Federal Subcontractor Who Failed to Follow FAR Regulations Finds That “Fair” and “Just” are Not Synonymous
April 22, 2019 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogInscribed over the doors of the U.S. Supreme Court are the words “Equal Justice Under Law.” It’s a reminder that judicial decisions should be just. That doesn’t necessarily mean fair.
In Aspic Engineering and Construction Company v. ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Case No. 17-16510 (January 28, 2019), the 9th Circuit overturned an arbitration decision in favor of a local Afghani subcontractor seeking termination costs after it was terminated for convenience by a U.S.-based general contractor. This, despite the arbitrator’s finding that the subcontract was “clearly drafted to give every advantage to” the general contractor, that the local Afghani subcontractor’s “experience with government contracting [was] not nearly as extensive as that of” the general contractor, and “that the normal business practices and customs of subcontractors in Afghanistan were more ‘primitive’ than those of U.S. subcontractors experienced with U.S. Government work.”
Aspic Engineering and Construction
Local Afghani subcontractor Aspic Engineering and Construction Company was awarded two subcontracts by ECC Centcom Constructors the general contractor on two projects in Afghanistan overseen by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The first subcontract involved construction of various buildings in the Badghis province of Afghanistan . The second subcontract involved the construction various buildings Sheberghan province of Afghanistan . Both subcontracts included clauses from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which were incorporated by reference, and included flow-down provisions obligating Aspic to ECC in the same manner that ECC was obligated to the U.S. government.
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Garret Murai, Wendel RosenMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Conflicting Exclusions Result in Duty to Defend
October 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the insurer had a duty to defend in light of conflicting endorsements in the policy. Panfil v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14621 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2015).
JRJ Ada, LLC was a contractor. JRJ's two members, Joe Panfil and Renee Michelon, had a CGL policy with Nautilus. The employee of JRJ's subcontractor, Astro Insulation, fell through a hole while performing insulation work, injuring himself. The employee sued JRJ, who sought a defense from Nautilus. Nautilus refused to defend because JRJ was not an insured under the policy. Further, Nautilus relied upon the policy's Contractor-Subcontrated Work Endorsement and Employee Exclusion to deny coverage.
Panfil and Michelon sued Nautilus. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and the court granted plaitniffs' motion while denying Nautilus' motion. The district court first found that the policy should be reformed to inlcude JRJ as an insured. Nautilus did not appeal this determination. The court also found that Nautilus breached its duty to defend and was therefore estopped from asserting policy defenses to coverage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Energy Company Covered for Business Interruption Losses Caused by Fire and Resulting in Town-Ordered Shutdown
February 15, 2021 —
David G. Jordan - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In the case of NextSun Energy Littleton, LLC v. Acadia Ins. Co., the United States District Court of Massachusetts held that once direct physical damage from a covered peril causes a covered business interruption loss, any increase in the duration of such business interruption, due to the enforcement of an ordinance or law, extends the coverage period provided for lost income. The Court further held that a policy exclusion for business interruption due to the enforcement of any ordinance or law not in force at the time of the loss only applies when the ordinance or law itself, not the enforcement action that it authorizes, was not in force at the time of the loss.
The case involved a solar panel company, NextSun Energy Littleton (NextSun), that operated solar panel arrays providing electricity to the town of Littleton, Massachusetts. Due to a fire, 88 of the solar panels were damaged, and the Town immediately issued a “red-tag” order halting all energy-generating activity pending a safety inspection. The plaintiff purchased insurance for its panels along with “Energy Generating Income” (EGI) coverage, from the defendant, Acadia Ins. Co. (Acadia). The EGI policy covered “direct physical loss or damage” to “renewable energy generating equipment” and also covered the actual loss of surplus power income incurred during the interruption period. However, it excluded interruption of energy-generating income “caused by the enforcement of any ordinance, law, or decree … not in force at the time of loss.”
