Back Posting with Thoughts on Lien Waivers
May 20, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAfter a week of being unable to post due to the rigors of my solo construction practice, I’m back on the blogging train. For those of you that missed my new musings this past week, I hope that you had a chance to look through some of the past Guest Post Friday posts for some good stuff to read.
During the course of my busy week last week, a question came up regarding the mechanic’s lien waivers that commercial construction companies routinely execute as part of the payment process. The waiver forms vary, but each essentially states that in exchange for payment the payee, whether a subcontractor or supplier (or even general contractor) waives its future rights to record a mechanic’s lien for the work that is covered by the payment received. Most if not all of these forms further require a certification that the funds paid will either be used to pay suppliers or that suppliers have already been paid. This general description is not the reason for this post.
As is always the case in the Commonwealth of Virginia where the contract is king and a court is unlikely to reinterpret any written contractual document, the devil is in how that waiver is worded. Some waivers are worded in such a way that they essentially require a payee to certify receipt of the funds prior to payment being received. These same forms require the same pre-payment certification that all suppliers and subcontractors of the payee have already been paid. In short they require a payee to both place complete trust in the payor that the check will be paid and that the check will not bounce while in many cases (often with an unstated “wink and nod”) claiming payment was already made when all know the likelihood is that it has not.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
10 Answers to Those Nagging Mechanics Lien Questions Keeping You Up at Night. Kind of
November 05, 2014 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogConstruction lawyers may not ponder the great questions in life.
We leave that to the estate planning attorneys.
But ponder we do.
And the next case, as I’ll explain below, “kind of” answers 10 important mechanics lien questions we construction attorneys toss and turn over at night.
Background
In Palomar Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Case Nos. G049907 and G049910 (October 14, 2014), developer Inland-LGC Beaumont, LLC (“Inland”) hired general contractor 361 Group Construction Services, Inc. (“361″) to construct a Kohl’s department store in Beaumont, California.
The Kohl’s department store was to be constructed on one parcel of a three-parcel tract. Inland later sold the parcel on which the Kohl’s department store was to be located to Kohl’s and the two other parcels were later acquired by Wells Fargo who foreclosed on the construction loan for the project.
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Garret Murai, Kronick Moskovitz Tiedemann & GirardMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@kmtg.com
Tariffs, Supply Snarls Spur Search for Factories Closer to U.S.
February 21, 2022 —
Laura Curtis - BloombergSmall businesses looking for a factory that can make some stylish orthopedic shoes, chairs or construction materials may have an easier time finding a closer-to-home alternative to waiting for the supply-chain snarl in the Pacific Ocean to work itself out.
Zipfox, an online platform that links businesses up with factories in Mexico, launched this week, enabling near-shoring of production and the chance to get goods into the U.S. more quickly than if businesses were sourcing from manufacturing hubs in China.
“People are feeling the pain from sourcing from China right now but they aren’t really aware of the manufacturing capability and capacity that Mexico already has,” Zipfox founder Raine Mahdi said Tuesday.
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Laura Curtis, Bloomberg
Best Lawyers Recognizes Twelve White and Williams Lawyers
September 15, 2016 —
White and Williams LLPThe 2017 Best Lawyers in America list includes twelve White and Williams lawyers. Inclusion in Best Lawyers is based entirely on peer-review. The methodology is designed to capture, as accurately as possible, the consensus opinion of leading lawyers about the professional abilities of their colleagues within the same geographical area and legal practice area. Best Lawyers employs a sophisticated, conscientious, rational, and transparent survey process designed to elicit meaningful and substantive evaluations of quality legal services.
2017 Best Lawyers
- Frank Bruno, Patent Law
- Richard Campbell, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
- James Coffey, Mergers and Acquisitions Law
- Timothy Davis, Real Estate Law
- William Hussey, Tax Law; Trusts and Estates
- Michael Kraemer, Employment Law - Management; Labor Law - Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment
- Randy Maniloff, Insurance Law
- John Orlando, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants
- Thomas Rogers, Real Estate Law
- Joan Rosoff, Real Estate Law
- Craig Stewart, Insurance Law; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants
- William Taylor, Construction Law
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Illinois Supreme Court Holds That the Implied Warranty of Habitability Does Not Extend to Subcontractors
March 04, 2019 — Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation Strategist
The implied warranty of habitability allows a homeowner to recover damages for latent defects that interfere with the intended use of a home. In Sienna Court Condo. Ass’n v. Champion Aluminum Corp., 2018 IL 122022, 2018 Ill. LEXIS 1244 (2018), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that buyers of new homes cannot assert claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against subcontractors involved in the construction of the homes because the subcontractors have no contractual relationship with the homeowners and the damages are purely economic. As the court explained, the implied warranty of habitability is a creature of contract (not tort) and, therefore, only exists when there is contractual privity between the defendants and the homeowners.
In Sienna, a group of condominium unit owners alleged that their new homes contained latent construction defects and asserted claims against the various parties involved in the construction and sale of the homes, including claims against the defendant subcontractors for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The plaintiffs contracted with the property developer to purchase the homes, but the plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the subcontractors involved in the construction of the homes. The Sienna court, overturning the decisions of the trial court and the appellate court, granted the subcontractors’ joint motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for the implied warranty of habitability because the plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the subcontractors and the damages were purely economic. Read the court decision
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Mr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Contractors May be Entitled to Both Prompt Payment Act Relief and Prejudgment Interest for a Cumulative 24%!
