Sometimes It’s Okay to Destroy Evidence
August 17, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Miller v. Lankow that Mr. Miller was within his rights to remediate his home, even though doing so destroyed the evidence of water intrusion.
Linda Lankow built a home in 1992. In 2001 or 2002, Lankow discovered a stucco problem at the garage which she attributed to moisture intrusion. She asked the original contractor to fix the wall. In 2003, Lankow attempted to sell her home, but the home inspection revealed fungal growth in the basement. Lankow made further repairs, including alterations to the landscaping.
In 2004, Lankow put her house on the market once again and entered into an agreement with David Miller. Miller declined to have an independent inspection, as the home had been repaired by professional contractors.
In 2005, Miller put the house on the market. A prospective buyer requested a moisture inspection. The inspection firm, Private Eye, Inc. found “significant moisture intrusion problems.”
Miller hired an attorney who sent letters to the contractors and to Lankow and her husband. Lankow’s husband, Jim Betz, an attorney, represented his wife and sent a letter to Miller’s attorney that Miller had declined an opportunity to inspect the home.
In 2007, Miller’s new attorney sent letters to all parties that Miller had decided to begin remediation work on the house. All stucco was removed. Miller then filed a lawsuit against the prior owners, the builders, and the realtors.
Two of the contractors and the prior owners moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Miller had spoliated evidence by removing the stucco. They requested that Miller’s expert reports be excluded. The district court found for the defendants and imposed sanctions on Miller.
The Minnesota Supreme court found that “a custodial party’s duty to preserve evidence is not boundless,” stating that “it may be particularly import to allow remediation in cases such as the one before us.” Their reasoning was that “remediation of the moisture intrusion problem in the home may be necessary, even essential, to address immediate health concerns.”
Given that Miller needed to remediate the problem in order to continue living there, and that he had given the other parties a “full and fair opportunity to inspect,” the court found that he was within his rights. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded it to them for review.
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Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies the Litigation Waiver of the One-Action Rule
September 07, 2017 —
Bob L. Olson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogNevada has a one-action rule which, with limited exceptions, requires a creditor seeking to recover a debt secured by real property to proceed against the security first prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally. In the event that a law suit is filed in violation of the one-action rule, final judgment may be entered in favor of the creditor but that judgment “releases and discharges the mortgage or other lien.” NRS 40.455(3). Nevada law further provides that, with the exception of certain guaranties, any provision in an agreement relating to the sale of real property which contains a waiver of Nevada’s anti-deficiency laws may not be enforced by a court because doing so violates Nevada’s public policy. NRS 40.453.
Nevada law also addresses when the one-action rule may be waived in litigation. In the author’s view, the governing statute, NRS 40.435 is ambiguous. Section 2 of that statute states that if the one-action rule is timely interposed as an affirmative defense, the action must either be dismissed without prejudice or continued to allow the creditor to file amended pleadings to convert the action into one which does not violate the one-action rule. This suggests that the one-action rule must be asserted as an affirmative defense in the debtor’s answer to the complaint or it is waived by the debtor. The first sentence of section 3 of the statute, however, seems to suggest that the debtor has up until the entry of a final judgment to waive the one-action rule by stating: “[t]he failure to interpose, before the entry of a final judgment, the provisions of NRS 40.430 [the one-action rule] as an affirmative defense in such a proceeding waives the defense in that proceeding.”
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Bob L. Olson, Snell & WilmerMr. Olson may be contacted at
bolson@swlaw.com
Still Going, After All This Time: the Sacketts, EPA and the Clean Water Act
September 13, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn August 16, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the Idaho property of Michael and Chantell Sackett was a regulated wetlands under the then-controlling 1977 EPA rules defining “waters of the United States,” and that the Sacketts dredging and filling of their property was subject to regulation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or EPA. EPA’s case, as it has been for many years, was based on 2008 EPA and Corps inspection reports and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the controlling opinion in the 2006 Supreme Court case, Rapanos v. United States. The Sacketts’ argument was that the text of the Clean Water Act, as interpreted by Justice Scalia and three other Justices, was controlling, but for several years, the Ninth Circuit has relied on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in these CWA controversies. The court’s opinion expressed considerable sympathy for the Sacketts as they negotiated the thicket of EPA’s regulatory processes, but it could not disregard circuit precedent. A few years ago, the Supreme Court ruled, in a unanimous decision, that EPA’s then extant administrative compliance orders were arbitrary and capricious. (See Sackett v. US, 566 US 120 (2015).) After that decision, the case was remanded to the federal district court, where it lingered for several more years.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Real Estate & Construction News Roundup (4/17/24) – Travel & Tourism Reach All-Time High, President Biden Emphasizes Housing in SOTU Address, and State Transportation Projects Under Scrutiny
May 13, 2024 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIn our latest roundup, Airbnb advocates for new short-term rental rules, the U.S. Supreme Court rules on hefty development fees, loan losses becomes a greater issue for banks, and more!
