Considering Stormwater Management
March 26, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAmanda Voss discusses stormwater and erosion control in a recent article published in Big Builder. “Stormwater and erosion control regulations are expanding their reach in the building industry,” Voss stated. “Now, even some remodeling programs have them.”
Voss presented various ideas to assist builders with stormwater management. First, she says, to identify potential pollutants: “You’ve got to pay attention not just to what you bring on to a site, but also to what leaves it—think erosion control and existing sediment.” Factors to consider include “site topography,” “materials brought in and out,” and the “staging area.”
Voss also suggested to “[m]ake sure that your stormwater strategy dovetails with a drainage plan,” and finally, to “[e]nlist the inspector as an ally.”
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Sales of Existing Homes in U.S. Fall to Lowest Since 2012
March 26, 2014 —
Shobhana Chandra – BloombergPurchases (ETSLTOTL) of previously owned homes in the U.S. declined in February to the lowest level since July 2012, a sign the industry may be slow to recover.
Contract closings on existing properties fell 0.4 percent to a 4.6 million annual rate, matching the median projection in a Bloomberg survey, figures from the National Association of Realtors showed today in Washington. Prices rose 9.1 percent from a year earlier, the group said.
The slowdown in sales since the middle of last year reflects a pickup in borrowing costs, declining affordability and, more recently, bad weather. Faster job growth that generates bigger income gains are needed to spur demand and allow housing to contribute more to the economy.
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Shobhana Chandra, BloombergMs. Chandra may be contacted at
schandra1@bloomberg.net
Home Builder Doesn’t See Long Impact from Hurricane
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFNo one needs to tell Toll Brothers about the impact of Hurricane Sandy. The Wall Street Journal reports that the home building company lost power as a result of the storm. Martin Connor, the company’s CFO, told the Journal that he did not expect the hurricane to have a big effect on sales. Luckily for the company, many of its large projects are either sufficiently completed to provide shelter or too early in the process to be affected by the storm. “This type of weather event has limited impact on the market. It may move settlements later, and may defer people a weekend or two until they go out shopping. But it doesn’t have a long impact.”
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Liability Insurer’s Duty To Defend Insured Is Broader Than Its Duty To Indemnify
June 03, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhen it comes to liability insurance, an insurer’s duty to defend its insured from a third-party claim is much broader than its duty to indemnify. This broad duty to defend an insured is very important and, as an insured, you need to know this. “A liability insurer’s obligation, with respect to its duty to defend, is not determined by the insured’s actual liability but rather by whether the alleged basis of the action against the insurer falls within the policy’s coverage.” Advanced Systems, Inc. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D996b (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (internal quotation omitted). This means:
Even where the complaint alleges facts partially within and partially outside the coverage of a policy, the insurer is nonetheless obligated to defend the entire suit, even if the facts later demonstrate that no coverage actually exists. And, the insurer must defend even if the allegations in the complaint are factually incorrect or meritless. As such, an insurer is obligated to defend a claim even if it is uncertain whether coverage exists under the policy. Furthermore, once a court finds that there is a duty to defend, the duty will continue even though it is ultimately determined that the alleged cause of action is groundless and no liability is found within the policy provisions defining coverage.
Advanced Systems, supra(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Anti-Concurrent, Anti-Sequential Causation Clause Precludes Coverage
February 26, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiWhere the building was damaged by both a covered cause and a non-covered cause, the policy's anti-concurrent/anti-sequential causation clause barred coverage for a collapsed building. Ashrit Realty LLC v. Tower Nat'l Ins. Co., 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 20, 2015).
The property sustained moderate damage during a storm on August 14, 2011. More extensive damage was caused by Hurricane Irene two weeks later. After the hurricane, a large hole formed due to the collapse of a pipe which ran underneath the property. Once the pipe collapsed, leaking water caused substantial soil erosion, which led to the collapse of the rear portion of the building.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Top Developments March 2024
April 22, 2024 —
Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterCLAIMS-MADE COVERAGE
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot. LLC, 2024 Del. LEXIS 68 (Del. Feb. 26, 2024)
Delaware Supreme Court concludes that a letter from a lawyer informing an insured of possible lawsuits without identifying potential plaintiffs or demanding payment is not a “claim for damages” within the meaning of claims-made CGL and umbrella liability policies. Citing case law from Delaware and other jurisdictions, it reasoned that, in the ordinary sense, a “claim for damages” (which the policies did not define) is “a demand or request for monetary relief by or on behalf of an identifiable claimant.” According to the court, the letter in question did not meet this definition because it did not identify any claimants “except in the vaguest terms” or request monetary relief on any claimant’s behalf, but rather communicated only a threat of future litigation. As a result, the letter was not a claim made before the policy periods at issue.
POLLUTION EXCLUSION
Wesco Ins. Co. v. Brad Ingram Constr., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1488 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024)
A divided Ninth Circuit panel, applying California law, holds that a pollution exclusion* in a CGL policy does not preclude a duty to defend an underlying suit alleging physical injury from exposure to “clouds of toxic dust” deposited in the environment by a wildfire and released during clean up efforts. Citing MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205 (Cal. 2003), the majority explained that determining whether a “pollution event” (i.e., “environmental pollution”) resulting in excluded injury has occurred involves consideration of “the character of the injurious substance” and whether the exposure resulted from a “mechanism specified in the policy.” It concluded that a potential for coverage (and, therefore, a defense obligation) existed because, although wildfire debris may be considered a “pollutant” in certain circumstances, the mechanism alleged in the underlying complaint – “expos[ure] . . . to clouds of toxic dust during the loading and unloading of [the underlying plaintiff’s] truck” – did not clearly constitute an “event commonly thought of as pollution.”
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White and Williams LLP
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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When Is a Project Delay Material and Actionable?
January 11, 2022 —
Rick Erickson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogWelcome to 2022! This year, the construction industry will undoubtedly reflect on the last two years as unprecedented times plagued by construction project delays. The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to suspension of work and closure of construction projects worldwide in 2020. The end of 2021 brought additional delays caused by an inexplicable clog in the supply chain of construction materials. The combined impact of these events on project milestones and completion deadlines led our clients to ask, with unusual and particular urgency, who is liable for such delays and how do contracting parties lessen the consequences from such unexpected and uncontrollable delays.
Granted that project delays are nothing new or unusual. They were common enough before inflation caused shipping complications and pandemic decimated the construction labor force. All delays, whatever the source, variably cause loss to all players on a construction project. But not all delays matter when it comes to claims and remedies available to the contracting parties in dispute resolution, where the determinative focus is on material delays impacting the entire project and on delays the claimant can credibly prove.
Most, if not all, jurisdictions interpret actionable delays from the contract documents for the project. The contract is definitely where you should start before pursuing any delay remedies. Delay remedies may be a time extension only, or a time extension plus your additional general conditions. Some delay remedies may be barred by the contract’s express terms and may be enforced adversely by the courts when such contract terms are indisputable. See Quinn Constr. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411 (D.C. Pa. 2010) (enforcing the subcontractor’s contractual waiver of claims for delay and disruption damages). On the other hand, delay damages that are expressly allowed by the contract—like overtime necessitated by the delays—are usually actionable and recoverable. Id. However, not only the contract terms, but applicable law, may affect the outcome.
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Rick Erickson, Snell & WilmerMr. Erickson may be contacted at
rerickson@swlaw.com