Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert Directory

Waive It Goodbye: Despite Evidence to the Contrary, Delaware Upholds an AIA Waiver of Subrogation Clause

April 19, 2022 — Lian Skaf - The Subrogation Strategist
Subrogation professionals have always been looking for ways to defeat onerous waiver of subrogation provisions in contracts signed by insureds. However, even when contracts are unsigned, if there is intent when the contract is made – usually long before a loss occurs – a waiver of subrogation can doom what otherwise may have been a strong case. The Superior Court of Delaware considered such a scenario to determine whether a waiver of subrogation provision applied to a multimillion-dollar subrogation case. In State of Delaware Insurance Coverage Office and Factory Mutual Insurance Co., both as subrogee of the University of Delaware v. DiSabatino Construction Co., Schlosser & Associates Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and V.E. Guerrazzi, Inc., C.A. No. N19C-08-080, 2022 Del. Super. LEXIS 108 (March 17, 2022), the court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a waiver of subrogation provision in the underlying contract. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs could not pursue the defendants in their suit to recover damages as a result of a fire. The court specifically denied the plaintiffs’ argument that since the contract was not signed and another “short form” version was later used the waiver of subrogation provision should not apply. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Skaf may be contacted at skafl@whiteandwilliams.com

Manufacturer of Asbestos-Free Product May Still Be Liable for Asbestos Related Injuries

July 30, 2015 — Kristian B. Moriarty, R. Bryan Martin and Lee Marshall – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Sherman v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (No. B252566, filed June 18, 2015), the Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a manufacturer of a brake grinding machine. The Court cited an exception to the general rule that manufacturers may not be held liable, under a strict products liability theory, where the plaintiff’s injuries arise from other products that are used in conjunction with the defendant’s product. Plaintiff and appellant, Michael Sherman, was an automobile mechanic from 1962 to 1977. Mr. Sherman alleged that during this period he used an arcing machine, which abraded brake linings by means of sand paper moving at high speeds. Sherman alleged the machine released asbestos dust, which he then brought home, exposing his wife Debra Sherman to asbestos. Ms. Sherman developed mesothelioma and passed away from exposure to the asbestos dust carried home by her husband. Reprinted courtesy of Kristian B. Moriarty, R. Bryan Martin and Lee Marshall of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com Mr. Marshall may be contacted at lmarshall@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

FIFA Inspecting Brazil’s World Cup Stadiums

March 26, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Representatives from FIFA have returned to Brazil to conduct inspections of the World Cup stadiums, according to the San Francisco Chronicle. Even though Brazil had told FIFA they would have all twelve done by the end of 2013, only nine are finished. Furthermore, “infrastructure work in many of the 12 host cities remains far from completed.” “This is the last occasion for the organizers to take stock of the operational preparations before the respective FIFA World Cup installations begin to be implemented in all 12 host cities,” FIFA said in a statement, as quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Out of Eastern Europe, a Window Into the Post-Pandemic Office

September 28, 2020 — Andra Timu & Irina Vilcu - Bloomberg
Special quarantine rooms. Floor-to-ceiling walls in bathroom stalls. Touchless entrances that take your temperature. This is what telecommunications company Ericsson’s office building in Bucharest looks like after coronavirus. The space has become the pilot for a 100-prong coronavirus standard that a real estate investor in Eastern Europe is pitching as a new global “immune” building standard. Liviu Tudor, president of the Brussels-based European Property Federation, hopes the standard will convince more employees to go back to work. He’s gathered a team of experts in construction, health care and engineering, such as such as Adrian Streinu-Cercel, the head of Bucharest's biggest infectious diseases hospital, to develop three tiers of “immune” building certifications that he says are intended to make indoor spaces “pandemic proof.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Andra Timu & Irina Vilcu, Bloomberg

Construction Defects and Second Buyers in Pennsylvania

February 07, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
The ability to sue over construction defects has typically been limited to the initial purchaser of a home. But as Kevin F. McKeegan writes in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently expanded that to subsequent purchasers. As Mr. Keegan notes, "not only can the first buyer of a new home bring a lawsuit against a builder, but now any subsequent buyer within 12 years of the home's construction can file a claim." Mr. Keegan, a lawyer with Meyer, Unkovic & Scott, notes that in the underlying case, the second owners of a home in Jamison, Pennsylvania filed a claim that the water infiltration violated the "implied warranty of habitability." There are still limitations on construction defects in Pennsylvania. The suit must be filed within twelve years of completion of the construction, and a breach of implied warranty must be proven. Mr. Keegan notes that "the homeowner must show that a defect is hidden and non-obvious, that it is the result of the builder's design or construction, and that it affects the habitability of the residence." Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Pennsylvania Superior Court Fires up a Case-By-Case Analysis for Landlord-Tenant, Implied Co-Insured Questions

