Keeping Detailed Records: The Best Defense to Constructive Eviction
October 24, 2023 —
Ben T. Welch & Ken Brown - Snell & WilmerInevitably, commercial property owners and managers will be faced with a claim by a tenant of constructive eviction. This article is intended to describe what constructive eviction is and to suggest what owners and managers can do to prepare for, and ward off, such claims.
Constructive eviction occurs where a tenant’s “right of possession and enjoyment” of the leasehold is disrupted by the landlord in a manner that renders the premises “unsuitable for the purposes intended.”i Put another way, it is interference that is so “substantial nature and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of a part or the whole of the demised premises.”ii Although easy to describe in theory, constructive eviction can be devilishly difficult to determine in the real world. In litigation, determining when interference crosses over the line to constructive eviction is intensely fact-sensitive and resists sweeping generalizations.iii
For instance, Utah courts have held that tenants have been constructively evicted when they have been subjected to continual harassment or insults by the landlord or the landlord’s agent,iv prevented or impaired in their access to the leased premises during operating hours,v or when a landlord fails to provide an operable elevator (or other essential commercial amenities) necessary for a tenant’s business operations.vi By contrast, claims of “discomfort” or “inconvenience” have been rejected as a basis for constructive eviction.vii The same goes for claims that a landlord wrongfully served a three-day notice to pay or quit.viii
Generally, constructive eviction is an affirmative defense made in response to a landlord’s lawsuit for nonpayment of rent.ix It is not, as is commonly supposed, a basis for a tenant’s premature abandonment of the premises. In other words, the defense is raised after the tenant has vacated as a result of being effectively “evicted.”x Further, the defense requires the tenant to actually abandon the premises and do so within a “reasonable time” after the alleged interference.xi A tenant cannot stay in possession and simply refuse to pay rent on the basis of constructive eviction.xii
The key consideration in preparing for, and responding to, a claim of constructive eviction is keeping good records. A tenant claiming constructive evicting likely must prove that the issue was raised in a timely manner and, despite multiple entreaties, was never resolved.xiii As such, it is critical that landlords acknowledge tenant complaints as well as document in writing their efforts to ameliorate those complaints. While a landlord does not carry the burden of proof for constructive eviction, detailed documentation can thwart a tenant’s claim that a landlord has been inattentive or unwilling to address the tenant’s concerns.
Detailed records are also useful in disputes where a tenant claims substantial interference. “The whole point of constructive eviction is that the landlord basically drove the tenant out through the landlord’s action or inaction.”xiv As such, a landlord that is unable to document the steps taken in response to complaints will be grossly disadvantaged whereas the tenant, which had control and knowledge of the premises, will have a much easier time describing how the alleged interference deprived them of enjoying the premises.
Even with meticulous records, however, owners and managers may still face claims of construction eviction. In such instances, counsel should be retained to properly advise on compiling, preserving, and employing the evidence necessary to refute the tenant’s claims.
i Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Grp., Inc., 139 P.3d 267, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
ii Gray, 139 P.3d at 270 (citing Neslen, 254 P.2d at 850) (internal formatting omitted).
iii See Gray, 139 P.3d at 269–70 (citing Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847, 850 (Utah 1953)); Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982).
iv See Gray, 139 P.3d at 270–71.
v Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953).
vi See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 375, 378 (Utah 1996) (citing Union City Union Suit Co. v. Miller, 162 A.D.2d 101, 556 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1990)).
vii See Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 682–84 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
viii Barton v. MTB Enterprises, 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (stating that the tenant’s complaints revolved around standard problems commonly associated with building maintenance and did not rise to the level of substantial interference); viv Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 898–900 (Utah 1989) (upholding trial court’s findings of fact concerning insufficiency of disruption so as to justify claim for constructive eviction).
ix See Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
x See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142.
xi See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142; see also Barton v. MTB Enterprises, Inc., 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648.
xii See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142 (citing Fernandez v. Purdue, 518 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1974)).
xiii See Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (noting that while the tenant had raised legitimate issues concerning state of the premises, the landorld had taken steps to remedy the problems within a reasonable time) (citing 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 617).
xiv Barton, 889 P.2d at 477.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ben T. Welch, Snell & Wilmer and
Ken Brown, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Welch may be contacted at bwelch@swlaw.com
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ASCE Statement on Senate Passage of the Water Resources Development Act of 2024
August 12, 2024 —
Marsia Geldert-Murphey, President of the American Society of Civil EngineersWASHINGTON — The
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) commends the Senate for passing S. 4367, the Thomas R. Carper Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2024. Both the House and Senate versions of WRDA will help improve America's ports and inland waterways, enhance flood risk management and storm risk reduction programs, and prioritize ecosystem restoration. ASCE now urges Congress to swiftly conference and pass a final WRDA bill in the upcoming months.
