Nebraska’s Prompt Pay Act for 2015
January 21, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorContinuing with our theme of Ready for 2015, this blog serves as a reminder of your rights and obligations under Nebraska’s Prompt Pay Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 45-1201-1211.
As you may recall, Nebraska’s legislature amended the Prompt Pay Act in 2014. The most significant changes are highlighted below.
Attorney’s Fees May be Recovered. The most significant change in the Prompt Pay Act allows contractors to recover damages if they pursue a claim under the Act. And, this is not reciprocal in that the defendant may not recover fees.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
In Pricey California, Renters Near Respite From Landlord Gouging
September 16, 2019 —
Noah Buhayar - BloombergThe housing crisis engulfing California has state lawmakers racing to pass bills that would boost construction and stop corporate landlords from egregiously jacking up rents.
The bills overcame key hurdles last week and are due for final votes before the legislature adjourns on Sept. 13. The hardest-fought measure would set a higher standard for evictions and cap annual rent increases at 5% plus the rate of inflation. While that’s below the typical pace of lease hikes -- and the bill has many caveats for landlords -- it would still mark the state’s most significant new protection for tenants in decades.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Noah Buhayar, Bloomberg
No Signature? Potentially No Problem for Sureties Enforcing a Bond’s Forum Selection Clause
March 21, 2022 —
Brian C. Padove - ConsensusDocsOne of the foundational tenets of contract law is that a party may only be bound by terms they agree to, or in other words, if the party did not sign a contract, that party cannot be bound by the terms thereof. While this principle is generally unwavering, there are certain situations in which a non-signatory to a contract may still be bound by the terms of a contract.
In particular, this non-signatory issue may arise when a payment bond claimant makes a bond claim, subsequently files a lawsuit, but the bond contains a forum selection clause different than the venue of the lawsuit and the surety seeks to enforce the bond’s forum selection clause. For example, the claimant may have filed its lawsuit against the surety in federal court, even though the bond provides language specifically mandating that no lawsuit shall be commenced by any claimant other than in a state court where the project is located. Thus, the question then becomes, can the surety enforce the forum selection clause against the claimant when the claimant did not sign the bond and/or never agreed to the terms thereof? The short answer, it depends (yes, that is a very lawyer-like answer). Given recent case law over the past decade, however, the surety has a strong argument in favor of enforcement of the forum selection clause.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Brian C. Padove, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Padove may be contacted at
bpadove@watttieder.com
Sometimes, Being too Cute with Pleading Allegations is Unnecessary
June 06, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThere are times where being too darn cute with your pleading allegations is unnecessary and does not work. But, the point is really that the cuteness is unnecessary.
In a Miller Act payment bond dispute in Boneso Brothers Construction, Inc. v. Sauer, Inc., 2018 WL 2387833 (N.D.Cal. 2018), a claimant asserted claims against a Miller Act payment bond surety for breach of the payment bond, breach of a subcontract, open account, and account stated. The question is why would the claimant sue the payment bond surety for breach of subcontract (when the subcontract was not with the surety), and open account and account stated. I have no clue, other than such claims appeared quite unnecessary when the claimant asserted an action on the Miller Act payment bond (which is what the surety is liable under — actions under the statutory payment bond). Such claims were dismissed. And, they should have been.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Real-Estate Pros Fight NYC Tax on Wealthy Absentee Owners
October 15, 2014 —
Henry Goldman and Allyson Versprille – BloombergA political battle is brewing at the apex of New York’s property market.
The real-estate industry is mobilizing to kill a proposed levy on non-resident owners of apartments valued at more than $5 million, seeking to ensure the world’s biggest city doesn’t follow London, Hong Kong and Singapore in extracting extra cash from trophy properties.
The industry’s lobbying arm, the Real Estate Board of New York, says the measure will scare off investors who fuel a business supporting more than 500,000 jobs and generating 40 percent of the five boroughs’ revenue. Brokers warn of economic calamity if officials slap a luxury tax on apartments owned by someone who lives in the city less than half the year.
Mr. Goldman may be contacted at hgoldman@bloomberg.net; Ms. Versprille may be contacted at aversprille1@bloomberg.net
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Henry Goldman and Allyson Versprille, Bloomberg
Following My Own Advice
October 21, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorI often advise clients on the use of E-Verify and the importance of getting policies and in place to ensure compliance. This is particularly true for clients that do federal and state work. Now it’s my turn to follow my own advice.
I was recently appointed to represent the Nebraska Board of Engineers and Architects. As such, I am a contractor for the State of Nebraska. That means I have to use E-Verify.
Here is a refresher of “our” E-Verify obligations as a contractor for the State.
Nebraska adopted an E-Verify law in 2009. Nebraska statute section 4-114 requires all contractors that are awarded a contract by a state agency or political subdivision to register with ta federal immigration verification system. Although not explicit in the statute, the Department of Labor has indicated that the obligation to E-Verify applies only to new employees that will be working on the project.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Former Mayor Arrested for Violating Stop Work Order
October 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe former mayor of Springfield, Florida has been arrested on charges of insurance fraud. More than a year ago, an investigator for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation found that an employee of Walker’s construction company was working without workers’ compensation and issued a stop work order. Walker’s employees continued work.
