Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Ohio Court Refuses to Annualize Multi-Year Policies’ Per Occurrence Limits
June 19, 2023 —
Patricia Santelle, Adam Berardi & Lynndon Groff - White and Williams LLPWhite and Williams recently obtained summary judgment against an insured on behalf of an insurer and a guarantor, establishing that two multi-year insurance policies provide per occurrence limits on a per policy rather than a per year basis, which shielded potential exposure by over $100 million.
The insured had previously sought and obtained coverage under two policies in connection with a single occurrence arising out of massive environmental contamination claims involving a large industrial site. The issue of whether the policies provide per occurrence limits on a policy term or annual basis was not resolved in this earlier litigation.
The first policy was effective for three years and provides per occurrence limits of $40 million. The second policy was effective for up to three years and provides per occurrence limits of $15 million.
Reprinted courtesy of
Patricia Santelle, White and Williams LLP,
Adam Berardi, White and Williams LLP and
Lynndon Groff, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Santelle may be contacted at santellep@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Berardi may be contacted at berardia@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Groff may be contacted at groffl@whiteandwilliams.com
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New York Appellate Team Obtains Affirmance of Dismissal of Would-Be Labor Law Action Against Municipal Entities
August 12, 2024 —
Lewis Brisbois NewsroomNew York, N.Y. (July 11, 2024) - In Charlot v. City of New York, ___ A.D.3d ___, 2024 NY Slip Op 03161 (2d Dep’t 2024), New York Associate Dean Pillarella, a member of the Appellate Practice, recently obtained an affirmance of the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action against the City of New York (“the City”) for failure to timely serve a notice of claim. New York Partner Meghan Cavalieri, a member of the Construction Practice, and her team authored and argued the initial motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff alleged to have sustained injuries as a result of a construction-site accident on December 8, 2020, on City-owned property in the course of the construction of a school by the New York City School Construction Authority. N.Y. General Municipal Law (“GML”) § 50-e(1)(a), requires service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arises as a condition precedent to the commencement of a tort action. The plaintiff served no notice of claim until June 2021 and commenced an action in January 2022, alleging violations of N.Y. Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200. Given the plaintiff’s failure to comply with GML § 50-e(1)(a), Meghan and her team rejected the notices of claim as untimely. The plaintiff then moved for leave to deem the notices of claim timely served nunc pro tunc. In response, Meghan and her team opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the action.
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Lewis Brisbois
Can an App Renovate a Neighborhood?
August 10, 2021 —
Patrick Sisson - BloombergOn a sleepy stretch of West Jefferson Boulevard not far from downtown Los Angeles, cars typically speed past blocks of old warehouses and blank retail facades for destinations elsewhere. But slow down, hit the sidewalk and peek into and around a few buildings, and you’ll see the telltale signs of renovation: sandblasted walls, new windows, work crews and exposed wood beams.
In an expansive brick building that once housed a child-care center before reverting to a warehouse, an inside-out renovation for a future food hall has stripped the wooden ceiling down to gorgeous bow trusses, sunlight filtering through the gaps and lighting up a floor of dirt filled with tracks from heavy machinery.
This string of commercial development, 20 buildings in total, isn’t a typical project, nor does it rely on traditional sources of financing. A clue can be found on the white and orange signs above a handful of buildings between La Brea Avenue and Crenshaw Boulevard, beckoning potential tenants to call Fundrise for leasing opportunities for built-to-suit office/retail.
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Patrick Sisson, Bloomberg
Reminder About the Upcoming Mechanic’s Lien Form Change
August 26, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs July 1, 2019 approaches with its inevitable changes to the Virginia Code, I wanted to remind you once again that the statutory form for a Virginia mechanic’s lien will change as of that date.
HB2409 passed both houses of the General Assembly and has been signed by the Governor. This bill reconciled the language found in Virginia Code Sec. 43-4 with the various forms for general contractor, subcontractor and sub-subcontractor/supplier forms found in later sections of the code. As you will see if you download the .pdf of the bill as signed, this involved some tweaks to 43-4 and some updates to the mechanic’s lien forms that are in the code. The recent Desai case from the Virginia Supreme Court made it clear that such action was necessary.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
California Case Adds Difficulties for Contractors & Material Suppliers
August 20, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFGarret Murai in his California Law Blog declared that “things just got a lot tougher for contractors and material suppliers in the Golden State.” In his blog, Murai analyzed the recent case Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Eastern Municipal Water District, Case No. E054618 (July 23, 2014), in which “the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth Appellate District found that a subcontractor’s public works payment bond claim was time barred because its stop payment notice was served ‘before’ a notice of completion was recorded.”
Murai explained the importance of the ruling and how it changed the status quo: “Whereas before, it was commonly understood that you could serve a stop payment notice ‘during’ construction (after all, that was the point wasn’t it, to stop construction funds before they are paid out), now you may have only have a 30 day window (probably less) to serve a stop notice within 30 days after a notice of completion or notice of cessation is recorded.”
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Supreme Court Upholds Prevailing Wage Statute
August 19, 2024 —
Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCHistorically, the prevailing wage was calculated by averaging the wages within a certain industry and county. However, in 2018 the Washington Legislature amended the statute so that the prevailing wage would be assessed based on the highest wage set by collective bargaining agreements in the county. The amendment (RCW 39.12.015(3)) reads as follows:
(3)(a)…the industrial statistician shall establish the prevailing rate of wage by adopting the hourly wage, usual benefits, and overtime paid for the geographic jurisdiction established in collective bargaining agreements…
(b) For trades and occupations in which there are no collective bargaining agreements in the county, the industrial statistician shall establish the prevailing rate of wage by…conducting wage and hour surveys.
So, for example, if union engineers bargain for a wage, that is the wage all engineers in the county must be paid on public projects. The legislature passed this law for the sake of efficiency because it took significant resources for the Industrial Statistician to compute the prevailing wage for every trade and every county, but the law has significant knock-on effects.
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Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mitigating Mold Exposure in Manufacturing and Multifamily Buildings
July 31, 2024 —
Laura Champagne - Construction ExecutiveAs hurricanes season and summer storms approach, more apartment complexes, commercial and industrial properties, and public buildings are at risk of leaking and flooding. Water-saturated structures are prime breeding grounds for mold, but there are ways to prevent, detect and remove it before it becomes a serious and costly issue—for buildings and building residents alike. Being proactive limits an owner’s exposure to the liability of debilitating health effects and structural safety concerns.
Mold requires three things to grow: water, food and humidity. Water will stealthily penetrate small porous surfaces of any building material, such as drywall, plaster, wood, concrete or even fabrics. These materials serve as a food source to quickly produce more fungus. Common sources of undetected water flow include foundation problems, poorly installed windows, roof malfunctions, gutter clogs, storm damage, leaky pipes, improper drainage, HVAC issues, faulty appliances, bathroom vent issues and wet building materials. Mold loves humidity and thrives in dark, warm environments, such as attics, basements, lofts, building corners and bathrooms.
Reprinted courtesy of
Laura Champagne, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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