The Senate version of WRDA includes key provisions that will help ensure the ongoing operation of America's inland waterways systems, which received a 'D+' on the
2021 Report Card for America's Infrastructure, including adjustments to the cost share requirements for rehabilitation projects that receive funding the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF). These changes will ensure the IWTF remains available for future projects to help reduce the backlog of inland waterways projects. This bill also creates a Levee Owners Advisory Board, which has the potential to improve communication between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, other federal agencies, and levee owners and operators.
Now that the House and Senate have passed their versions of WRDA, we encourage lawmakers to include several provisions included in the House version in their final conference bill. This includes the reauthorization of the National Dam Safety Program through 2028, provisions that reduce restrictions on the amount of funds states can receive in National Dam Safety Program State Assistance Grants; improves access to the High Hazard Potential Dam Rehabilitation Grant Program; and requires the incorporation of low-head dams into the National Inventory of Dams, and an extension of the National Levee Safety program through 2033.
ABOUT THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS
Founded in 1852, the American Society of Civil Engineers represents more than 160,000 civil engineers worldwide and is America's oldest national engineering society. ASCE works to raise awareness of the need to maintain and modernize the nation's infrastructure using sustainable and resilient practices, advocates for increasing and optimizing investment in infrastructure, and improve engineering knowledge and competency. For more information, visit www.asce.org or www.infrastructurereportcard.org and follow us on Twitter, @ASCETweets and @ASCEGovRel.
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Is the Issuance of a City Use Permit Referable? Not When It Is an Administrative Act
January 10, 2018 —
Adam E. Lang - Real Estate Litigation BlogArizona’s Constitution gives electors in cities, towns, and counties the ability to refer legislation that was enacted by their local elected officials to the ballot for popular vote. Ariz. Const. art. IV, Pt. 1 § 1(8). But only legislative acts are referable; administrative acts are not. In general, a legislative act makes new law and creates policy, is permanent in nature, and is generally applied. On the other hand, an administrative act is one that executes and implements a law already in place. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 169 Ariz. 485, 489-90, 821 P.2d 146, 150-51 (1991).
For more than fifty years, Arizona courts have been clear: zoning and rezoning ordinances are legislative acts and therefore referable to popular vote. City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 17, 363 P.2d 607, 609 (1961) (holding that “what constitutes an appropriate zone is primarily for the legislature”); Fritz v. City of Kingman, 191 Ariz 432, 432, 957 P.2d 337, 337 (1998) (noting “we reaffirm our view that zoning decisions are legislative matters subject to referendum”); Pioneer Trust Co. of Arizona v. Pima Cty., 168 Ariz. 61, 64–65, 811 P.2d 22, 25–26 (1991) (holding “that, in Arizona, zoning decisions are legislative acts subject to referendum” and that even a “conditional approval of . . . rezoning was a legislative act”); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc., 134 Ariz. 46, 653 P.2d 694 (1982) (analyzing whether zoning referendum complied with statutory requirements); Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980) (noting “that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute legislative action”); City of Phoenix v. Oglesby, 112 Ariz. 64, 65, 537 P.2d 934, 935 (1975) (“The matter of zoning is appropriately one for the legislative branch of government.”); Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 108 Ariz. 449, 452, 501 P.2d 391, 394 (1972) (denying an attempt to enjoin referendum on county’s zoning decision).
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Adam E. Lang, Snell & WilmerMr. Lang may be contacted at
alang@swlaw.com
CA Supreme Court Expands Scope of Lawyers’ Statute of Limitations to Non-Legal Malpractice Claims – Confusion Predicted for Law and Motion Judges
August 26, 2015 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Lee v. Hanley (S220775 – Filed 8/20/2015), the California Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 by holding that its limitations period applies to claims against attorneys “whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.” Although it resolved a district split by finding that the statute governs for non-legal malpractice claims against attorneys including those of non-clients, by having the statute’s applicability “turn on the conduct alleged and ultimately proven, not on the way the complaint was styled,” this 5-2 decision also increased the specter of creative pleading and lengthy litigation.
