Construction Litigation Roundup: “Ursinus is Cleared!”
March 11, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyUrsinus University in Pennsylvania – a “private, nonprofit liberal arts college” – funded a construction project for a new building utilizing monies loaned by the Montgomery County Health and Higher Education Authority, a public economic development authority “formed by the Board of County Commissioners… authorized to issue bonds relative to projects for eligible educational institution such as Ursinus.”
Loans up to the amount of $23,000,000 became available to the University, and construction proceeded using the loans as construction funds. At issue: whether a project was to be considered publicly funded project such that prevailing wage rates were required to be paid. IBEW filed a related grievance with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Labor Law Compliance, which was refused by the Bureau, on the basis that because work was “financed completely by loans from the Authority, which Ursinus was required to repay in their entirety, the Project was ultimately funded through private sources and exempt from coverage under the [Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act].” A grievance to the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board ensued, and the Board took a different position.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”
The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.
As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.
Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.
The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”
The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.
Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”
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Just Decided – New Jersey Supreme Court: Insurers Can Look To Extrinsic Evidence To Deny a Defense
September 05, 2022 —
Randy J. Maniloff - White and Williams LLPLast week, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Norman International, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Company, No. 086155 (N.J. Aug. 11, 2022). At issue was coverage for a work-site injury and the interpretation of a policy exclusion for operations or activities performed by an insured in certain counties in New York. The case is significant in terms of addressing causation for purposes of the application of exclusions. But the more wide-reaching issue has nothing to do with the scope of the exclusion.
The real story from Norman is the New Jersey high court’s pronouncement that an insurer, in certain circumstances, can use extrinsic evidence to deny a defense to its insured. New Jersey duty to defend law has been a jungle land and in need of more supreme court guidance.
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Randy J. Maniloff, White and Williams LLPMr. Maniloff may be contacted at
maniloffr@whiteandwilliams.com
OSHA Releases COVID-19 Guidance
June 15, 2020 —
L. Stephen Bowers & Joshua Tumen - White and Williams LLPThe United States Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) ensures safe and healthful working conditions for employees by setting and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education and assistance.
The COVID-19 outbreak has increased demand for N95 filtering face piece respirators (N95 FFRs), limiting availability for workers in healthcare and emergency response. On April 3, 2020, OSHA issued interim guidance for employers to combat the supply shortages of N95 FFRs and to comply with the respiratory protection standard (29 CFR § 1910.134). This guidance will remain in effect until further notice and applies in all industries.
Employers must continue to manage their respiratory protection programs and be mindful of N95 FFR shortages. Specifically, employers should identify and evaluate respiratory hazards in the workplace, and develop and implement written respiratory protection programs. Businesses should reassess their engineering controls, work practices, and administrative controls to identify any changes they can make to decrease the need for N95 FFRs. Some examples provided in the guidance include using portable local exhaust systems or moving operations outdoors. Employers may also consider temporarily suspending non-essential operations, to the extent such operations are not already suspended due to state mandates.
Reprinted courtesy of
L. Stephen Bowers, White and Williams LLP and
Joshua Tumen, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Bowers may be contacted at bowerss@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Tumen may be contacted at tumenj@whiteandwilliams.com
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Connecticut Appellate Court Breaks New Ground on Policy Exhaustion
April 26, 2021 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsThe Connecticut Appellate Court recently issued a wide-ranging opinion, Continental Casualty Co. v. Rohr, Inc.,[1] which significantly extended the current restrictive view on when a general liability policy can be considered exhausted so as to trigger overlying excess coverage. The case marks a further step away from Judge Augustus Hand’s almost-century-old ruling in Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,[2] which held that an underlying policy could be “exhausted” by a below-limits settlement as long as the insured was willing to “fill the gap” between the settlement amount and the limits of the policy.[3]
In recent years, courts in California and elsewhere have increasingly walked back Zeig’s broad ruling – holding in Qualcomm v. Certain Underwriters,[4] for example, that an insured’s below-limits settlement with primary carriers does not exhaust the limits of primary coverage, or allow the insured to access overlying excess coverage.[5]
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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Blackstone Said to Sell Boston Buildings for $2.1 Billion
May 21, 2014 —
Hui-yong Yu – BloombergBlackstone Group LP (BX) agreed to sell five office properties in Boston to a venture led by Toronto-based Oxford Properties Group for about $2.1 billion, according to two people with knowledge of the transaction.
The buildings total almost 3.3 million square feet (306,000 square meters) and are mostly in downtown Boston, said the people, who asked not to be named because the sale is private. The sale is Blackstone’s largest of U.S. office properties since the real estate market crash.
Oxford plans to purchase 100 High St. and 125 Summer St., and team with JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)’s asset-management unit to buy three other properties: 60 State St., 225 Franklin St. and One Memorial Drive in nearby Cambridge, the people said. Blackstone also is selling its roughly half-stake in Boston’s Rowes Wharf to part-owner Morgan Stanley (MS) for about $200 million, according to one of the people.
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Hui-yong Yu, BloombergHui-yong Yu may be contacted at
hyu@bloomberg.net
Residential Contractors, Be Sure to Have these Clauses in Your Contracts
May 16, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI have often “mused” on the need to have a good solid construction contract at the beginning of a project. While this is always true, it is particularly true in residential contracting where a homeowner may or may not know the construction process or have experience with large scale construction. Often you, as a construction general contractor, are providing the first large scale construction that the homeowner has experienced. For this reason, through meetings and the construction contract, setting expectations early and often is key.
As a side note to this need to set expectations, the Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation (DPOR) and the Virginia General Assembly require certain clauses to be in every residential construction contract. DPOR strictly enforces these contractual items and failure to put them in your contracts can lead to fines, penalties and possibly even revocation of a contractor’s license.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Court of Appeal Puts the “Equity” in Equitable Subrogation
October 05, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogSubrogation as a concept is well understood in insurance circles. According to the Institute of Risk Management Institute’s glossary of insurance terms subrogation is “the assignment to an insurer by the terms of [a] policy or by law, after payment of a loss, of the rights fo the insured to recover the amount of the loss from one legally liable for it.” In other words, if an insurer comes out of pocket for something someone else broke, the insurer can turn to that responsible party for reimbursement of its out of pocket costs.
Typically, subrogation is, as stated in IRMI’s glossary of insurance terms, a matter of contract and the rights and responsibilities of parties are set forth within the terms of a policy. However, subrogation may, as stated in IRMI’s glossary, also be matter of law. And this is where equitable subrogation comes in.
“Equitable subrogation,” according to IRMI, is “the right of subrogation granted under common law when one party has made a payment on behalf of another and becomes entitled to whatever recovery rights the other party has against a responsible third party.”
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
