Luxury Villa Fraudsters Jailed for Madeira Potato Field Scam
September 25, 2018 —
Franz Wild - BloombergFour men and a woman convicted of conning people to invest in a fraudulent luxury villa construction scheme on a potato field in the Portuguese island of Madeira were sentenced to as long as 5 1/2 years in a U.K. jail.
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Franz Wild, Bloomberg
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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Colorado Defective Construction is Not Considered "Property Damage"
September 12, 2022 —
Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In the July 5, 2022, case of Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Houston Casualty Co., the United States District Court for Colorado addressed the issue of whether damage to defectively installed balconies is considered “property damage” under Colorado law, requiring payment by a commercial general liability policy.
Facts of the Case
The case stems from a construction project where a subcontractor improperly installed balconies on an apartment complex. The owner of the project secured commercial general liability (CGL) coverage through an OCIP insured by Houston Casualty Company (HHC). The OCIP insured the general contractor and subcontractors. The general contractor also purchased a subcontractor default insurance policy insured by Indian Harbor.
All parties agreed that the subcontractor improperly installed portions of various balconies, including flashing, water-proof sealing, and water-resistant barriers, among other defects with the installation process. The parties also agreed that other portions of the balconies were properly installed. However, in order to repair the defects in the installations, every bit of each balcony had to be torn off and re-constructed.
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Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
California’s Wildfire Dilemma: Put Houses or Forests First?
November 29, 2021 —
Jim Hinch - BloombergAs record-breaking fires blacken millions of acres in California and elsewhere in the West this year, politicians are mostly sticking to a standard script in response. President Joe Biden’s proposed budget this year includes a $500 million boost to what the White House calls “forest management” and other efforts to reduce wildfire risk. In July, California lawmakers approved $1.5 billion in similar prevention spending.
The funds are in addition to the $2 billion the federal government spends each year fighting fires — a figure twice what it was 10 years ago and roughly five times more than in the 1980s and 1990s. A study last year found that in 2018, wildfires in California caused $148.5 billion in economic damage, including $46 billion outside the state.
Roughly one in three American houses is now in what forest scientists call the wildland-urban interface, where growing cities, remote workers, second-home buyers and commuters priced out of other housing markets are often pushing into fire-prone regions. A 2017 study found that 900,000 homes in the Western U.S. worth a combined $237 billion were “at high risk for fire damage.”
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Jim Hinch, Bloomberg
Ninth Circuit Affirms Duty to Defend CERCLA Section 104 (e) Letter
October 10, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly — Insurance Law HawaiiThe Ninth Circuit held there is a duty to defend not only a PRP letter issued by the EPA, but also a section 104 (e) letter. Anderson Brothers, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18156 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013).
The insured received two letters from the EPA notifying it of potential liability under CERCLA for environmental contamination of the Portland Harbor Superfund Site. The first letter was received in January 2008, and stated that the EPA sought the insured's cooperation in its investigation of the release of hazardous substances at the site. The letter enclosed an extensive, 82-question "Information Request" seeking information about the insured's current and former activities at the site. The letter informed the insured that its voluntary cooperation was sought, but compliance with the Information Request was required by law and failure to respond could result in an enforcement action and civil penalties of $32,500 per day. The insured tendered the 104 (e) letter to St. Paul and requested a defense and indemnity pursuant to the CGL policy. St. Paul declined to provide a defense because the letter did not constitute a "suit," which was required by the policy to trigger the duty to defend.
The second letter from the EPA, received in November 2009, was entitled "General Notice Letter for the Portland Superfund Site" and notified the insured that it was a "potentially responsible party ("PRP").
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
California Supreme Court Confirms the Right to Repair Act as the Exclusive Remedy for Seeking Relief for Defects in New Residential Construction
February 22, 2018 —
Brenda Radmacher – Construction Law BlogThe California Supreme Court recently issued its decision on a critical issue in the residential construction industry – the claims for construction defects that a California homeowner can bring against a builder or seller of new residential properties in California.
Holding
In McMillin Albany v. The Superior Court of Kern County, the Court held that California’s Right to Repair Act (California Civil Code, sections 895, et seq.) (the “Act”) is the exclusive remedy for homeowners claiming defective construction of new residences in California.
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Brenda Radmacher, Gordon & ReesMs. Radmacher may be contacted at
bradmacher@grsm.com
Statute of Limitations Bars Lender’s Subsequent Action to Quiet Title Against Junior Lienholder Mistakenly Omitted from Initial Judicial Foreclosure Action
October 19, 2020 —
Lyndsey Torp - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogA recently issued opinion by the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District tells a cautionary tale regarding a lender’s failure to name a junior lienholder in its initial judicial foreclosure action.
In Cathleen Robin v. Al Crowell, — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 2020 WL 5951506, plaintiffs sued defendant, a junior lienholder, for quiet title, having failed to name him in the initial judicial foreclosure action. Defendant raised the statute of limitations defense, but the trial court found in favor of plaintiffs. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the 60-year statute of limitations which the trial court applied only applied to a nonjudicial trustee’s sale, and the trial court could not exercise the trustee’s power of sale after the expiration of the statute of limitations on a judicial action to foreclose.
In 2006, plaintiffs loaned Steve and Marta Weinstein (the “Weinsteins”) $450,000, secured by a deed of trust on one parcel of the Weinstein’s property. In 2007, the Weinsteins and defendant Al Crowell (“Crowell”) recorded a second deed of trust on the property, securing a promissory note executed by the Weinsteins in 2004.
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Lyndsey Torp, Snell & WilmerMs. Torp may be contacted at
ltorp@swlaw.com
Industry Standard and Sole Negligence Defenses Can’t Fix a Defect
June 14, 2021 —
Lian Skaf - The Subrogation StrategistStrict products liability cases have been the subject of much fluctuation in the Pennsylvania courts over the last few years. Utilizing hope created by the courts in recent strict liability cases, defendants have tried to revive defenses based on meeting industry standards and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania tempered that hope with limitations of how far strict liability defenses can extend.
In Sullivan v. Werner Co., No. 3086 EDA 2019, 2021 Pa. Super. LEXIS 210, an appellate panel of the Superior Court reviewed the lower court’s decision to exclude evidence of industry standards and of the plaintiff’s negligence in a trial that resulted in a $2.5 million verdict for the plaintiff. Upholding the decision of the lower court, the court found that the proffered evidence was within the discretion of the court to exclude.
In Sullivan, Michael Sullivan (Sullivan) was working as a union carpenter at a renovation project for a local school. He and his apprentice were installing exterior sheathing to the outdoor walls. In order to install the sheathing, Sullivan had to use a scaffold. He put together a new SRS-72 scaffold manufactured by Werner Company (Werner) that his foreman bought at Lowe’s Companies, Inc. (Lowe’s) and used the scaffold during the course of his work. While on the scaffold, Sullivan fell through and crashed to the ground. He suffered permanent injuries as a result of the incident.
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Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLPMr. Skaf may be contacted at
skafl@whiteandwilliams.com