In Lee, the client had advanced $120,000 to cover attorney’s fees, costs and expert witness fees for the underlying litigation. After the case settled, the attorney advised the client that she had a credit balance of approximately $46,000. In response to her demand for a refund, the attorney then advised the client that she did not have a credit balance. More than one year later, the client filed suit to recover the $46,000, plus interest. The trial court sustained the attorney’s demurrer based on the one-year statute of limitations in section 340.6. The appellate court, however, reversed, reasoning that the client’s claim could be construed as one for conversion, in which case section 340.6 would not apply.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Seattle’s Newest Residential Developer
March 13, 2023 —
Michael J. Yelle - Ahlers Cressman & SleightOn February 14, 2023, Seattle voters passed Initiative 135, creating the “Seattle Social Housing Developer” (“Public Developer” or “PD”) and the initiative was signed into law by Mayor Bruce Harrel on March 1, 2023.
[1] With this initiative, voters created Seattle’s newest housing developer. The PD aims to develop, own, and maintain housing in the City of Seattle.
[2] In addition, the PD also intends to retrofit acquired properties to increase energy efficiency and bring them into compliance with accessibility standards.
[3] Contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers may see this as an opportunity to compete for and build everything from new multi-unit housing to handrail installation projects. This post will explore some of the basics of contracting with a public corporation like the Public Developer and what contractors may want to consider in their business planning.
What is the PD?
The Public Developer is a political subdivision of the State of Washington, like a port or fire district.
[4] The Public Developer is not an agency or department of the City of Seattle. In this way, it is like Seattle Public Schools (SPS) because both SPS and the PD operate within the City of Seattle, but have (or will have) their own staff, procurement rules, and standard contracts distinct from the City’s. Like SPS, the PD can also enter construction and supply contracts, sue, and be sued.
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Michael J. Yelle, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Human Eye Resolution Virtual Reality for AEC
July 02, 2018 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessVirtual reality opens new perspectives for communication and customer involvement in construction. Sweco, Varjo, and Teatime Research are together exploring the possibilities of VR using state-of-the-art technology.
“I think that the use of VR in construction is still at a visionary stage and useful practical applications are rare,” says Niina Jaatinen, Service Manager at Sweco. “When we learned about Varjo’s exceptional technology, we thought that maybe it’s now time to start developing the really useful apps customers would yearn for.”
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
info@aepartners.fi
Back Posting with Thoughts on Lien Waivers
May 20, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAfter a week of being unable to post due to the rigors of my solo construction practice, I’m back on the blogging train. For those of you that missed my new musings this past week, I hope that you had a chance to look through some of the past Guest Post Friday posts for some good stuff to read.
During the course of my busy week last week, a question came up regarding the mechanic’s lien waivers that commercial construction companies routinely execute as part of the payment process. The waiver forms vary, but each essentially states that in exchange for payment the payee, whether a subcontractor or supplier (or even general contractor) waives its future rights to record a mechanic’s lien for the work that is covered by the payment received. Most if not all of these forms further require a certification that the funds paid will either be used to pay suppliers or that suppliers have already been paid. This general description is not the reason for this post.
As is always the case in the Commonwealth of Virginia where the contract is king and a court is unlikely to reinterpret any written contractual document, the devil is in how that waiver is worded. Some waivers are worded in such a way that they essentially require a payee to certify receipt of the funds prior to payment being received. These same forms require the same pre-payment certification that all suppliers and subcontractors of the payee have already been paid. In short they require a payee to both place complete trust in the payor that the check will be paid and that the check will not bounce while in many cases (often with an unstated “wink and nod”) claiming payment was already made when all know the likelihood is that it has not.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
The “Your Work” Exclusion—Is there a Trend against Coverage?
September 10, 2014 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorTwo more courts have weighed in on the “your work” exclusion in commercial general liability (CGL) policies, finding that contractors did not have coverage for work performed improperly. These cases highlight that whether you have coverage for poor workmanship will depend on the state’s law applied. It now appears that if you are in South Carolina or Massachusetts, you will not have coverage.
The South Carolina case, Precision Walls, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, involved a subcontractor hired to tape insulation. After taping the insulation, a brick veneer was installed on the exterior. During the brick installation, the mason reported that the tape was losing its adhesion and the subcontractor was instructed to repair the problem. In order to access the tape, portions of the brick veneer had to be removed and re-installed. The subcontractor then sought coverage for the costs associated with repairing the tape.
The insurer denied coverage and the subcontractor sued its insurer. The court ruled in favor of the insurer, finding that the defective tape was “your work” because it was “material furnished in connection” with the subcontractor’s work. The policy specifically excluded from coverage damage to property caused by “your work”. Thus, there was no coverage for the subcontractor.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
