Ninth Circuit Finds Policy’s Definition of “Policy Period” Fatal to Insurer’s “Related Claims” Argument
April 10, 2019 —
Jason M. Taylor - TLSS Insurance Law BlogProfessional liability policies often include some form of a “related claims” or “related acts” provision stating that if more than one claim results from a single wrongful act, or a series of related wrongful acts, such claims will be treated as a single claim and deemed first made during the policy period in which the earliest claim was made. These provisions can have significant implications on the applicable policy and policy limits, retroactive date issues, and whether such claims were first made and reported during a particular policy period. Recently, the Ninth Circuit issued a stern reminder of how the particular policy language can effect, and in this case thwart, the intended scope of the carrier’s “related claims” provision.
In Attorneys Ins. Mut. Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 2019 WL 643442 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2019), the Ninth Circuit construed a “related claims” provision included in two consecutive lawyers professional liability policies. During both the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 insurance policy periods, attorney J. Wayne Allen (“Allen”) was insured through his employer by Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation’s (“Liberty”) professional liability insurance. Third parties filed suit against Allen during the 2009–2010 policy period in a probate case, and a second, related civil suit during the 2010–2011 policy period.
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Jason M. Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
Flag on the Play! Expired Contractor’s License!
October 02, 2015 —
Yas Omidi – California Construction Law BlogIt’s football season again. Which means, of course, that in addition to touch downs and field goals, you’ll also see hooting and hollering when the ref throws down a yellow flag signaling that a foul has been committed.
In Judicial Council of California v. Jacob Facilities, Inc., Case Nos. A140890, A141393 (August 20, 2015), The California Court of Appeals for the First District threw down its own yellow flag under the dreaded Business and Professions Code section 7031, finding that a contractor was required to disgorge all monies received on a project – to the tune of a whopping $18 million – when its parent company allowed the subsidiary’s contractor’s license to lapse when it rebranded a new company to perform the work of the old company but never formally assigned the contract. I think someone in marketing may be in big trouble.
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Yasmeen, Omidi, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMs. Omidi may be contacted at
yomidi@wendel.com
Court Bars Licensed Contractor From Seeking Compensation for Work Performed by Unlicensed Sub
June 06, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIt all started with a tree.
A eucalyptus tree to be exact.
What followed is one of the more important cases to be decided under Business and Professions Code section 7031 in recent years. Yes, that Section 7031. The statute variously described by the state’s courts as “harsh[ ],” draconian” and “unjust,” but, importantly, nevertheless valid.
Under Section 7031, an unlicensed contractor is barred from seeking compensation for work requiring a contractor’s license. This has been called the “shield.” However, in addition to the “shield,” project owners can also employ Section 7031’s “sword,” and seek disgorgement of all monies paid to an unlicensed contractor. Section 7031’s “shield” and “sword” applies even if the project owner knew that the contractor was unlicensed. They also apply even if the unlicensed contractor’s work was flawless. And they also apply even if a contractor was unlicensed during a portion of its work. This is because, as courts have stated, Section 7031 is a consumer protection statute intended to protect the public from unlicensed contractors and applies irrespective of the equities.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Don’t Be Lazy with Your Tenders
October 24, 2022 —
Rick Erickson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogOur clients probably spend significant time, money and effort refining and updating their contract provisions covering indemnification and the duty to defend claims arising on their projects. But they should also consider spending an appropriate and adequate amount of time, money and effort when sending notices, or “tenders,” to enforce those critical provisions. Tenders demanding defense and indemnity are strictly interpreted based on what the contract documents require. Getting tenders wrong can result in losing one of the most significant risk-shifting tools in the contract. It can also be a monumental mistake if insurance coverage for indemnification damages and defense costs are lost because of an inadequate tender.
The legal definition of “tender” is simple; it is “[a]n unconditional offer of money or performance to satisfy a debt or obligation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1479-80 (7th ed. 1999). Whereas “tender of defense” for insurance is “the act in which one party places its defense and all costs associated with said defense with another due to a contract or other agreement … [which] transfers the obligation of the defense and possible indemnification to the party to which the tender was made.” Int’l Risk Mgmt. Inst., Glossary. Thus, when claims arise on your projects, notice by tenders of defense and indemnity will often determine dispute resolution and available insurance proceeds.
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Rick Erickson, Snell & WilmerMr. Erickson may be contacted at
rerickson@swlaw.com
Despite Misapplying California Law, Federal Court Acknowledges Virus May Cause Physical Alteration to Property
October 26, 2020 —
Scott P. DeVries, Michael S. Levine & Michael L. Huggins - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOn August 28, Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the Central District of California, entered the latest ruling in the ongoing saga of the COVID-19 business interruption coverage dispute between celebrity plaintiff’s attorney Mark Geragos and Insurer Travelers.
The case, 10E, LLC v. The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut, was filed in state court. Travelers removed to federal court, where Geragos sought remand and Travelers moved to dismiss. Judge Wilson denied remand and granted the Motion to Dismiss, finding plaintiff did not satisfactorily allege the actual presence of COVID-19 on insured property or physical damage to its property. This holding is inconsistent with long standing principles of California insurance law and appears to improperly enhance the minimal pleading threshold under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only allege a claim “that is plausible on its face.”).
After rejecting Geragos’ attempt to have the case remanded based on a finding that Geragos had fraudulently joined a defendant to avoid removal, the Judge proceeded to the Motion to Dismiss which raised three issues: (1) the effect of the Virus Exclusion in the Travelers’ Policy, (2) whether plaintiff failed to allege that the governmental orders prohibited access to its property, and (3) whether plaintiff could “‘plausibly allege that it suffered ‘direct physical loss or damage to property’ as required for civil authority coverage.’” Rather than address the effect of the exclusion, which would be the narrowest issue (this exclusion is not present in all policies), the Court proceeded directly to the third issue, which has the broadest potential application.
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Scott P. DeVries, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael L. Huggins, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. DeVries may be contacted at sdevries@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Huggins may be contacted at mhuggins@HuntonAK.com
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Appellate Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Order Compelling Appraisal
January 16, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Eleventh Circuit recently held that the district court's order compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings pending appraisal was an interlocutory order that was not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292 (a) (1). Positano Place at Naples Condominium Association, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27961 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2023).
Postiano Condominium Association suffered damage from Hurricane Irma. Pastiano notified its insurer, Empire, seven months later. Empire investigated the claim and inspected the property. Positano sent a written request for appraisal. Empire did not respond and Pastiano filed suit, alleging that the parties' dispute was not a coverage dispute but a dispute over the amount of the loss. Postiano moved to compel appraisal and to stay the proceedings pending completion of the appraisal.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Coverage for Construction Defects Barred By Exclusion j (5)
April 15, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Texas Court Appeal reversed a trial court judgment which found coverage in favor of the contractor based upon exclusion j(5). Dallas Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Calitex Corp., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2002 (Tex. Ct. App. March 3, 2015).
Turnkey Residential Group, Inc., was the contractor to construct a twelve-unit townhome complex in Dallas. The owner of the project was Calitex Corporation. Construction began on November 2006. The project was to be completed by Turnkey by October 27, 2007.
Calitex filed suit against Turnkey and some of its subcontractors in February 2008. Calitex alleged problems with Turnkey's work included: (1) the stone exterior was not properly treated and leaked, and some areas were left uncovered with stone; and (2) windows leaked. It was further alleged that the quality of materials, labor and craftsmanship did not meet the standards of the contract and resulted in damages. Turnkey submitted a notice of claim to its insurer, Dallas National Insurance Company (DNIC). Coverage was denied.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
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