August 22, 2022 — Margarita Kutsin - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
The Washington Prompt Payment Act, in Ch. 39.76 RCW and in RCW 39.04.250, ensures that contractors and subcontractors are promptly paid for their performance on public works contracts. Where a government entity or a prime contractor wrongfully withholds undisputed amounts due, that government entity or prime contractor must pay interest at a rate of 12% per annum.
Separately, prejudgment interest is awarded “based on the principle that a defendant ‘who retains money which he ought to pay to another should be charged interest upon it.’” Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wn.2d 468, 472, 730 P.2d 662 (1986) (quoting Prier v. Refrigeration Eng’g Co., 74 Wn.2d 25, 34, 442 P.2d 621 (1968)). The purpose is to “compensate the plaintiff for the use value of the money representing liquidated or determinable damages.” Id. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Margarita Kutsin, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Ms. Kutsin may be contacted at margarita.kutsin@acslawyers.com
Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated
April 26, 2011 — Beverley BevenFlorezCDJ STAFF
Decision Affirmed in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by the trial court in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate. In the trial case, Central Arkansas Foundation Homes (CAFH) sought payment for a home built for Choate, while Choate alleged that the builders committed multiple construction defects including using the wrong foundation materials and positioning the house in the wrong direction.
After the house was built, CAFH contacted Choate regarding payment, however, Choate alleged that the finished product did not match the contract. “ After CAFH completed construction, it obtained permanent home financing for Choate and tried to contact her to close the transaction. Choate did not respond until October 2005, when she sent CAFH a list of alleged construction defects, including that the house was facing in the wrong direction; that it was not built on a slab; and that the fireplace, garbage disposal, driveway, and storage area were missing. CAFH replied to Choate in writing, telling her that she had until January 6, 2006, to close on the house or CAFH would sell it. The correspondence enclosed worksheets showing that the amount Choate would owe at closing exceeded $94,000, which included interest that had accrued on the as-yet unpaid construction loan.”
Initially, the court found in favor of CAFH. “On April 18, 2007, Choate’s attorney withdrew from representing her. Soon thereafter, CAFH’s attorney asked the court to set a final hearing on the case. The attorney purportedly sent Choate a letter by regular mail on May 15, 2007, advising her that the case was set for trial on July 9, 2007. Choate, however, did not appear. CAFH did appear, and its general manager, John Oldner, testified to events leading up to the case and the amount of damages claimed. According to Oldner, the interest on the construction loan had accrued to the point that CAFH now sought $104,965.88 from Choate. The court found in favor of CAFH and entered judgment for that amount, plus attorney fees, on July 18, 2007. The court ruled that CAFH could sell the house and either remit any excess to Choate or look to Choate for the deficiency if the sales price did not cover the judgment.”
However, Choate successfully argued that she did not receive notice of the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the outcome was quite different. “On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment for Choate, ruling that the house was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ contract and that the contract should be rescinded. The court found that the house suffered from numerous construction defects, that the contract contemplated a slab rather than a concrete-pier foundation, and that CAFH ignored Choate’s complaints that the house was facing the wrong way. The judgment directed CAFH to hold Choate harmless on the construction loan, to deed Choate’s two acres back to her, and to remove the house from Choate’s property.”
The Court of Appeals “found that Choate would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the septic systems and utility lines that CAFH installed on her land. The court therefore awarded $5340 to CAFH as a quantum-meruit recovery for the value of that work. CAFH contends that the award is not sufficient, but we see no clear error.” In the end, the Court of Appeals provided this reason for declining to reverse the trial court’s decision: “The court in this case apparently concluded that the house constructed by CAFH was so fundamentally at odds with Choate’s contractual expectations that she was not unjustly enriched and should simply be, as nearly as possible, returned to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the court ordered the house removed from her property and permitted CAFH to either relocate the house or salvage the house’s materials and unused appliances. We decline to reverse the court’s weighing of the equities in this manner.”
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Federal Court Asks South Dakota Supreme Court to Decide Whether Injunction Costs Are “Damages,” Adopts Restatement’s Position on Providing “Inadequate” Defense
August 13, 2019 — Anthony L. Miscioscia & Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLP
Do costs associated with complying with an injunction constitute covered “damages?” The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota recently certified that question to the South Dakota Supreme Court, in Sapienza v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, No. 3:18-CV-03015-RAL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84973 (D.S.D. May 17, 2019). If the South Dakota Supreme Court takes on the question, it will become one of the few highest state courts to do so.[1] The Sapienza case is also notable because the court adopted § 12 of the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (Restatement) regarding an insurer’s potential liability for providing an “inadequate” defense. In doing so, the Sapienza court joins a growing list of courts to rely upon or cite to the Restatement.
The Sapienza case arose out of an underlying dispute between residential neighbors over the size and location of the Sapienzas’ new house they built in a historic district in Sioux Falls, SD. The newly-built house allegedly prevented the neighbors from using their fireplace, blocked natural light the neighbors previously enjoyed, and decreased the value of the neighbors’ house. The neighbors sought a permanent injunction requiring the Sapienzas to modify or relocate the house. The Sapienzas’ homeowners’ insurer provided them with defense counsel, but the insurer instructed the Sapienzas that it would not cover any costs associated with an injunction as such costs did not constitute covered “damages.”
Reprinted courtesy of Timothy Carroll, White and Williams LLP and Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Schulman may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Anderson may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
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