Second Circuit Certifies Question Impacting "Bellefonte Rule"
December 15, 2016 —
Ellen Burrows – White and Williams LLPCalling into question the continued validity of the so-called “Bellefonte Rule,” on December 8, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question whether a facultative reinsurance contract limit is presumptively all-inclusive and “caps” the reinsurer’s total exposure even where the reinsured policy pays defense costs in addition to the limit. Global Reinsurance Corporation v. Century Indemnity Company Docket No. 15-2164-cv (December 8, 2016).[1]
In Bellefonte Reinsurance Company v. Aetna 903 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990), the court ruled that a reinsurer was not liable to pay defense costs above the stated reinsurance contract limit. Although litigants argued that this ruling was dependent on the fact that the reinsured policy limits were defense cost-inclusive, a later panel of the Second Circuit applied the “cap” ruling in Bellefonte to a situation where the reinsured policy limit was not cost-inclusive and where the insurer was obligated to pay defense costs in addition to the policy limit. Unigard Security Insurance Company v. North River Insurance Company 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Ellen Burrows, White and Williams LLPMs. Burrows may be contacted at
burrowse@whiteandwilliams.com
Negligence Per Se Claim Based Upon Failure to Pay Benefits Fails
December 21, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of the insurer's motion for summary judgment, thereby rejecting the insureds' negligence per se claim for failure to pay benefits. Braun-Salinas v. Am Family Ins. Group, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19555 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2016).
The insureds argued that Oregon recognized a negligence per se claim based on an insurer's failure to pay benefits in violation of the statutory standard under state law. Oregon appellate courts, however, only allowed a negligence per se claim only where a negligence claim otherwise existed. The Oregon courts had previously rejected a statutory theory, holding that a violation of the statute did not give rise to a tort action.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Crews Tested By Rocky Ground, Utility Challenges
September 03, 2019 —
Louise Poirier - Engineering News-RecordProblematic utility locations and difficult ground conditions required the project team to develop innovative solutions on the University of Texas at San Antonio’s $95-million Science and Engineering Building.
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Louise Poirier, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Poirier may be contacted at poirierl@enr.com
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Franchisors Should Consider Signing a Conditional Lease Assignment Rather Than a Franchisee’s Lease
November 17, 2016 —
Richard H. Herold – Real Estate Litigation BlogIn Franchise & High Properties, LLC v. Happy’s Franchise, LLC, a 2015 decision issued by the Court of Appeals in Michigan, the franchisor, Happy’s Pizza Franchise, LLC, signed a five-year lease for the commercial space to be occupied by its franchisee, Happy’s Pizza #19, Inc. The franchisor did so to secure a right of first refusal to purchase the property and to enforce the franchise agreement to have the lease assigned to the franchisor if the franchisee defaulted.
The issue in the case was whether the term “tenant” referred solely to Happy’s Pizza #19 or whether it also included Happy’s Franchise as a co-tenant. “Tenant” was defined as follows: “Happy’s Pizza #19, Inc., 29102 Telegraph Road, Suite 607, Southfield, MI 48034, the lessee, and Happy’s Pizza Franchise, LLC, a Michigan limited liability company (hereinafter referred to as `Franchisor’), hereinafter designated as the Tenant.”
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Richard H. Herold, Real Estate Litigation BlogMr. Herold may be contacted at
rherold@swlaw.com
Policy Lanuage Expressly Prohibits Replacement of Undamaged Material to Match Damaged Material
March 09, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiConstruing an all-risk Businessowners Policy, the court found that the policy language did not required replacement of undamaged material match materials that were damaged. Pleasure Creek Townhomes Homeowners' Ass'n v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2019 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1095 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).
The policy covered the Association's 14 townhome buildings. In June 2017, a hail storm damaged siding on all 14 buildings. An appraisal panel included the cost to replace the undamaged, faded siding in its appraisal award so that it would match the new siding. American Family refused to pay this component - which was appraised at about $211,382 - of the award.
An exclusion in the policy provided,
We will not pay to repair or replace undamaged material due to mismatch between undamaged material and new material used to repair or replace damaged material.
We do not cover the loss in value to an property due to mismatch between undamaged material and new material used to repair or replace damaged material.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal Court Enforces “Limits” and “Most We Will Pay” Clauses in Additional Insured Endorsement
September 13, 2021 —
Craig Rokuson - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn the recent case of Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. XL Ins. Am., Inc., 20-CV-4614 (LJL), 2021 WL 3617218 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2021), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York—in deciding a motion for consideration—had occasion to review the 2013 ISO changes to the additional insured endorsement, and held that coverage under a policy providing additional insured coverage was limited to the $1,000,000 required by contract, and not the $2,500,000 limit to the policy.
In Zurich, Zurich and its named insured D.A. Collins sought the full limits of the primary policy issued by XL to the D.A. Collins’ subcontractor, HBI, which are $2,5000 per occurrence and in the aggregate, for an underlying personal injury lawsuit. XL also issued an excess policy in the amount of $5,000,000 to HBI.
The contract between D.A. Collins and HBI required HBI to obtain commercial liability coverage “in an amount of $1,000,000 per occurrence and $2,000,000 in the aggregate. It further provides that the “required limits for the umbrella excess coverage shall be sufficient to provide a total of $5,000,000 per occurrence/aggregate.”
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Craig Rokuson, Traub LiebermanMr. Rokuson may be contacted at
crokuson@tlsslaw.com
2018 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars!
July 18, 2018 —
Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney, LLPWilke Fleury is thrilled to announce our 2018 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars! Twelve of our talented attorneys have been honored with the Super Lawyers and Rising Stars distinctions.
Super Lawyers® is a service of the Thomson Reuters, Legal Division. Each year, the research team at Super Lawyers® undertakes a rigorous multi-phase selection process that includes a statewide survey of lawyers, independent evaluation of candidates by the attorney-led research staff, a peer review of candidates by practice area and a good-standing and disciplinary check. The Super Lawyers list represents only five percent of lawyers in California and Rising Stars reflects 2.5% of the state’s up-and-coming lawyers.
Congratulations to Wilke Fleury’s 2018 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars!
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Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney, LLP
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
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