Real Estate & Construction News Round-Up (11/30/22) – Proptech Trends, Green Construction, and Sustainable Buildings
December 13, 2022 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThis week’s round-up explores 4 key trends expected to impact proptech in 2023, global investment in green construction technologies, sustainable buildings and their perceived value for tenants in Europe, and more.
- Sitting at the crossroads between real estate and technology, proptech has experienced significant growth, which is expected to accelerate via 4 key trends in 2023. (Zain Jaffer, Forbes)
- Global investment in green construction technologies reached $2.2 billion in 2022, with legislation and technological innovation serving as the key driving forces behind this growth. (Jennifer Kite-Powell, Forbes)
- In Europe, sustainable buildings have increased the asset values for commercial real estate managers, with tenants willing to pay more for efficient buildings. (David Worford, Environment + Energy Leader)
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
Irvine Partner Cinnamon J. Carr and Associate Brittney H. Aquino Prevail on Summary Judgment
June 17, 2024 —
Linda Carter - Kahana FeldCongratulations to Irvine Partner Cinnamon J. Carr and Associate Brittney H. Aquino for Prevailing on a Motion for Summary Judgment!
Irvine Partner Cinnamon J. Carr and Associate Brittney H. Aquino prevail on summary judgment in a slip and fall case venued in Riverside County!
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Kahana Feld’s client, a grocery store with over 50 stores throughout Southern California. Prior to Plaintiff’s fall, security cameras captured footage of a third-party customer picking up a case of water bottles near the entrance of the store. The customer tilted the case and water streamed to the floor. The customer then returned the leaky case to the pallet, picked up another case of water, and walked away. Approximately a minute and 10 seconds later, Plaintiff walked through the area, slipping on the spilled water.
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Linda Carter, Kahana FeldMs. Carter may be contacted at
lcarter@kahanafeld.com
Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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‘Revamp the Camps’ Cabins Displayed at the CA State Fair
July 30, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThis year, the California State Fair is displaying “four modern, environmentally friendly cabins” as “part of the ‘revamp the camps’ mission by the Forward Parks Commission, California State Parks and 12 architecture graduate students at Cal Poly Pomona,” according to the Sacramento Bee. The commission’s purpose is “to find solutions for the financial, cultural and population changes affecting state parks” including “drawing millennials and urban residents who live far from traditional state parks.”
Guidelines stated that the cabins “had to be portable, accessible to the physically disabled and made from sustainable materials.” Furthermore the cabins had to be under $15,000 each, have no running water or electricity, and “[y]et the design had to appeal to a younger market.”
“After a review of the surveys and recommendations from the Parks Forward Commission, the hope is to place the prototypes in state parks for public use,” the Sacramento Bee reported.
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Revisiting Statutory Offers to Compromise
August 28, 2023 —
Kathryne Baldwin - Wilke FleuryThe fourth appellate district published an opinion earlier this year in Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450 that serves as an excellent refresher on requirements of the “998 Offer,” or a statutory offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §998.
In Smalley, set in the context of a Lemon Law action, Defendant Subaru made a 998 Offer for $35,001.00, together with attorneys’ fees and costs totaling either $10,000.00 or costs and reasonably incurred attorneys’ fees, in an amount to be determined by the Court. (Smalley, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at 454.) Plaintiff objected that the offer was not reasonable and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him a total judgment award of $27,555.74 – far short of the $35,001.00 offer. The trial court found Plaintiff had failed to beat the 998 at trial and that Subaru’s earlier 998 offer was reasonable. Plaintiff appealed the post-judgment order awarding Plaintiff pre-offer costs and Defendant post-offer costs on the grounds that the 998 was not reasonable in that it did not specify whether Plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of a motion for attorneys’ fees. The fourth district affirmed the trial court’s order and engaged in a helpful review of 998 requirements.
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Kathryne Baldwin, Wilke FleuryMs. Baldwin may be contacted at
kbaldwin@wilkefleury.com
DIR Public Works Registration System Down, Public Works Contractors Not to be Penalized
July 15, 2024 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn a bit of a major freak-out this past Friday, June 28, 2024, public works contractors with Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) registrations expiring on June 30, 2024 were unable to renew their public works registrations. Those who had submitted checks were not receiving responses, DIR was not accepting online payments, and there was no telephone number or address to contact the DIR about the issue.
This, of course, could have been a big deal since Labor Code section 1725.5 prohibits contractors and subcontractors from bidding on, being listed in a bid, or being awarded a public works contract unless registered with the DIR.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Mortgage Whistleblower Stands Alone as U.S. Won’t Join Lawsuit
April 28, 2014 —
Jef Feeley and David McLaughlin – BloombergTwo years after Lynn Szymoniak helped the U.S. recover $95 million from Bank of America Corp. and other lenders for mortgage-fraud tied to the housing bubble, the whistle-blower said the government is ignoring a chance to collect more money for identical claims against other banks.
Szymoniak got $18 million when the U.S. Justice Department intervened in her foreclosure-fraud lawsuit. The government negotiated a settlement with five lenders including Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)
The other banks accused of the same behavior, including Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) and HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA), are still fighting Szymoniak’s suit, saying she isn’t a true whistle-blower. And the U.S., while continuing its crackdown on banks that packaged risky loans for sale as securities, hasn’t joined with her this time, leaving her to fight the banks alone. U.S. District Judge Joseph Anderson in Columbia, South Carolina, today is set to consider their bid to throw the case out.
Mr. Feeley may be contacted at jfeeley@bloomberg.net; Mr. McLaughlin may be contacted at dmclaughlin9@bloomberg.net
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Jef Feeley and David McLaughlin, Bloomberg
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
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