Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Impact Your Construction Project?
November 07, 2022 —
Chris Cazenave - ConsensusDocsThe Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a set of statutes governing commercial transactions. Every state has adopted the UCC or some version of it. Understanding when and how the UCC applies to construction contracts is important because it can affect the agreement’s terms.
Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sales of goods, which the UCC defines very broadly to mean “all things (including specialty manufactured goods) which are movable . . . other than money in which the price is to be paid . . . .” UCC § 2-105. For the construction industry, UCC Article 2 governs most, if not all, purchases of materials and equipment installed or incorporated into the project. As a result, contractors and subcontractors should be familiar with the circumstances under which Article 2 may apply and how it may affect the project.
This article provides a brief overview of when Article 2 may affect your construction project and why it matters. The article also generally covers the UCC’s potential effects on the applicable statute of limitations, implied warranties, and when the obligation to make the payment arises.
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Chris Cazenave, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Cazenave may be contacted at
ccazenave@joneswalker.com
Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies the Litigation Waiver of the One-Action Rule
September 07, 2017 —
Bob L. Olson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogNevada has a one-action rule which, with limited exceptions, requires a creditor seeking to recover a debt secured by real property to proceed against the security first prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally. In the event that a law suit is filed in violation of the one-action rule, final judgment may be entered in favor of the creditor but that judgment “releases and discharges the mortgage or other lien.” NRS 40.455(3). Nevada law further provides that, with the exception of certain guaranties, any provision in an agreement relating to the sale of real property which contains a waiver of Nevada’s anti-deficiency laws may not be enforced by a court because doing so violates Nevada’s public policy. NRS 40.453.
Nevada law also addresses when the one-action rule may be waived in litigation. In the author’s view, the governing statute, NRS 40.435 is ambiguous. Section 2 of that statute states that if the one-action rule is timely interposed as an affirmative defense, the action must either be dismissed without prejudice or continued to allow the creditor to file amended pleadings to convert the action into one which does not violate the one-action rule. This suggests that the one-action rule must be asserted as an affirmative defense in the debtor’s answer to the complaint or it is waived by the debtor. The first sentence of section 3 of the statute, however, seems to suggest that the debtor has up until the entry of a final judgment to waive the one-action rule by stating: “[t]he failure to interpose, before the entry of a final judgment, the provisions of NRS 40.430 [the one-action rule] as an affirmative defense in such a proceeding waives the defense in that proceeding.”
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Bob L. Olson, Snell & WilmerMr. Olson may be contacted at
bolson@swlaw.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
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South Carolina Clarifies the Accrual Date for Its Statute of Repose
March 18, 2019 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistIn Lawrence v. General Panel Corp., 2019 S.C. LEXIS 1, No. 27856 (S.C. Jan. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of South Carolina answered a certified question related to South Carolina’s statute of repose, S.C. Code § 15-3-640,[1] to wit, whether the date of “substantial completion of the improvement” is always measured from the date on which the certificate of occupancy is issued. The court held that a 2005 amendment to § 15-3-640 did not change South Carolina law with respect to the date of substantial completion. Thus, under the revised version of § 15-3-640, “the statute of repose begins to run at the latest on the date of the certificate of occupancy, even if there is ongoing work on any particular part of the project.” A brief review of prior case law may assist with understanding the court’s ruling in Lawrence.
In Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 2001), the Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed the question of whether § 15-3-640 ran from substantial completion of the installation of the windows at issue or on substantial completion of the building as a whole. Citing § 15-3-630(b),[2] the court found that the windows “were ‘a specified area or portion’ of the larger condominium project” and, upon their incorporation into the larger project they could be used for the purpose for which they were intended. Thus, the court held that “the statute of repose began running when installation of the windows was complete.”
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William L. Doerler, White and WilliamsMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Deadline for Hurricane Ian Disaster Recovery Applications Announced
October 17, 2022 —
Lewis BrisboisWashington, D.C. (October 11, 2022) - On Friday, October 7, 2022, the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) announced that applications for the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Public Assistance Grant Program are due by October 29, 2022.
