No Duty To Defend Additional Insured When Bodily Injury Not Caused by Insured
July 26, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found there was no duty to defend a suit for bodily injury against the additional insured where the injury was not caused by the insured. Consigli Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95339 (D. Mass. June 21, 2017).
Consigli was the general contractor for a renovation project at a high school. Among the subcontractors was American Environmental, Inc., who was responsible for demolishing concrete floors within the existing structures, and Costa Brothers, who did the masonry work. Wellington M. Ely was an employee of Costa Brothers and worked as a mason on the project.
Costa Brothers had a CGL policy with Travelers. As a subcontractor, Costa Brothers agreed to name Consigli as an additional insured on its policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Fourth Circuit Applies a Consequential Damages Exclusionary Clause and the Economic Loss Doctrine to Bar Claims by a Subrogating Insurer Seeking to Recover Over $19 Million in Damages
February 23, 2016 —
William L. Doerler – White and Williams LLPIn Severn Peanut Company, Inc. v. Industrial Fumigant Company, 807 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. (N.C.) 2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit), applying North Carolina law, considered whether a consequential damages clause in a contract between the Severn Peanut Company, Inc. (Severn) and Industrial Fumigant Company (IFC) barred Severn and its subrogating insurer, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers), from recovering over $19 million in damages that Severn suffered as the result of a fire and explosion at its Severn, North Carolina plant. The Fourth Circuit, rejecting Severn’s unconscionability and public policy arguments related to the consequential damages clause and finding that the economic loss doctrine barred Severn from pursuing negligence claims, affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in IFC’s favor.
As noted in the Severn decision, the facts showed that Severn and IFC signed a Pesticide Application Agreement (PAA) requiring IFC to use phosphine, a pesticide, to fumigate Severn’s peanut storage dome and to apply the pesticide “in a manner consistent with instructions . . . and precautions set forth in [its] labeling.” With respect to damages, the PAA specified that IFC’s charge for its services, $8,604 plus applicable sales tax, was “based solely upon the value of the services provided” and was not “related to the value of [Severn’s] premises or the contents therein.” In addition, the PAA specified that the $8,604 sum to which the parties agreed was not “sufficient to warrant IFC assuming any risk of incidental or consequential damages” to Severn’s “property, product, equipment, downtime, or loss of business.”
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Courts Favor Arbitration in Two Recent Construction Dispute Cases
November 21, 2018 —
Jason Plaza - The Subrogation StrategistRecent court decisions have signaled the courts’ proclivity to prefer arbitration over full-fledged litigation when provisions in construction contracts are called into question. While the courts recognize a party’s constitutional right to a jury trial, the courts also lean strongly towards resolving disputes via arbitration as a matter of public policy, especially if a construction contract carves out arbitration as an alternative to litigation.
In Avr Davis Raleigh v. Triangle Constr. Co., 818 S.E.2d 184 (N.C. App. 2018), the North Carolina Appeals Court reviewed the issue of whether the contracting parties selected binding arbitration as an alternative to litigation. The contract at issue was an AIA A201-2007 form document. Under the terms of the contract, the parties elected to arbitrate claims under $500,000 but to litigate claims over this amount. However, if there were several claims under $500,000 but the aggregate of all claims exceeded $500,000, then the contract implied that all claims would be arbitrated. Since the claims involved were an amalgamation of the two, the contracting parties disagreed about whether the arbitration provision would apply. The plaintiff interpreted this provision to mean litigation was mandatory when at least one claim exceeded $500,000 and that arbitration was mandatory when no single claim exceeded this amount. In contrast, the defendant interpreted this provision as meaning that when there were several claims worth less than $500,000 individually, but more than $500,000 aggregately, then all claims must be arbitrated. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff’s interpretation.
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Jason Plaza, White & Williams LLP
Construction Litigation Roundup: “A Less Than Valiant Effort”
June 21, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA Miller Act claimant in federal court in New Jersey in relation to a VA medical center project found itself on the wrong end of the law and was sent packing by the court.
The claimant had supplied products for the project to general contractor Valiant Group, LLC, pursuant to a purchase order from the GC. The general contractor allegedly refused to pay the supplier, leading to the claim against the GC and its payment bond surety in the amount of $126,900. The supplier also sought recovery under the federal Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-07. State law claims were asserted as well.