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
Did You Really Accept That Bid? – How Contractors Can Avoid Post-Acceptance Bid Disputes Over Contract Terms
July 28, 2016 —
David A. Harris & Steven M. Cvitanovic – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPWhen California general contractors submit bids to an owner, can they force their subcontractors to honor their bids? Can they recover damages if the subcontractor later refuses to do so?
While the general rule in California is that a general contractor who reasonably relies on a subcontractor’s bid may recover damages when the subcontractor reneges, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District recently held that there is a substantial and important exception to the general rule.
In Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (LASC No. YC067984), the Court of Appeal held that where a general contractor requires a subcontractor to enter into a “standard-form subcontract” which materially differs from the subcontractor’s bid, the general contractor has rejected the subcontractor’s bid and has instead issued a counteroffer. The subcontractor is thereafter free to walk, or accept the new terms. If the subcontractor walks, the general contractor may not seek to enforce the terms of the subcontract or seek reliance damages.
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David A. Harris, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Harris may be contacted at dharris@hbblaw.com
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
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Construction Firm Sues City and Engineers over Reservoir Project
October 28, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe city of Fremont, Ohio and Arcadis have been sued by Trucco Construction. Trucco had been hired by the city to build a reservoir designed by Arcadis, the News-Messenger reports. Peter Welin, attorney for Trucco, said that he found “startling evidence of the company’s negligence” when he deposed Arcadis engineers. “This project could never be built the way they bid it.”
Their suit alleges that Arcadis and the city were aware that the site was not conducive to construction and also that Arcadis failed to be a neutral party in discussions between Trucco and the city regarding compensation.
Sam Wamper, an attorney for Fremont, said he was going to file a motion which would include “quite an interesting story,” but declined to elaborate.
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Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Impact Your Construction Project?
November 07, 2022 —
Chris Cazenave - ConsensusDocsThe Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a set of statutes governing commercial transactions. Every state has adopted the UCC or some version of it. Understanding when and how the UCC applies to construction contracts is important because it can affect the agreement’s terms.
Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sales of goods, which the UCC defines very broadly to mean “all things (including specialty manufactured goods) which are movable . . . other than money in which the price is to be paid . . . .” UCC § 2-105. For the construction industry, UCC Article 2 governs most, if not all, purchases of materials and equipment installed or incorporated into the project. As a result, contractors and subcontractors should be familiar with the circumstances under which Article 2 may apply and how it may affect the project.
This article provides a brief overview of when Article 2 may affect your construction project and why it matters. The article also generally covers the UCC’s potential effects on the applicable statute of limitations, implied warranties, and when the obligation to make the payment arises.
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Chris Cazenave, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Cazenave may be contacted at
ccazenave@joneswalker.com
Court Rejects Efforts to Limit Scope of Judgment Creditor’s Direct Action Under Insurance Code Section 11580
May 01, 2019 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Ins. Co. of St. of PA v. Amer. Safety Indemnity Co. (No. B283684, filed 3/1/19) (“ICSOP”), a California appeals court rejected one insurer’s efforts to limit the scope of another insurer’s direct action as a judgment creditor under Insurance Code section 11580(b)(2).
In ICSOP, homeowners filed a claim in arbitration against their general contractor alleging damages from subsidence. While the arbitration was pending, the general contractor filed suit against the grading subcontractor seeking indemnity and contribution. The complaint attached the homeowners’ complaint in arbitration pleading damages of $2.3 million, and alleged that the subcontractors had a duty to indemnify for those damages. The arbitrator awarded the homeowners $1.1 million.
The general contractor was insured by plaintiff ICSOP, which paid the arbitration award. A default judgment was entered against the grading subcontractor for $1.5 million, that included both the arbitration award plus $356,340 for the general contractor’s attorney’s fees. American Safety insured the grading subcontractor but refused to indemnify ICSOP. ICSOP then sued American Safety on the default judgment, pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580(b). The trial court granted summary judgment for ICSOP and the appeals court affirmed.
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
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