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David G. Jordan, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMr. Jordan may be contacted at
DJordan@sdvlaw.com
How to Fix America
July 11, 2021 —
Bloomberg CityLabIn 2011, then-President Barack Obama stood in front of the deteriorating Brent Spence Bridge linking Ohio and Kentucky with a plea to Republican leadership: Pass the jobs bill to rebuild America. (It did not pass.) Six years later, when asked about the same bridge, then-President Donald Trump answered “we’re going to get it fixed.” (It did not get fixed.)
It took two trucks colliding on the Brent Spence’s lower deck — leading to a massive fire — just before 3 a.m. on Nov. 11, 2020, for work to begin. A post-crash inspection found the bridge structurally sound, and more than $3 million in repairs were made by year-end. But with traffic volume at around double its intended capacity, much more work is needed to alleviate persistent jams and accidents.
Such has been the state of infrastructure in the U.S. for decades — fixes get put off until they’re absolutely necessary, and U.S. airports, roads and public transportation draw frequent comparisons to those in nations with far fewer resources. Meanwhile, countries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East have leapt ahead with so-called smart cities, high-speed trains and eco-friendly buildings. In 2019, the U.S. ranked 13th in the world in a broad measure of infrastructure quality — down from fifth place in 2002, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report.
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"Ordinance or Law" Provision Mandates Coverage for Roof Repair
May 16, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the insured was entitled to coverage under the policy's "ordinance or law" provision for repairs to prevent a future collapse of both the damaged and undamaged portions of the building. Jefferson Cnty. Schools v. Tenn. Risk Mgmt. Trust, 2018 Tenn. app. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 15, 2018).
A major rainstorm caused a portion of Building 8, an aging vocation building at a high school, to collapse. Building 8 was covered through Tennessee Risk Management up to $100,000. Excess claims were covered by Travelers Indemnity Company. The policy included an "ordinance or law" provision providing for coverage of expenses "caused by the enforcement of any ordinance or law." Further, the insurer agreed to pay for the loss to any undamaged portions of a building caused by the enforcement of any ordinance or law that required the construction or repair of buildings.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Prospective Additional Insureds May Be Obligated to Arbitrate Coverage Disputes
September 07, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesThe Court of Appeal closed out 2019 by ruling that an additional insured can be bound to the arbitration clause in a policy when a coverage dispute arises between that additional insured and the carrier. (Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (2019) 44 Cal. App. 5th 834, 837.)
In 2009, Future Farmers of America (“Future Farmers”) entered into a license agreement with SMG Holdings Incorporated (“SMG”) to use the Fresno Convention Center. As part of the agreement, Future Farmers was required to secure comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) coverage and name SMG and the City of Fresno as additional insureds (“AI”) on its policies.
Future Farmers purchased a general liability policy from Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”). Neither SMG nor the City of Fresno were added as AIs, but the policy contained a “deluxe endorsement” which extended coverage to lessors of premises for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased or rented” to the named insured. The policy also contained an endorsement that extended coverage where required by a written contract for liability due to the negligence of the named insured. Philadelphia’s policy also stated that if the insurance company and insured “do not agree whether coverage is provided . . . for a claim made against the insured, then either party may make a written demand for arbitration.”
A patron to Future Farmer’s event at the Fresno Convention Center was seriously injured after he tripped over a pothole in the parking lot and hit his head. He sued both Fresno and SMG. In turn, Fresno and SMG tendered their defense to Philadelphia. Philadelphia denied coverage finding that the incident did not arise out of Future Farmer’s negligence, and that SMG had the sole responsibility for maintaining the parking lot. Consequently, Philadelphia concluded that neither Fresno nor SMG qualified “as an additional insured under the policy” for the injury in the parking lot.
