - Construction Executive“Any person that I knew of in the city of Atlanta who did anything ran it by Herman before they did anything else.”
These are the words of Anthony Dixon, senior project manager and 47-year veteran employee with H. J. Russell & Company. But ask anyone who knows anything about H. J. Russell, and they’ll say the same thing: The story of the company is the story of Herman J. Russell himself.
From humble beginnings in Atlanta’s Summerhill neighborhood came a young man with an unbreakable entrepreneurial spirit, who used that drive to forge an unlikely path to success in the Jim Crow–era South. What began as a plastering company in 1952 is today one of the largest Black-owned contractors in the United States, with Herman’s children—Donata Russell Ross, H. Jerome Russell and Michael B. Russell Sr.—at the helm (a natural fit for the family-focused firm).
Over its 72-year history, H. J. Russell has grown exponentially, contracted when necessary and persevered through segregation, the turbulence of the Civil Rights Movement and multiple economic downturns. Now, in the next five years, they’re poised to become a billion-dollar company.
But long before any of that, there was just a boy and a dream.
Reprinted courtesy of
Maggie Murphy, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Risky Business: Contractual Versus Equitable Rights of Subrogation
December 16, 2023 —
Kyle Rice - The Subrogation StrategistIn Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Infrastructure Eng’g. Inc., 2023 Ill. App. LEXIS 383, the insurer, Zurich American Insurance Company (Insurer) proceeded as subrogee of Community College District No. 508 d/b/a City Colleges of Chicago and CMO, a Joint Venture. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District (Appellate Court) addressed whether Insurer – who issued a builder’s risk policy to insure a building during construction – could subrogate on behalf of the building owner, City Colleges of Chicago (City Colleges), who was part of the joint venture and an additional named insured, but who had not been directly paid for the underlying loss. The Appellate Court determined that the policy language established that the carrier was contractually permitted to subrogate on behalf of all additional named insureds on the policy, including the building owner.
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Kyle Rice, White and WilliamsMr. Rice may be contacted at
ricek@whiteandwilliams.com
Am I Still Covered Under the Title Insurance Policy?
May 01, 2019 —
Ian Douglas - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogWhen transferring property for corporate restructuring or estate planning purposes, an important issue to consider is whether the successor owner will be covered by the grantee’s title insurance policy. Because title insurance policies insure only the title of the “Insured” identified in the policy, the successor in interest of the named insured may not be covered following the transfer.
In older ALTA title insurance policies, the definition of “Insured” included the person or entity specifically identified in the policy as the insured, as well as any subsequent owners who took title to the subject property by operation of law. Because those policies did not clarify what the term “by operation of law” meant, it was unclear whether certain subsequent owners, such as a parent or subsidiary of the original insured, fell within the definition of “Insured”. In order to avoid any risk that a subsequent owner following a transfer between related parties was not covered by the grantor’s title policy, parties often obtained an “additional insured” endorsement which provided the subsequent owner coverage under the original policy.
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Ian Douglas, Snell & WilmerMr. Douglas may be contacted at
idouglas@swlaw.com