FEMA provides disaster recovery assistance to eligible individuals, families, governments, and private non-profit entities. However, the process for recovering costs is complicated, and FEMA has broad discretion to determine whether applicants and their expenses are eligible. All too often, failure to understand FEMA regulations or submit sufficient documentation results in FEMA denying applicants’ claims, leaving individuals, local governments, and non-profits to bear the full cost of recovery.
While ensuring successful recovery through the FEMA grant program can be challenging, clients can increase their likelihood of success when preparing the initial application and documentation by enlisting experienced legal counsel who understand the FEMA process and regulations.
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Lewis Brisbois
Construction Law Alert: Unlicensed Contractors On Federal Projects Entitled To Payment Under The Miller Act
May 07, 2014 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic and Jessica M. Lassere Ryland - Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPAs a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Technica LLC ex rel. U.S. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 12-56539, 2014 WL 1674108 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2014), allowed an unlicensed subcontractor to recover from a prime contractor for unpaid services relating to a federal construction project under a federal Miller Act claim. California law otherwise prevents unlicensed contractors from recovering for unpaid work on non-federal projects as a penal measure intended to encourage contractors to maintain a valid license at all times.
Technica LLC (“Technica”) worked as a sub-subcontractor on a large federal fence replacement project (the “Project”). Over the course of a year, Technica supplied nearly a million dollars worth of labor, materials, and services for the Project. However, Technica received only $287,861.81 in partial payments for its work. Technica proceeded to file suit in district court against the prime contractor Candelaria Corporation (“Candelaria”) and its payment surety Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“CCIC”) under the Miller Act to recover amounts owed to it on the subcontract against the payment bond.
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Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP and
Jessica M. Lassere Ryland, Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com; Ms. Lassere Ryland may be contacted at jlassere@hbblaw.com
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London Shard Developer Wins Approval for Tower Nearby
November 05, 2014 —
Neil Callanan - BloombergSellar Property Group, developer of the Shard in London, won local government approval to build a 26-story residential tower close to the skyscraper on the south bank of the River Thames.
The council for the Southwark borough voted in favor of the 148-apartment project, which also includes a 16-story tower, at a meeting yesterday, Sellar spokesman Baron Phillips said by e-mail. The project, like the Shard, will be developed in a partnership with the state of Qatar.
Developers plan to construct more than 25,000 luxury properties in London worth more than 60 billion pounds ($96 billion) over the next decade, EC Harris said in an Oct. 7 report. The homes approved yesterday at the Fielden House site are expected to sell for about 800,000 pounds each, according to a filing by the borough.
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Neil Callanan, BloombergMr. Callanan may be contacted at
ncallanan@bloomberg.net
Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 Not Just for Individual Homeowners Anymore?
March 22, 2017 —
Maggie Stewart - Colorado Construction Litigation On March 9, 2017, the Colorado Court of Appeals announced its decision in Broomfield Senior Living Owner, LLC v. R.G. Brinkmann Company, No. 16CA0101, 2017 COA 31 (Colo. App. Mar. 9, 2017). As a matter of first impression, the Court evaluated whether a senior living facility constitutes “residential property” protected by the Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 ("HPA") provision of the Construction Defect Reform Act (CDARA).
In 2007, Plaintiff Broomfield entered into a contract with Defendant Brinkmann for construction of a senior assisted and independent living facility. The contract contained warranty provisions related to the quality of construction and cautioned that Plaintiff’s failure to provide Defendant with prompt notice of any defects would result in waiver of any claim for breach. The contract also limited Defendant Brinkmann’s liability by identifying three separate accrual provisions that would determine the time period in which Plaintiff could bring a claim. The project was completed in 2009.
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Maggie Stewart, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMs. Stewart may be contacted at
stewart@hhmrlaw.com
