New York Appellate Court Applies Broad Duty to Defend to Property Damage Case
January 03, 2022 —
Craig Rokuson - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn the recent case of New York Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Eastman Cooke & Associates, 153 N.Y.S.3d 840, 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2021), New York’s first department affirmed a duty to defend under New York law. In the underlying action, the plaintiff alleged property damages due to prolonged construction work in a different unit of the subject property. The underlying plaintiff sued the owner of the subject property, which in turn sued Eastman Cooke, the general contractor at the premises. New York Marine denied coverage to Eastman Cooke, asserting that the underlying suit did not seek damages occurring during the New York Marine policy period, and commenced a declaratory judgment action.
The trial court held—and the First Department affirmed—that New York Marine has a duty to defend Eastman Cooke. Initially, the court found that the underlying suit alleged property damage as required for coverage, because there were allegations regarding loss of use of the property. The court also found that the underlying suit alleged damages occurring during the New York Marine policy period. Although the underlying complaint alleged that the underlying plaintiffs were reimbursed for damages occurring during the New York Marine policy period by another insurer, the court held that the evidence was that the payments only covered a certain part of the damages sought. Accordingly, because there was a reasonable possibility that some unreimbursed damages may fall within the New York Marine policy period.
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Craig Rokuson, Traub LiebermanMr. Rokuson may be contacted at
crokuson@tlsslaw.com
Walkability Increases Real Estate Values
June 18, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFCNBC reported that environmentally-conscious Millennials are looking for homes that are within walking or biking distance to stores and work. The “areas that offer so-called walkability should see more home buyers and renters than those that don't.”
"Cities that want to thrive in our new economic and demographic realities will need to find ways to create and support more of these dynamic, productive walkable districts that are in high demand," Geoff Anderson, CEO of Smart Growth America, told CNBC. Anderson, “in conjunction with George Washington University School of Business, released a new report ranking the walkability of the nation's 30 largest metropolitan areas.”
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Need to Cover Yourself for “Crisis” Changes on a Job Site? Try These Tips (guest post)
July 02, 2018 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback – Construction Law in North CarolinaToday, we welcome back friend of the blog Christopher G. Hill.
Chris is a LEED AP, a Virginia Supreme Court certified mediator, construction lawyer and owner of the Richmond, VA firm, The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC. Chris authors the Construction Law Musings blog where he discusses legal and policy issues relevant to construction professionals.
As construction professionals we’ve all been there. Something happens on a job site that requires immediate attention and possibly a changed sequence of work or possibly a change to a subcontractor’s scope. It could be a buried power line that Miss Utility failed to mark properly or an owner that wants a different HVAC configuration at the last minute. It could also simply be that it rained too much, and work had to slow down.
The above examples are instances of items that are beyond the control of the general contractor or the subcontractors and are the type that require shifts in work schedules and changes in scope that must be dealt with on the fly and require quick decisions and immediate action if the project is to meet any time of completion reasonably close to that which is listed in the contract documents. It can often seem that there is no time to meet the written change order provisions of any well drafted construction contract.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Shifting Fees and Costs in Nevada Construction Defect Cases
November 26, 2014 —
Casey J. Quinn - Newmeyer & Dillion LLPIn Nevada, homeowners who sue a builder for residential constructional defects may recover attorneys’ fees and costs caused by the defect. Many times, the request for attorneys’ fees can outpace the size of the actual claim for defects. However, Nevada provides builders with two ways to potentially shift the right to recover attorneys’ fees and costs away from the homeowner and to the builder.
The first arises during the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapter 40 process (Nevada’s Right to Repair law). After a builder receives notice of construction defects, it is required to provide the claimant with a written response to each defect, which may include a proposal for monetary compensation (including contribution from a subcontractor, supplier, or design professional). See NRS 40.6472. If a claimant unreasonably rejects a reasonable written offer of settlement included in the response and decides to commence litigation, the court may deny the claimant’s attorneys’ fees and costs and award attorneys’ fees and costs to the builder. See NRS 40.650. Thus, by including a reasonable offer of monetary compensation in a Chapter 40 response, a builder could possibly avoid paying any fees and costs and even recover its own fees in defending against the claim.
A second method for shifting fees and costs is through a written offer of judgment (OOJ). See NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68. Not limited solely to construction defect matters, an OOJ is a useful tool in all kinds of litigation. OOJs are designed to facilitate and encourage pre-trial settlement by incentivizing parties to make reasonable settlement offers that—when unreasonably rejected—have the consequence of shifting the right to recover attorneys’ fees. Basically, when a party rejects an OOJ and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the court cannot award any attorneys’ fees and costs to the rejecting party and may award attorneys’ fees incurred from the date of the offer to the entry of judgment, as well as all reasonable costs, to the party who made the offer. In a recent decision, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that when a homeowner rejects an OOJ and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, it can wipe out that homeowner’s right to Chapter 40 fees and costs. See Gunderson, et al. v. D.R. Horton, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (Feb. 27, 2014). In other words, “While NRS Chapter 40 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees proximately caused by a construction defect, it does not guarantee it.” Id.
