“Bound by the Bond”
September 02, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA New York trial court granted judgment in favor of a performance bond surety on a construction project, based upon the failure of the claiming party to abide by the terms of the bond.
The “AIA Document A312” bond form – described by the court (quoting surety law authority) to be “one of the clearest, most definitive, and widely used type of traditional common law ‘performance bonds’ in private construction” – contains various procedures which must be honored as a “condition precedent to an action to recover” on the bond/against the surety. One of those prerequisites is a “declaration of default” concerning the contractor principal (here, a subcontractor).
The case involved the construction of an 85-story skyscraper in midtown Manhattan, and the performance of the subcontract for the building’s superstructure. The bonded contract was at a value of approximately $25,000,000 and obligated the sub to provide a performance bond “in a form similar to the [A312 bond],” and which was otherwise satisfactory to the obligee/construction manager.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 —
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPOn June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
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New Hampshire Applies Crete/Sutton Doctrine to Bar Subrogation Against College Dormitory Residents
May 17, 2021 —
Kyle Rice - The Subrogation SpecialistPursuant to the Sutton Doctrine, first announced in Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975), some jurisdictions consider a tenant a coinsured of its landlord absent an express agreement to the contrary. In Ro v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2019-0620, 2021 N.H. LEXIS 34 (Mar. 10, 2021), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the Sutton Doctrine, adopted by New Hampshire in Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Crete, 846 A.2d 521 (N.H. 2004), extends to resident students in a college dormitory. Thus, absent specific language to the contrary, a student is an implied coinsured under the fire insurance policy issued for his or her dormitory.
In 2016, two students at Dartmouth College, Daniel Ro and Sebastian Lim, set up a charcoal grill on a platform outside of a fourth-floor window in the Morton Hall dormitory. The grill started a fire on the platform that ultimately spread to the roof of the dormitory. During fire suppression efforts, all four floors of the dormitory sustained significant water damage. Following the loss, the building’s insurer, Factory Mutual Insurance Company (Insurer), paid $4,544,313.55 to the Trustees of Dartmouth College for the damages.
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Kyle Rice, White and WilliamsMr. Rice may be contacted at
ricek@whiteandwilliams.com
Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend
October 30, 2023 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises.
The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
Poor Pleading Leads to Loss of Claim for Trespass Due to Relation-Back Doctrine, Statute of Limitations
April 13, 2017 —
Brett G. Moore & Lawrence S. Zucker II - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (No. C070770, Filed 4/6/2017), the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District held that the relation-back doctrine could not save a property owner’s trespass claim against an adjacent neighbor where the property owner’s original complaint was factually devoid and was later amended to include the trespass claim after the statute of limitations had run.
The relation-back doctrine is a well-settled legal principle which allows a plaintiff to amend a complaint to add a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. As long as the factual allegations “relate back” to the those alleged in the original complaint, an additional cause of action will not be subject to the applicable statute of limitations. The policy behind statutes of limitation is to put a defendant on notice of the need to defend against a claim in time to prepare an adequate defense.
On May 21, 2007, a fire broke out at defendant Lambirth Trucking Company’s (“Lambirth”) soil enhancement facility adjacent to plaintiff Vincent Scholes’ (“Scholes”) property. Scholes had previously notified Lambirth that wood chips and rice hulls were accumulating on his property as a result of Lambirth’s operations. Local authorities also warned Lambirth of the hazards presented by storage of those materials.
Reprinted courtesy of
Brett G. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Moore may be contacted at bmoore@hbblaw.com
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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To Require Arbitration or Not To Require Arbitration
December 31, 2014 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsMany, if not most, construction contracts that I review during the course of my practice day include a mandatory arbitration clause. Most of these refer in a blanket manner to AAA Construction Industry Rules. The topic for this post is not whether such clauses are enforceable or whether they are one tool in the contracting tool box in a state where the contract is king. I picked the title of this post carefully because I wanted to discuss whether such clauses should be required as a routine part of all construction contracts and, if so, how those clauses can and should be written.
I have previously shared my thoughts on mandatory arbitration and its desirability in numerous spots here at Construction Law Musings (you can search arbitration or check out the ADR page for more). In short, my opinion is that arbitration was initially conceived with the purpose of streamlining the dispute resolution process and to correspondingly lower the costs associated with such dispute resolution. Arbitration, when used correctly, can, in certain very industry specific cases, help by using an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators that have some expertise in the particular area of the construction industry or the particular specialized issue that will turn the case one way or the other. All of these goals are good and I applaud them.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Court Says No to Additional Lawyer in Las Vegas Fraud Case
October 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLeon Benzer, who has been accused of being one of the masterminds of the Las Vegas HOA scam, has been denied in his bid to add an additional attorney to his publicly-funded defense. Daniel Albregts, Benzer’s court-appointed attorney, made the request due to the large amount of evidence in the case. Federal prosecutors have provided the defense with more than 3.4 million pages of documents. According to U. S. Magistrate Judge George Foley Jr., “defendant’s counsel should be able to prepare and provide an adequate defense with the assistance of appropriate paralegal and other support services.”
Mr. Albregts is currently assisted by Russell Aoki, whose role is that of technical consultant on matters regarding electronic distribution. Federal prosecutors opposed Mr. Albregts hiring Franny Forsman, a former federal public defender. Had Ms. Forsman been hired, the government would have paid $110 per hour for her services. The government is seeking $25 million in restitution from Mr. Benzer.
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Netherlands’ Developer Presents Modular Homes for Young Professionals
March 05, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFBuilder Magazine reported that Heijmans, a development and building company based in The Netherlands, believes their new modular home, the Heijmans ONE, is a solution for young professionals looking for an affordable, urban option.
“As a designer, I believe prefabricated architecture can beautifully balance quality, experience and economic feasibility,” the project's architect Tim van der Grinten, of Moodbuilders Architecture, told Builder Magazine. “The architecture of this compact house is characterized by natural materials, space, openness and identity. It is a clearly recognizable property that you can make your own.”
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