Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
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Idaho Federal Court Rules Against Sacketts After SCOTUS Decided Judicial Review of an EPA Compliance Order was Permissible
May 13, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelIn a decision released on March 31, in Sackett v. EPA, the U.S. District Court for Idaho held, without benefit of oral argument, that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) motion for summary judgment should be granted, and accordingly, the Sacketts had violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by making improvements to 0.63 acres of land they owned without a required CWA permit when the land qualified as a “wetlands.”
The EPA had determined the Sacketts’ “property is subject to the CWA because it contains wetlands adjacent to Priest Lake, a traditionally ‘navigable water,’ and, additionally, their property is wetland adjacent to a tributary and similarly situated to other wetlands and has a significant nexus to Priest Lake.” The District Court rejected the Sacketts’ arguments that their property was not a “wetlands” subject to the CWA.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Damages or Injury “Likely to Occur” or “Imminent” May No Longer Trigger Insurance Coverage
January 05, 2017 —
Masaki J. Yamada – Ahlers & Cressman PLLCWashington Courts allow an insurer to determine its duty to defend an insured against a lawsuit based only on the face of the complaint and the limitations of the insurance policy. This is otherwise known as the “eight corners” rule (four corners of the complaint plus the four corners of the policy). In other words, the insurance company is not permitted to rely on facts extrinsic to the complaint in order to deny its duty to defend an insured. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. VanPort Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 751, 763 (2002). The laws in Washington provide greater protection to the insured over the insurer when it comes to the insurer’s duty to defend. The duty to defend a claim is triggered if a claim could “conceivably” be covered under the policy. See Woo v. Fireman’s Insurance, 161 Wn.2d 43 (2007). If there is any ambiguity in a policy with regard to coverage, the ambiguity is interpreted in favor of the insured.
As a result, contractors in Washington regularly tender claims or potential claims to their insurers even when damage has not occurred but will occur in the imminent future. Especially in the context of construction defect cases, a contractor will tender such a claim to its insurer to trigger the broad duty of the insurer to provide a defense. We also regularly recommend this to our contractor clients. For example, if a building owner serves a contractor with a claim that the construction and installation of a window system will imminently cause leaks and corrosion, we would recommend that the contractor tender the claim to its commercial general liability insurer. Washington courts have found a duty to defend when there are allegations in the complaint that covered damages will occur in the imminent future.
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Masaki J. Yamada, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Yamada may be contacted at
myamada@ac-lawyers.com
Roots of Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam Reach Back a Decade
August 05, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFRecent court documents in the Las Vegas HOA scandal reveal that the late Nancy Quon, thought to be a mastermind in the scam was involved with a similar case before 2001. The Las Vegas Review-Journal reports that the Nevada attorney general’s office launched an investigation of the Starfire condominium complex. Claims were made that an architect and a construction company attempted to fill the Starfire board with straw buyers. Quon represented a resident to filed a claim over defective windows.
Chris Rasmussen, the attorney for Edith Gillespie, Leon Benzer’s half sister, has noted that his client was not charged in the Starfire case, but the Review-Journal notes that no one was, as the insurance company settled quickly, which ended the chances for a criminal investigation. The Starfire case is described as “a $6 million lawsuit based on fraudulent construction defect claims.” Quon, Benzer, and their co-conspirators are alleged to have modeled their subsequent actions after Starfire.
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Construction Worker Falls to His Death at Kyle Field
January 15, 2014 —
Melissa Zaya-CDJ STAFFThe family of Angel Garcia, a construction worker who fell to his death while working on Texas A&M’s football stadium (Kyle Field), has filed a $100 million lawsuit against six construction companies claiming inadequate safety policies, procedures, and negligence, Jordan Overturf of The Eagle reported.
