Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Litigation Roundup: “You Can’t Make Me Pay!”

August 19, 2024 — Daniel Lund III - Lexology
The foregoing is an accurate statement, generally speaking, for Louisiana public entities. Statutory and constitutional provisions in Louisiana protect public entities from being forced to pay monies – including satisfying court judgments – when the monies have not been specifically allocated for the purpose. Correspondingly, there is ordinarily no means to seize public assets to satisfy judgments. On the other hand, writs of mandamus in Louisiana – actions designed to compel a public official to undertake a ministerial duty over which the public official has no discretion – can be aimed at forcing a public official (on behalf of the public entity) to pay money. In an inverse condemnation case, plaintiffs prevailed on the theory that a Louisiana public entity had “damaged and interfered with their use and enjoyment of their private homes and church” during a New Orleans drainage project. The plaintiffs pursued a writ of mandamus to compel payment their approximately $1.5 million judgment for damages and fees as a “ministerial duty” of the public entity. To be sure, in connection with the judgment, the public entity had not at any time specifically allocated funds for the payment. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Daniel Lund III, Phelps
Mr. Lund may be contacted at daniel.lund@phelps.com

Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment

November 07, 2012 — CDJ STAFF
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial. The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer. The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal. The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred. In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no. Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Read the court decision
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Washington State Enacts Law Restricting Non-Compete Agreements

September 23, 2019 — Ellie Perka - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Washington State has enacted a new law that means big changes for employers. The new law, in effect on January 1, 2020, will dramatically limit the enforcement of non-compete agreements in our state and imposes tough penalties on employers found to be in violation. While the new law does not take effect for many months, businesses should nonetheless act quickly and before year’s end to evaluate practices and, if necessary, revise existing and future non-compete agreements to ensure compliance. Under the new law, if an employee successfully proves a company’s non-compete agreement is unenforceable, then the employer will be required to pay the greater of $5,000 or an employee’s actual damages, plus the employee’s attorneys’ fees (and its own, in defending the non-compete), expenses and costs incurred in challenging the agreement. Brief Summary of Changes Washington Courts have typically disfavored restrictive covenants but usually enforced a non-competition agreement that protected an employer’s legitimate business interests and was reasonable in scope, geographic reach, and duration. The Legislature halted this trend through passage of Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1450. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Ellie Perka, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Ms. Perka may be contacted at ellie.perka@acslawyers.com

Seattle Independent Contractor Ordinance – Pitfalls for Unwary Construction Professionals

October 09, 2023 — Travis Colburn - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Chapter 14.34 of the Seattle Municipal Code is a relatively new ordinance that can affect the parties to a construction contract for work performed within the City of Seattle’s city limits. The Independent Contractor Protection Ordinance (“ICPO”) was enacted to provide self-employed persons, or entities composed of not more than one person, regardless of corporate form, recourse for timely payment for work performed. The ICPO applies to contracts of $600[i] or more between an independent contractor and a hiring entity where the work, in whole or in part, is known to be performed within the City of Seattle’s city limits.[ii] The ICPO cannot be waived by parties to a contract.[iii] Historically, the primary legal recourse for non-payment or late payment for work performed under a contract involves an expensive breach of contract action, and one reason the ICPO was enacted was to give greater protection to a growing number of Washington independent contractors who report problems with timely and accurate payment. The ICPO affects “hiring entities” or any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any entity, person or group of persons, or a successor thereof, that hires independent contractors to provide services within the scope of a hiring entity’s business or commercial activities. In the construction context, most general contractors, subcontractors, design professionals, and design consultants should be aware of this ordinance, as well as certain owners[iv] and development-side entities. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Travis Colburn, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Mr. Colburn may be contacted at travis.colburn@acslawyers.com

Construction Continues To Boom Across The South

September 09, 2019 — Louise Poirier - Engineering News-Record
Contractors reported revenue growth of $2 billion in 2018 and are optimistic heading into the second half of 2019. The looming threat of a downturn, though, weighs heavy on some industry leaders’ minds as does the constant threat of workforce shortages. Reprinted courtesy of Louise Poirier, Engineering News-Record Ms. Poirier may be contacted at poirierl@enr.com Read the court decision
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Awarding Insurer Summary Judgment Before Discovery Completed Reversed

August 29, 2022 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's awarding of summary judgment to the insurer because discovery was not completed. Sacramento v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 4292 (Fla. Ct. App. June 22, 2022). The insured filed a claim under the all-risk policy for water damage caused by Hurricane Irma. Citizens denied the claim based upon a policy exclusion. The insured filed suit on March 8, 2019. On April 24, 2020, Citizens moved for summary judgment. A hearing was set for August 10, 2020. Citizens filed a notice for a deposition of a Mitigation Company representative scheduled to occur on December 1, 2020. On August 14, 2020, the insured filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion arguing that it would be premature to grant the motion because there were still pending depositions. The insured specifically requested that the trial court not enter summary judgment until the mitigation company's representative was deposed because he was a key witness who would be testifying regarding the cause of loss. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Proving Impacts to Critical Path to Defeat Liquidated Damages Assessment

December 16, 2019 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
When a contractor is staring down the barrel of an owner’s assessment of liquidated damages, the burden will fall on the contractor to establish that the delay was attributable to the owner and the owner’s agents. The contractor will want to do this not only to defeat the assessment of liquidated damages, but because it will want to establish that the delay caused it to incur extended field overhead (general conditions) for which the owner is responsible. A contractor supports its burden by proving the impacts to its critical path. “In general, proving an allegation of government-caused delays without a means of showing the critical path is a steep prospect.” James Talcott Construction v. U.S., 2019 WL 1040383, *8 (Fed. Cl. 2019) (unreported opinion) (finding that because contractor did NOT present a critical path analysis it could not support its claim for delay caused by the government). Avoiding the assessment of liquidated damages means the contractor needs to support that it encountered excusable delay and it is/was entitled to an extension of time to complete the project. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

South Carolina Clarifies the Accrual Date for Its Statute of Repose

March 18, 2019 — William L. Doerler - The Subrogation Strategist
In Lawrence v. General Panel Corp., 2019 S.C. LEXIS 1, No. 27856 (S.C. Jan. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of South Carolina answered a certified question related to South Carolina’s statute of repose, S.C. Code § 15-3-640,[1] to wit, whether the date of “substantial completion of the improvement” is always measured from the date on which the certificate of occupancy is issued. The court held that a 2005 amendment to § 15-3-640 did not change South Carolina law with respect to the date of substantial completion. Thus, under the revised version of § 15-3-640, “the statute of repose begins to run at the latest on the date of the certificate of occupancy, even if there is ongoing work on any particular part of the project.” A brief review of prior case law may assist with understanding the court’s ruling in Lawrence. In Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 2001), the Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed the question of whether § 15-3-640 ran from substantial completion of the installation of the windows at issue or on substantial completion of the building as a whole. Citing § 15-3-630(b),[2] the court found that the windows “were ‘a specified area or portion’ of the larger condominium project” and, upon their incorporation into the larger project they could be used for the purpose for which they were intended. Thus, the court held that “the statute of repose began running when installation of the windows was complete.” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Doerler, White and Williams
Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com

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