Because of the potentially harsh consequences of rejecting an OOJ, there are specific requirements that must be met to trigger them. An offer of judgment must be made in writing, can be made at any time at least 10 days before trial, and is irrevocable for 10 days with no provision for withdrawal before the 10 days expire. See Nava v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 396, 46 P.3d 60 (2002). A party may make successive offers of judgment, but the most recent offer extinguishes previous offers and is controlling for determining the date from which attorneys’ fees may be awarded. See Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc. 132 P.3d 1022 (2006).
In Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983), the Nevada Supreme Court explained that the purpose of OOJs are not to cause plaintiffs to unfairly forego legitimate claims. However, when a valid offer of judgment is made, the offer is rejected, and the party rejecting the offer fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, a court must evaluate whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith; whether the offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and whether the fees sought by the offer are reasonable and justified. “After weighing the foregoing factors, the district judge may, where warranted, award up to the full amount of fees requested.” Id.
It is worth noting that in Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc. 132 P.3d 1022 (2006), the Nevada Supreme Court held that when a party rejects a reasonable OOJ and is foreclosed from recovering fees and costs, the party is likewise foreclosed from an award of fees and costs under Chapter 40. This means that even if a builder fails to include a monetary settlement offer as part of a Chapter 40 response, it may still avoid paying the claimant’s fees and costs with a reasonable and timely OOJ.
Finally, it is important to remember that OOJs are a powerful tool that can cut both ways. If an OOJ is not reasonable and timely, or if it fails to contemplate all the potential recovery of an offeree, the OOJ may have no effect on the outcome of a case. Moreover, if a party rejects an OOJ and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, that party could end up paying the offeror’s costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the offer. Given this powerful impact, OOJs should be an integral part of pre-litigation planning and overall litigation strategy.
About the Author
Casey J. Quinn is an associate in the Las Vegas office of
Newmeyer & Dillion LLP. His practice focuses on complex commercial, construction, and insurance litigation and appellate work. Casey can be reached by email at Casey.Quinn@ndlf.com.
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Appraisers May Determine Causation
January 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn a case of first impression, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that an appraisal may determine issues of causation. North Glenn Homeowners Association v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 854 N.W. 2d 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
On July 15, 2009, North Glenn Homeowners Association submitted a claim to State Farm for hail damage on the roof. The claim was paid. North Glenn did not repair all of the damage, instead deciding to use some of the money to make other repairs to the property.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
California Case Is a Reminder That Not All Insurance Policies Are Alike Regarding COVID-19 Losses
April 05, 2021 —
Neal I. Sklar & Joshua A. Morehouse - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.A recent case from the Central District of California reminds us that not all insurance policies are alike. Depending on the particular policy, losses from the COVID-19 outbreak could qualify as property damage and therefore could be recoverable under an all-risk insurance policy.
COVID-19 has in many cases imposed significant costs on contractors, and in a host of ways. Contractors’ attempts to recover these costs from owners or insurers have at times been frustrated by contractual or policy language written after a lengthy time, during which the risk of a pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 was not as much of a concern as it is now. This has led contractors to explore new, often creative legal theories in their attempts to recover costs flowing from COVID-19.
A recent Complaint filed in the Central District of California focuses on all-risk property insurance policies and the potential for contractors who have purchased such policies to classify contamination from COVID-19 as an insurable property loss.
In AECOM v. Zurich Insurance Company, Case No. 2:21-cv-00237-JAK-MRW (C.D. Cal), a contractor purchased “all-risk” property insurance from Zurich. This policy covered “economic losses from all risks not expressly excluded.” According to the Complaint, the presence of COVID-19 on its properties “physically alter[ed] air, airspace, and surfaces preventing… (the contractor) from using its properties for their intended purpose and function.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Neal I. Sklar, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
Joshua A. Morehouse, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Sklar may be contacted at nsklar@pecklaw.com
Mr. Morehouse may be contacted at jmorehouse@pecklaw.com
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Whose Lease Is It Anyway: Physical Occupancy Not Required in Landlord-Tenant Dispute
February 07, 2018 —
Afua Akoto – SDV Case Alert In September 2017, a Texas Federal district judge ruled that that Personal and Advertising Injury coverage in a CGL policy did not require physical occupancy in a landlord-tenant dispute.
In the underlying lawsuit, restaurant owner Ziggy Gruber alleged that John Dunn, the landlord of a Houston shopping center, wrongfully interfered with his right of occupancy at the shopping center by failing to complete the negotiation of a lease and preventing his occupancy of the space. Gruber further alleged that he had acquired a direct interest in the premises and became a rightful tenant but as a result of Dunn’s interference, he was never able to open his restaurant.
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Afua Akoto, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. Ms. Akoto may be contacted at
asa@sdvlaw.com
A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default
April 22, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it.
An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:
Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.
Williams Building Company, supra.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
