General Release of Contractor Upheld Despite Knowledge of Construction Defects
February 27, 2019 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogAh, the elusive Lepus Cornutus, commonly known as the Jackalope. Rarely seen, we may have one in SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC, Court of Appeals for the Second District, Case No. B285086 (November 15, 2018), an interesting case involving a developer, a contractor, a general release, and Civil Code section 1688.
SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC
In 2005, Variel Warner Ventures, LLC (Variel Warner) entered into a construction contract with Verdugo Management & Investment, Inc. (Verdugo) to construct improvements at an 85 unit apartment complex. Under the terms of the contract, Verdugo agreed to construction the improvements in a good and workmanlike manner in strict compliance with all drawings and specifications and to comply with all laws. It didn’t. The work was defectively flashed, counterflashed, and waterproofed.
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Garret Murai, Wendel RosenMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
The Ups and Downs of Elevator Maintenance Contractor's Policy Limits
October 03, 2022 —
Richard W. Brown & Sarah J. Markham - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The December 2021 First Department decision in Nouveau Elevator Indus. v. New York Marine & General Ins. Co. is pushing some buttons in the elevator industry, given the significant implications it may have on the adequacy of policy limits for elevator service companies operating in New York state.
The Court held in Nouveau that monthly elevator maintenance work performed under an ongoing service agreement is considered “completed operations” for purposes of applying policy limits. Specifically, the Court found that the per location policy limits are not implicated here, and instead held that the products-completed operations aggregate limit applies to completed work, which expressly includes “that part of the work done at a job site [that] has been put to its intended use.”
Facts of the Case
Nouveau provides elevator maintenance and service in the greater New York city region. Its work is done in multiple buildings and locations throughout the city. Nouveau purchased six commercial general liability (CGL) policies from New York Marine for consecutive one-year periods. Each of the CGL policies provides a liability limit of $1 million, with an aggregate limit of $2 million, per accident or occurrence.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard W. Brown, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Sarah J. Markham, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Brown may be contacted at RBrown@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Markham may be contacted at SMarkham@sdvlaw.com
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Challenging a Termination for Default
September 23, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesNo contractor wants to be terminated for default. It is the harshest contractual recourse. It is a recourse that has implications, particularly in the public sector. However, a party needs to be in a position to support the basis of the termination for default, and the terminated party, in most instances, should not be in a position to imply accept the basis of the default. This applies regardless of the project.
In the federal context: “When a contractor challenges a default termination, the government bears the burden of establishing the validity of the termination.” Sergent’s Mechanical Systems, Inc. v. U.S., 2024 WL 4048175, *7 (Fed.Cl. 2024) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Once the government establishes the default, “the contractor bears the burden of establishing that the default was excused by fault of the government.” Id. at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Relevant considerations as to whether the contractor is in default include the contractor’s failure to meet contract specifications or the required schedule. Sergent’s Mechanical Systems, supra, at *8. “[T]here is ‘a requirement that the contractor give reasonable assurances of performance in response to a validly issued cure notice.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Congratulations to BWB&O’s Newport Beach Team on Obtaining a Defense Verdict in Favor of their Subcontractor Client!
April 02, 2024 —
Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPBremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara’s Newport Beach Partner Morgan Stiefel and Associate Brandon Cook obtained a defense verdict after years-long litigation in favor of their subcontractor client.
This lawsuit stemmed from a claim made by Plaintiff for eye injuries arising out of claimed negligence and strict liability associated with our client’s performance of a sandblasting job at a construction site adjacent to Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff alleges that while she was in her backyard, sand hit her in the eyes at a high velocity speed, resulting in permanent damage to her eyes.
We argued our clients took all necessary safety precautions in the performance of this job, and Plaintiff’s eye irritation symptoms could not have been caused by our client. All of her alleged injuries were either pre-existing or could be explained by circumstances other than our client’s actions. Through expert testimony and our arguments, we were able to show the jury that Plaintiff lied about the sand entering her eyes at a high velocity and her symptoms being caused by our clients’ performance of the sandblasting job.
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Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Genuine Dispute Over Cause of Damage and Insureds’ Demolition Before Inspection Negate Bad Faith and Elder Abuse Claims
June 30, 2016 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Paslay v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (No. B265348, filed 6/27/16), a California appeals court found triable issues of fact regarding whether State Farm breached its contract in paying a water loss, but affirmed summary adjudication for the insurer on bad faith and elder abuse claims based on the genuine dispute doctrine.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Denver Airport's Renovator Uncovers Potential Snag
March 04, 2019 —
Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-RecordThe renovation of the Great Hall of Denver International Airport’s iconic Jeppesen Terminal, roofed by a series of peaked tensile tents that echo the nearby mountains, has hit a bump. Routine but limited concrete testing of the nearly quarter-century-old terminal’s elevated floor slab, to determine whether the floor could support crane loads, shows the compressive strength of the concrete in certain sections is lower than was specified for the original project, more than 25 years ago.
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Nadine M. Post, ENRMs. Post may be contacted at
postn@enr.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Maryland Legislation Prohibits Condominium Developers from Shortening Statute of Limitations to Defeat Unit Owner Construction Defect Claims
May 16, 2018 —
Nicholas D. Cowie - Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogNew Maryland legislation prevents developers from shortening the time period within which condominium associations and their unit owner members can assert claims for hidden construction defects in newly constructed condominium communities. The legislation known as HB 77 and SB 258 passed both houses of the Maryland General Assembly and was signed into law by Governor Lawrence J. Hogan on April 24, 2018 (see photo above). Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq. is the author of the legislation, which will be codified as Section 11-134.1 of the Maryland Condominium Act, effective October 1, 2018.
This article discusses how this new legislation ends the practice by which some condominium developers attempted to use condominium documents to shorten the normal statute of limitations in order to prevent condominium associations and their unit owner members from having a fair opportunity to assert their warranty and other legal claims for latent construction defects.
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq., Cowie & MottMr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