The coverage dispute continued, and in 2016, Philadelphia issued a demand for arbitration which was rejected by SMG. Philadelphia then petitioned the state court to compel arbitration arguing that SMG could not avoid the burdens of the policy while seeking to obtain policy benefits. SMG used Philadelphia’s conclusion that it did not qualify as an AI under the policy to argue that Philadelphia was “estopped from demanding arbitration”. In other words, SMG argued that it could not be held to the burdens of the policy without being provided with the benefits of the policy.
The trial court sided with SMG finding that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties. The court noted that while third party beneficiaries can be compelled to arbitration there was no evidence that applied here, and Philadelphia could not maintain its inconsistent positions on the policy as its respects SMG.
Disagreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that SMG was a third-party beneficiary of the policy. The AI obligations in the license agreement and the deluxe endorsement in the Philadelphia policy collectively establish an intended beneficiary status. The Court saw SMG’s tender to Philadelphia as an acknowledgement of that status.
Relatedly, the Court found that SMG’s tender to Philadelphia – its demand for policy benefits – equitably estopped them from avoiding the burdens of the policy. The Court stated it defied logic to require a named insured to arbitrate coverage disputes but free an unnamed insured demanding policy coverage from the same requirement. Conversely, the Court found no inconsistency in Philadelphia’s denial of coverage to SMG and its subsequent demand for arbitration. Philadelphia did not outright reject SMG’s status as a potential insured, but rather concluded that there was no coverage because the injury occurred in the parking lot. In other words, the coverage determination turned on the circumstances of the injury not SMG’s status under the policy.
In short, the Court concluded that the potential insured takes the good with the bad. If one seeks to claim coverage as an additional insured, they can be subject to the restrictions of the policy including arbitration clauses even if they did not purchase the policy.
Securing additional insurance has become increasingly more difficult and limited over the years, and this holding presents yet another hurdle to attaining AI coverage. For those seeking coverage, it is important to note that the Court’s ruling may have turned out differently had the carrier outright denied SMG’s AI status, rather than concluding that the injury was not covered.
Your insurance scenario may vary from the case discussed above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
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Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
EPA Issues Interpretive Statement on Application of NPDES Permit System to Releases of Pollutants to Groundwater
May 27, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn Tuesday, April 23, 2019, in a development of interest to practically anyone who operates a plant or business, EPA published its Interpretive Statement in the Federal Register. (See 84 FR 16810 (April 23, 2019).) After considering the thousands of comments it received in response to a February 20, 2018, Federal Register notice, EPA has concluded that “the Clean Water Act (CWA) is best read as excluding all releases of pollutants from a point source to groundwater from a point source from NPDES program coverage, regardless of a hydrological connection between the groundwater and jurisdictional surface water.”
Acknowledging that its past public statements have not been especially consistent or unambiguous on this important matter, EPA states that this interpretation “is the best, if not the only reading of the CWA, is more consistent with Congress’ intent than other interpretations of the Act, and best addresses the question of NPDES permit program applicability for pollutant releases to groundwater within the authority of the CWA.” Indeed, the absence of “a dedicated statement on the best reading of the CWA has generated confusion in the courts, and uncertainly for EPA regional offices and states implementing the NPDES program, regulated entities, and the public.” The recent and contrary interpretations of this issue by the Ninth Circuit (Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737) and the Fourth Circuit (Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP, 887 F.3d 637) will be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which will now have the benefit of the agency’s official position. In addition, EPA discloses that it will be soliciting additional public “input” on how it can best provide the regulated community with “further clarity and regulatory certainly”; these comments will be due within 45 days (June 7, 2019).
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Fix for Settling Millennium Tower May Start This Fall
August 17, 2020 —
Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-RecordWith the lengthy and complex permitting and approval process complete and almost all the other details worked out, construction could begin in mid-November on the estimated $100-million shoring fix for the 645-ft-tall Millennium Tower in San Francisco. The perimeter pile upgrade for the 58-story residential condominium building, which has settled more than 17 in. toward the northwest since its completion in 2009, was originally expected to begin earlier this year.
Nadine M. Post, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Post may be contacted at postn@enr.com
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