Chipping away at the federal law claims – the claims forming the asserted basis for federal court jurisdiction for the case – the court first dispensed with the Prompt Payment Act claim. According to the court, allegations that the general contractor had “wrongfully and improperly withheld remuneration… despite [having] ‘received payment from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs’" – whether or not accurate – did not trigger the Act. The court wrote:
“The Prompt Payment Act was enacted ‘to provide the federal government with an incentive to pay government contractors on time by requiring agencies to pay penalties . . . on certain overdue bills . . . [and] was later amended to include provisions applicable to subcontractors.’… Absent from the Act, however, are ‘any explicit provisions for subcontractor enforcement if the prime contractor fails to make timely payment.’… This is because the Act ‘merely requires that the prime contractor's contract with the subcontractor include the specified payment clause. [It] does not require the prime contractor to actually make payments to the subcontractor[.]’… The Act, therefore, does not ‘give subcontractors an additional cause of action for an alleged breach by a general contractor of a subcontract.’”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
“Genuine” Issue of “Material” Fact and Summary Judgments
December 18, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThis is short article on summary judgments. A motion for summary judgment, as you may already know, is a procedural vehicle to try to dispose of issues or claims in a lawsuit, either partially or fully. The objective is that the moving party claims that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to a judgment (partially or finally) as a matter of law. See Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510. In May of 2021, Florida adopted the federal summary judgment standard which theoretically means trial courts should grant more summary judgments, not less, based on the more rigorous standard.
There have been many articles that discuss Florida’s new summary judgment standard including how the standard used to be versus how it is supposed to be now that it is modeled after the federal standard. That isn’t the point of this posting. (Here is an article published in the Florida Bar Journal that provides a primer on summary judgments in case you are interested.)
The point of this posting is to understand the words “genuine” and “material” as underlined above when moving for or defending against a summary judgment. These words have important meaning in the context of motions for summary judgment. In other words, what is a genuine issue of material fact? This is a question that should not be overlooked because these are the facts you want to focus on and frame your arguments on when moving for or defending against a summary judgment. Notably, these are also the facts you want to introduce and emphasize at trial.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
First-Party Statutory Bad Faith – 60 Days to Cure Means 60 Days to Cure
October 19, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a first party bad-faith lawsuit, such as a bad faith claim against an insured’s property insurer, there are three requirements that must be met before the bad faith lawsuit is filed: “‘(1) determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required notice must be filed under section 624.155(3)(a).’” Fortune v. First Protective Ins. Co., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2092a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citation omitted).
The third requirement is for the insured to file a Civil Remedy Notice (known as a “CRN”) as a condition precedent to filing a statutory bad faith lawsuit giving the insurer 60 days’ notice of the bad faith violation and to cure the violation, i.e., pay the claim if the violation is payment.
A very common bad faith payment violation is the assertion that the insurer did NOT attempt “in good faith to settle claims when, under the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly towards its insured and with due regard for his or her interests.” Fla. Stat. s. 624.155(1)(b)(1).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Nine Newmeyer & Dillion Attorneys Recognized as Southern California Super Lawyers
February 11, 2019 —
Newmeyer & Dillion LLPProminent business and real estate law firm Newmeyer & Dillion LLP is pleased to announce that nine of its Newport Beach attorneys have been selected to the 2019 Southern California Super Lawyers list. Each year, no more than 5 percent of lawyers are selected to receive this honor.
Attorneys named to the Southern California Super Lawyers list include:
Michael Cucchissi
Jeff Dennis
Greg Dillion
Joseph Ferrentino
Charles Krolikowski
John O'Hara
Jane Samson
Michael Studenka
Paul Tetzloff
Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The patented selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.
About Newmeyer & Dillion
For almost 35 years, Newmeyer & Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, privacy & data security and insurance law, Newmeyer & Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client's needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer & Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949.854.7000 or visit www.ndlf.com.
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The Coronavirus, Zoom Meetings and Now a CCPA Class Action
April 13, 2020 —
Jeffrey M. Dennis & Heather H. Whitehead - Newmeyer DillionWith the ongoing COVID-19 (commonly referred to as the Coronavirus) pandemic and orders to “stay at home” in place across the United States, most organizations have been and continue to utilize remote arrangements. The software program known as “Zoom Meetings”, has become immensely popular as a means to facilitate meetings amongst employees, team members and other consultants rather than meeting in person.
Despite such status, Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom) has been named as a defendant in one of the first, and certainly the most high-profile, class action lawsuits to be filed in California alleging violations of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA).
The Class Action
The complaint filed alleges that Zoom did not protect the personal information of its users as it collected personal information and then shared such information to third parties, including Facebook, without adequate disclosures to users. The allegations specifically refer to Zoom’s boasting about its maintenance of users’ privacy and that they can be trusted with user data. Further, it is noted that there is no disclosure provided in the Zoom Privacy Policy that disclosed that personal information was being shared with Facebook and other third parties.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jeffrey M. Dennis, Newmeyer Dillion and
Heather H. Whitehead, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Dennis may be contacted at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com
Ms. Whitehead may be contacted at heather.whitehead@ndlf.com
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