According to The Eagle, Garcia’s attorneys alleged, “[Garcia] was ‘catapulted off the edge of a fourth-floor ramp’ on the northeast side when a section of concrete fell onto the bucket of the skid steer-loader he was operating. The tractor hit a steel beam during the fall, which exerted enough force to eject Garcia from the tractor.” Garcia did not survive his injuries. The complaint claims the companies involved violated the Occupational Safety and Health Administration rules and regulations. The defendants in the suit were unavailable for comment, according to The Eagle.
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Is the Issuance of a City Use Permit Referable? Not When It Is an Administrative Act
January 10, 2018 —
Adam E. Lang - Real Estate Litigation BlogArizona’s Constitution gives electors in cities, towns, and counties the ability to refer legislation that was enacted by their local elected officials to the ballot for popular vote. Ariz. Const. art. IV, Pt. 1 § 1(8). But only legislative acts are referable; administrative acts are not. In general, a legislative act makes new law and creates policy, is permanent in nature, and is generally applied. On the other hand, an administrative act is one that executes and implements a law already in place. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 169 Ariz. 485, 489-90, 821 P.2d 146, 150-51 (1991).
For more than fifty years, Arizona courts have been clear: zoning and rezoning ordinances are legislative acts and therefore referable to popular vote. City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 17, 363 P.2d 607, 609 (1961) (holding that “what constitutes an appropriate zone is primarily for the legislature”); Fritz v. City of Kingman, 191 Ariz 432, 432, 957 P.2d 337, 337 (1998) (noting “we reaffirm our view that zoning decisions are legislative matters subject to referendum”); Pioneer Trust Co. of Arizona v. Pima Cty., 168 Ariz. 61, 64–65, 811 P.2d 22, 25–26 (1991) (holding “that, in Arizona, zoning decisions are legislative acts subject to referendum” and that even a “conditional approval of . . . rezoning was a legislative act”); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc., 134 Ariz. 46, 653 P.2d 694 (1982) (analyzing whether zoning referendum complied with statutory requirements); Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980) (noting “that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute legislative action”); City of Phoenix v. Oglesby, 112 Ariz. 64, 65, 537 P.2d 934, 935 (1975) (“The matter of zoning is appropriately one for the legislative branch of government.”); Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 108 Ariz. 449, 452, 501 P.2d 391, 394 (1972) (denying an attempt to enjoin referendum on county’s zoning decision).
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Adam E. Lang, Snell & WilmerMr. Lang may be contacted at
alang@swlaw.com
Preparing Your Business For Internal Transition
October 14, 2019 —
Stephen P. Katz, Esq. - ConsensusDocsWhen is it right to start thinking about succession planning and preparing a construction company for transition? Many would agree – in concept, at least – that serious thought regarding succession and transition planning should begin at a company’s inception and be revisited throughout its lifecycle, but as a practical matter, it is frequently not part of the mindset when growing a business. This article explores issues that construction company owners should consider in order to achieve smooth transition of ownership and control. We will address three critical questions:
- What happens to the business when an owner retires;
- In the event an owner(s) become disabled; and,
- Unplanned exit/owner pre-deceases her/his exit from the company
Owners who do not plan carefully for transition are often faced with the less than appealing option of liquidating their business for much less than its value, or by closing the business with no return upon that event. However, those who plan carefully can realize the value of their life’s work, pass the business to the next generation and see their legacy continue.
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Stephen P. Katz, Esq., Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Mr. Katz may be contacted at
skatz@pecklaw.com
Burg Simpson to Create Construction Defect Group
November 06, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFBurg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C. has announced that the attorneys of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Perczak & Nuss, P.C. will be joining them as S2SPN Construction Defect Group of Berg Simpson. The group will be headquartered at Burg Simpson’s Engelwood offices.
The combined firms will comprise 55 attorneys. Michael Burg, founding shareholder at Burg Simpson, said that “in Colorado for the past 29 years, these lawyers have provided the highest level of construction defect representation.” His counterpart, Scott Sullan of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Perczak & Nuss said that he and his colleagues are “delighted to be a part of the Burg Simpson team.” The two firms join forces effective January 1, 2014.
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