The charges were delayed because Walker challenged the stop work order. Once it was determined that the stop work order was issued properly, Walker was charged with a third-degree felony.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Significant Victory for the Building Industry: Liberty Mutual is Rejected Once Again, This Time by the Third Appellate District in Holding SB800 is the Exclusive Remedy
December 15, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman & Ravi R. Mehta – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin I. Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Certified for Publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District recently elaborated on the scope of the Right to Repair Act, commonly known as SB-800 (“Act”). In
Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Kevin Hicks, et al.) (certified for publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), the Court considered whether the Act (and specifically the Act’s pre-litigation procedure) applies, when homeowners plead construction defect claims based only on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Act (
Civil Code §896). The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The homeowners of seventeen (17) single-family homes filed a Complaint against the builder of their homes, Elliott Homes, Inc. (“Elliott”), alleging common law causes of action for construction defects. Elliott filed a motion to stay the litigation on the ground that the homeowners failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the homeowners that this pre-litigation procedure did not apply because the homeowners had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. Elliott appealed. The Court of Appeal purely considered the question of whether the Act, including its pre-litigation procedure, applies when a homeowner pleads construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, and not on statutory violations of the Act’s building standards.
To answer this question, the Court analyzed a recent case decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. In this subrogation case, a builder’s insurer asserted common law causes of action (but not statutory building standard violations) alleging construction defects against the builder to recover amounts paid to the homeowner after a sprinkler system failure caused extensive damage to the subject property. The trial court sustained the builder’s demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it was time-barred under the Act. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order, holding that common law construction defect claims arising from actual damages are not covered by the Act because “the Act does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases where actual damage has occurred.” (
Liberty Mutual, 219 Cal.App.4th 98, 109).
The
Elliott Court declined to follow
Liberty Mutual, finding that that Court failed to properly analyze the language of the Act. The
Elliott Court analyzed both the statutory scheme and the legislative history of the Act to arrive at the conclusion that common law causes of action for construction defects do indeed fall within the purview of the Act.
According to the
Elliott Court, the Act “broadly applies to
any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in…residential construction and in such an action, a homeowner’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of the standards set forth in the Act, except as specified.” Further, the Act expressly provides that “no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed.”
Civil Code §943(a). In turn,
Civil Code §944 allows for a recovery for the cost of repairing a building standard violation, or for the cost of repairing any damage caused by such a violation, among other things.
The limited exceptions to the Act’s applicability concern the enforcement of a contract, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. Civil Code §943(a). Additionally, the Act does not apply to condominium conversions. Civil Code §896.
The Elliott Court explains that apart from these exceptions, the Legislature intended the Act to apply to all construction defect claims (regardless of damage) relating to the construction of residential properties whose sales contracts are signed after January 1, 2003. There is no exception in the Act, express or implied, for common law causes of action.
Next, the Court turns to the Act’s legislative history to buttress this conclusion. This history makes clear that the Act is a legislative response to the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, that construction defects in residential properties are only actionable in tort when actual property damage manifests. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings indicate that the Act was the product of protracted negotiations between varying interested parties, including construction industry trade groups and consumer protection groups. The Legislature intended (1) to promulgate building standards, violations of which would be actionable, even without damage, and (2) to allow homeowners to recover for actual damage caused by construction defects not covered by the building standards. In other words, the Act was intended to provide homeowners redress regardless of whether damage had manifested.
Therefore, the Court concluded that common law causes of action for construction defects, regardless of damage, are subject to the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its earlier order, and to enter a new order granting Elliott’s motion to stay the litigation until the homeowners (and Elliott) have satisfied the pre-litigation procedure of the Act.
II. McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132
Similar to the Third Appellate District Court’s ruling in
Elliott, the Fifth Appellate District Court also rejected the holding of
Liberty Mutual in a matter now pending before the California Supreme Court:
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132 (review granted and opinion superseded sub nom.
Albany v. Superior Court 360 P.3d 1022). Also similar to
Elliott, in
McMillin a group of homeowners filed common law construction defect claims against the builder of their homes. The builder,
McMillin, moved to stay the litigation pending compliance with the Act’s pre-litigation procedure. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act does not apply because the homeowners have not asserted statutory building standard violations contained within the Act.
In reasoning substantially similar to that of
Elliott, the
McMillin Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s holding that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for pursuing construction defect claims, with or without damage. Thus, the
McMillin Court issued a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s earlier order and to enter a new order granting McMillin’s motion to stay.
On November 24, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the homeowners’ petition for review. In August of 2016, briefing was completed and the matter is now awaiting the scheduling of arguments. CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the pending appeal of this matter to the California Supreme Court, as well as all related developments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Ravi R. Mehta, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Mehta may be contacted at rmehta@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
