Newmeyer Dillion Named 2020 Best Law Firm in Multiple Practice Areas by U.S. News-Best Lawyers
November 24, 2019 —
Newmeyer DillionProminent business and real estate law firm Newmeyer Dillion is pleased to announce that U.S. News-Best Lawyers® has recognized the firm in its 2020 "Best Law Firms" rankings, with six of its practice areas earning the highest ranking possible - Tier 1 in the Orange County Metro area. The practices recognized include Commercial Litigation, Construction Law, Insurance Law, Litigation - Construction, Litigation - Real Estate and Real Estate Law.
Firms included in the 2020 "Best Law Firms" list have been recognized by their clients and peers for their professional excellence. Firms achieving a Tier 1 ranking have consistently demonstrated a unique combination of quality law practice and breadth of legal expertise.
“We are grateful that the firm’s clients and our peers again recognize our personalized approach to legal service. We strive to provide creative solutions that propel our clients’ businesses forward,” said Managing Partner Paul Tetzloff.
To be eligible for the “Best Law Firms” ranking, a firm must have at least one attorney recognized in the current edition of The Best Lawyers in America for a specific practice area. Best Lawyers recognizes the top 4 percent of practicing attorneys in the U.S., selected through exhaustive peer-review surveys in which leading lawyers confidentially evaluate their professional peers.
ABOUT NEWMEYER DILLION
For 35 years, Newmeyer Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of corporate, privacy & data security, employment, real estate, construction, insurance law and trial work, Newmeyer Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client’s needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949.854.7000 or visit www.newmeyerdillion.com
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Revel Closing Shows Gambling Is No Sure Thing for Renewal
September 03, 2014 —
Christopher Palmeri – BloombergThe Revel Casino Hotel was envisioned as a playground for Wall Streeters who hated flying to Las Vegas. Instead, it’s become a money pit for the banks and money managers who spearheaded the New Jersey project, and the losses will keep coming even after closing today.
The Atlantic City resort, built at a cost of $2.4 billion, ceased operations after two bankruptcies and a 10-month search for a buyer. Barring a sale, the new owners may be Wells Fargo & Co. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., which provided $125 million in court-approved funding. Previous backers also included Capital Group Cos., the third-largest manager of U.S. mutual funds, and Morgan Stanley, the original investor.
The resort fell prey to poor timing, bad design and a misreading of the local market. The Revel saga shows what can go wrong when bankers stray from what they know, according to Charles Geisst, a professor of finance at Manhattan College in New York and author of the book “Wall Street: A History.”
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Christopher Palmeri, BloombergMr. Palmeri may be contacted at
cpalmeri1@bloomberg.net
Contractor Allegedly Stole Construction Materials
October 16, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA Bronx man has been arrested for the theft of about $5,000 of construction materials and equipment from a New Hyde Park residence. When construction workers informed the homeowner of the missing items, the homeowner contacted Damion Brown, who apparently had previously been doing construction work at the home. Mr. Brown admitted he had taken the items but would not return them to the homeowner. The homeowner contacted police, who took M. Brown into custody.
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Construction Litigation Roundup: “Tear Down This Wall!”
September 06, 2023 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyIf you enter a contract to do that in Louisiana, you had better have Louisiana contractor’s license!
It is now axiomatic in Louisiana that when a Louisiana contractor’s license is required, the contract for work performed by an unlicensed contractor is an “absolute nullity,” such that the contract is deemed never to have existed. While Louisiana does not prohibit (as would be the case in certain other states) that contractor from quantum meruit/unjust enrichment recovery, who wants to rely on those noncontractual bases for recovery?
After any hurricane in Louisiana, out-of-state contractors swoop in. In the case of a water mitigation company from Texas working on a property that was water damaged by Hurricane Ida, the customer refused to pay for services rendered and then defended against payment by urging that work performed by the mitigation firm required a Louisiana contractor’s license – which the mitigation firm lacked.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Construction Contract Provisions that Should Pique Your Interest
September 30, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsConstruction contracts are a big part of my legal practice and the drumbeat here at Construction Law Musings. Why? Because not only does your construction contract set the expectations and “rules of the game” for a construction project, it will be read strictly and literally by the Virginia courts should there be a dispute. For these reasons, construction professionals need to be alert for the language in certain key clauses in a construction contract to assure that these clauses are as balanced as possible and also well understood. Here are my “Top Five”:
- “Pay if Paid”- These clauses are almost always in the subcontracts between a general contractor and a subcontractor and are enforceable in Virginia if drafted correctly and under the proper circumstances.
- Change Orders- Whether work is subject to a change order and the required payment for any changed work are often a key source of contention (read legal fees). A properly drafted and followed change order provision can help avoid much of this contention.
- Indemnity- Much has been made in recent years about indemnity provisions and their enforceability. All parties in the construction payment chain can and should be aware of how to best draft their indemnity provisions to make them enforceable. Failure to do so can be catastrophic.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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To Sea or Not to Sea: Fifth Circuit Applies Maritime Law to Offshore Service Contract, Spares Indemnity Provision from Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act
March 29, 2017 —
Richard W. Brown & Afua Akoto – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Faced with the issue of whether maritime or state law should be applied to determine the validity of an indemnity clause in a Master Services Contract (MSC), the Fifth Circuit affirmed that where there is no historical treatment of the contract in question (1), it would consider six factors established in Davis (2).
In Doiron, the Apache Corporation and STS (3) entered a broad-form blanket MSC, under which STS agreed to perform flow-back services, a process designed to dislodge solid objects from inside a well, on Apache’s well located off shore of Louisiana. The MSC also contained an indemnification provision, which required STS to defend and indemnify Apache and its company groups against all claims of property injury or bodily injury. During the flow-back operation, Larry Doiron Inc. (LDI), one of the Apache Company groups, supplied a crane barge for use by STS employees. Subsequently, the crane knocked over an STS employee, causing him to suffer severe injuries. LDI then made a formal demand to STS for defense and indemnification. STS rejected the demand and argued that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act applied to the MSC instead of maritime law. Pursuant to the Act, indemnity clauses in agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas or water are void as against public policy. But, under maritime law, the enforcement of such provisions is not barred. Therefore, if the MSC was construed under the Act, STS had no duty to defend or indemnify LDI.
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Richard W. Brown, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Afua S. Akoto, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Brown may be contacted at rwb@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Akoto may be contacted at asa@sdvlaw.com
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West Virginia Wild: Crews Carve Out Corridor H Through the Appalachian Mountains
May 08, 2023 —
Aileen Cho - Engineering News-RecordWhen crews with Kokosing Construction Co. began a $209-million design-build contract—the largest of its kind in West Virginia—in 2015, they first had to build roads in order to build the actual road called Corridor H.
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Aileen Cho, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Cho may be contacted at choa@enr.com
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