February 03, 2020 — Gus Sara - The Subrogation Strategist
In Joella v. Cole, 2019 PA Super. 313, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently considered whether a tenant, alleged by the landlord’s property insurance carrier to have carelessly caused a fire, was an implied co-insured on the landlord’s policy. The court found that the tenant was an implied co-insured because the lease stated that the landlord would procure insurance for the building, which created a reasonable expectation that the tenant would be a co-insured under the policy. Since the tenant was an implied co-insured on the policy, the insurance carrier could not maintain a subrogation action against the tenant. This case confirms that Pennsylvania follows a case-by-case approach when determining whether a tenant was an implied co-insured on a landlord’s insurance policy. The Joella case stems from a fire at an apartment building in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The landlord’s property insurance carrier paid the landlord $180,000 to repair the damages resulting from the fire. In March 2018, the insurer brought a subrogation action against Annie Cole, a tenant in the building, alleging that Ms. Cole’s negligent use of an extension cord caused the fire. Ms. Cole raised the affirmative defense that she was an implied co-insured on the landlord’s insurance policy. The subrogating insurer filed a partial motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Ms. Cole’s defense. In response, Ms. Cole filed a cross motion for partial judgment, arguing that because the lease specified that the landlord would maintain fire insurance for the building, there was a reasonable expectation that she would be a co-insured on that policy. The trial court found in favor of Ms. Cole, holding that the landlord’s insurer could not maintain a subrogation action against her because she was an implied co-insured of the landlord’s insurance policy under the terms of the lease. The landlord’s insurer filed an appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Gus Sara, White and Williams
Mr. Sara may be contacted at sarag@whiteandwilliams.com

Force Majeure Recommendations

August 15, 2022 — Denise Motta - Gordon & Rees Construction Law Blog
This Bulletin provides guidance to contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and others to ensure compliance with contractual change order requirements in the event work on a construction project is impacted by a force majeure event. Contract Protection Tips: A force majeure event is defined as an unforeseeable circumstance that prevents someone from fulfilling a contract. Because many events arising on a construction project could be arguably unforeseen, it is imperative that the contract contain a Force Majeure provision. Examine all contracts for the applicable Force Majeure provision. Look for a clause like this:

§ 8.3.3 Any failure or omission by Owner or Contractor in performance of its obligation shall not be deemed a breach or create any liability for damages or other relief (other than additional time) if it arises from any cause beyond the reasonable control of such party, including, without limitation, acts of God, floods, fire, explosions, storms, earthquakes, acts of public enemy, war, terrorism, rebellion, insurrection, riot, sabotage, invasion, epidemic, quarantine, strikes, lockouts, labor disputes or other industrial disturbances, or any order or action by any governmental agency, or causes of similar nature.

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Denise Motta, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
Ms. Motta may be contacted at dmotta@grsm.com

Failure to Meet Code Case Remanded to Lower Court for Attorney Fees

May 24, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

Judge Patricia J. Cottrell, ruling on the case Roger Wilkes, et al. v. Shaw Enterprises, LLC, in the Tennessee Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s conclusion that “the builder constructed the house in accordance with good building practices even though it was not in strict conformance with the building code.” However, Judge Cottrell directed the lower court to “award to Appellants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in their first appeal, as determined by the trial court.”

Judge Cottrell cited in her opinion the contract which specified that the house would be constructed “in accordance with good building practices.” However, after the Wilkes discovered water leakage, the inspections revealed that “that Shaw had not installed through-wall flashing and weep holes when the house was built.” The trial court concluded that:

“Separate and apart from the flashing and weep holes, the trial court concluded the Wilkeses were entitled to recover damages for the other defects they proved based on the cost of repair estimates introduced during the first and second trials, which the court adjusted for credibility reasons. Thus, the trial court recalculated the amount the Wilkeses were entitled to recover and concluded they were entitled to $17,721 for the value of repairs for defects in violation of good business practices, and an additional 15%, or $2,658.15, for management, overhead, and profit of a licensed contractor. This resulted in a judgment in the amount of $20,370.15. The trial court awarded the Wilkeses attorneys” fees through the Page 9 first trial in the amount of $5,094.78 and discretionary costs in the amount of $1,500. The total judgment following the second trial totaled $26,973.93.”

In this second appeal, Judge Cottrell concluded, that “the trial court thus did not have the authority to decide the Wilkeses were not entitled to their attorneys” fees and costs incurred in the first appeal.”

Read the court’s decision

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES