Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Third Circuit Holds That Duty to Indemnify "Follows" Duty to Defend

December 27, 2021 — Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
In a win for policyholders, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a District Court’s 2018 ruling, which held that the duty to indemnify follows the duty to defend where a settlement precludes a determination on the facts of the case relative to liability and apportionment. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Penn National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.,1 a large concrete panel collapsed and killed a construction worker at a construction site in New Kensington, Pennsylvania. Cost Company (“Cost”), Liberty Mutual’s insured, was a masonry subcontractor on the project and had further subcontracted with Pittsburgh Flexicore Co. (“Flexicore”), Penn National’s insured, for the concrete panels. Cost’s subcontract agreement required Flexicore to name Cost as an additional insured under its general liability policy issued by Penn National. When the construction worker’s widow filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Cost and Flexicore, Cost demanded that Penn National defend and indemnify it as an additional insured under the policy. Penn National refused, arguing that any additional insured status had terminated at the conclusion of Flexicore’s work for Cost. As a result, Liberty Mutual defended Cost in the lawsuit, which was ultimately settled. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Vita may be contacted at JVita@sdvlaw.com

$24 Million Verdict Against Material Supplier Overturned Where Plaintiff Failed to Prove Supplier’s Negligence or Breach of Contract Caused an SB800 Violation

November 21, 2017 — Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin
Originally published by CDJ on March 16, 2017 Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWL Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379 COURT OF APPEAL EXTENDS GREYSTONE HOMES, INC. v. MIDTEC, INC., HOLDING THAT CIVIL CODE §936 CREATES A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR CLAIMS AGAINST MATERIAL SUPPLIERS BROUGHT UNDER SB800. The Fourth District California Court of Appeal recently published its decision Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379, holding that claims against a material supplier under SB800 (Civil Code §895 and §936) require proof that the SB800 violation was caused by the supplier's negligence or breach of contract. Civil Code §936 states in relevant part, that it applies "to general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals to the extent that the general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals caused, in whole or in part, a violation of a particular standard as the result of a negligent act or omission or a breach of contract .... [T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any general contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, individual product manufacturer, or design professional with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply." Reprinted courtesy of Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq., Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq., Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com Read the court decision
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Notice of Claim Sufficient to Invoke Coverage

August 06, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
Indirect notice to the insurer was sufficient to trigger coverage for the additional insured under a liability policy. Spoleta Constr., LLC v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5174 (N.Y. App. Div. July 11, 2014). An employee of the subcontractor was injured at the construction project on October 20, 2008. The general contractor was named as an additional insured on the subcontractor's CGL policy with Aspen. Under the subcontract, the subcontractor also agreed to defend and indemnify the general contractor for all claims arising out of the subcontractor's work. The general contractor did not receive notice of the accident until late December 2009 in a letter from the injured employee's attorney. On January 27, 2010, the general contractor's liability carrier sent a letter to the subcontractor giving notice of the employee's claim and requesting that the subcontractor put its carrier on notice. On February 9, 2010, the subcontractor sent to Aspen a claim form with the January 2010 letter attached. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Effective October 1, 2019, Florida General Contractors Have a Statutory Right to Recovery of Attorney Fees Against a Defaulted Subcontractor’s Surety

July 01, 2019 — Warren E. Friedman - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Florida contractors will soon have a level playing field, at least related to the right to recovery of attorney fees in certain circumstances. Effective October 1, 2019, the Florida statute by which legal fees may be recovered from insurers and sureties was amended to expressly afford that right to contractors. Florida’s Insurance statute, Chapter 627, affords a right to recovery of attorney fees when a judgment is obtained against an insurer and in favor of any insured pursuant to a policy or contract executed by the insurer. See Fla. Stat. § 627.428. In the construction context, the Florida Legislature has also applied this right to the recovery of attorney fees from sureties, for example in circumstances where suit is brought against a surety under a payment or performance bond. See Fla. Stat. § 627.756. But there was an oddity to this statute – it specifically provided this right for “owners” and “subcontractors”, but “contractors” were skipped over. For as long as Section 627.756, Florida Statutes has been on the books, the right to recovery of attorney fees against a surety under a payment or performance bond was only afforded to owners, subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen. Specifically, since at least 1977, Section 627.756, Florida Statutes substantially provided as follows (emphasis added): Section 627.428 applies to suits brought by owners, subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen against a surety insurer under payment or performance bonds written by the insurer under the laws of this state to indemnify against pecuniary loss by breach of a building or construction contract. Owners, subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen shall be deemed to be insureds or beneficiaries for the purposes of this section. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Warren E. Friedman - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Friedman may be contacted at wfriedman@pecklaw.com

California Court of Appeal Adopts Horizontal Exhaustion Rule

June 28, 2013 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
In a long running suit regarding thousands of asbestos bodily injury claims brought against Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corporation, the California appellate court held that the excess carrier's indemnity obligation did not attach until all collectible primary policies were exhausted. Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, 215 Cal. App.4th 210 (Cal. Ct. App. April 8, 2013). Kaiser manufactured a variety of asbestos-containing products from 1944 through the 1970's. Truck Insurance Company provided primary insurance to Kaiser from 1964 to 1983, through four CGL policies covering 19 annual policy periods. The policy in effect from 1974 to 1981 contained a $500,000 "per occurrence" liability limit. Kaiser was insured by three other primary carriers between 1947 and 1987. ICSOP issued a first layer excess policy to Kaiser from 1974 through 1976. Kaiser tendered numerous claims for bodily injury to Truck. By October 2004, Truck's indemnity payments exceeded $50 million and included at least 39 claims that resulted in payments in excess of $500,000. For claims alleging bodily injury in 1974, Kaiser selected Truck's 1974 policy to respond to each of the claims. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred Eyerly
Tred Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Labor Under the Miller Act And Estoppel of Statute of Limitations

May 08, 2023 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
If you want a case that goes into history of the federal Miller Act, check out the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s opinion in U.S. ex rel. Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 2023 WL 3083440 (4th Cir. 2023). While I am not going to delve into this history, it’s a worthwhile read. It is also a worthwhile read for two other points. First, it discusses what constitutes “labor” under the Miller Act. Second, it discusses doctrine of estoppel to prevent a surety from raising the statute of limitations to bar a Miller Act payment bond claim, which is a doctrine you do NOT want to rely on, as this case reinforces. Both of these points applicable to Miller Act claims are discussed below. This case dealt with a prime contractor renovating staircases that was terminated by the federal government. The prime contractor hired a professional engineer as its subcontractor to serve as its project manager and supervise labor on the project. The engineer/subcontractor also had “logistical and clerical duties, taking various field measurements, cleaning the worksite, moving tools and materials, and sometimes even watering the concrete himself.” Dickson, supra, at *1. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment

November 07, 2012 — CDJ STAFF
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial. The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer. The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal. The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred. In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no. Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Read the court decision
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Coverage Found For Cleanup of Superfund Site Despite Pollution Exclusion

March 05, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined that the pollution exclusion did not bar defense or indemnity for the insured's obligation to clean up a superfund site. Decker Mfg. Corp. v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12169 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2015). From 1966 to 1981, Decker disposed of its waste materials at the township landfill. The landfill was closed in 1981. Decker was insured under a CGL policy for a four year period from January 1, 1973, through January 1, 1977. After the landfill was closed, the EPA began an investigation which eventually led to a Unilateral Administrative Order in 1995 in which Decker was ordered to remove drums, construct a landfill cap, and monitor groundwater. Decker notified Travelers of the EPA's order on November 14, 1995. Travelers responded that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Decker. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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