Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
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Assessing Defective Design Liability on Federal Design-Build Projects
March 22, 2021 —
Dirk Haire, Adam Hamilton & Dana Molinari - ConsensusDocsA common misconception by many government officials is that a design-builder is always responsible for every design error or omission on a design-build project. This article examines the actual liability standard applied by the courts and boards of contract appeals when a design defect arises on a federal design-build project.
Background: Design-Build Contracts and the Spearin Doctrine
Design-build contracts combine the design and construction elements of a construction project into one contract. Design-build contracts often include two types of specifications: design and performance. Design specifications may set forth various parameters, such as precise measurements, tolerances, and materials. In doing so, the specifications create a fixed “roadmap” governing a contractor’s performance of the project. Performance specifications, on the other hand, set forth “operational characteristics” to achieve a particular objective or standard, but generally leave the details to the contractor.
Reprinted courtesy of
Dirk Haire, Fox Rothschild LLP,
Adam Hamilton, Fox Rothschild LLP and
Dana Molinari, Fox Rothschild LLP
Mr. Haire may be contacted at dhaire@foxrothschild.com
Mr. Hamilton may be contacted at ahamilton@foxrothschild.com
Ms. Molinari may be contacted at dmolinari@foxrothschild.com
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Congratulations to Nicole Whyte, Keith Bremer, John Toohey, and Tyler Offenhauser for Being Recognized as 2022 Super Lawyers!
February 07, 2022 —
Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPBWB&O is proud to announce that Partners Nicole Whyte, Keith Bremer, John Toohey, and Tyler Offenhauser have been named as 2022 Southern California’s Super Lawyers! We are also honored to share that Nicole Whyte is included in two of the top lists, Top 50 Women Lawyers in Southern California and Top 50 Lawyers in Orange County!
Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The patented selection process includes independent research, peer nominations, and peer evaluations. Each candidate is evaluated on 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement. During the final selection process, only lawyers in the top 5% of the total lawyers in the state are selected to the Super Lawyers list.
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Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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Wildfire Risk Scores and Insurance Placement: What You Should Know
July 15, 2024 —
Louis "Dutch" Schotemeyer & Molly L. Okamura - Newmeyer DillionWhat Are Wildfire Risk Scores and How Are They Calculated?
Wildfire risk scores are scores assigned to properties by third-party vendors based on the likelihood of direct or indirect exposure to a wildfire. Wildfire risk scores can be a factor used by insurance companies when making coverage decisions. Additionally, wildfire risk scores can be a helpful metric for real estate developers to consider when determining whether to buy a piece of property.
There are a variety of vendors that use unique methods to calculate wildfire risk scores. For example, CoreLogic, FireLine, and RedZone are vendors used by insurance companies in California. Some vendors' scoring scales are from 1-10, and some are from 1-100, but generally the higher the score, the higher the likelihood of a wildfire impacting the property. There is no national, standardized scoring scale.
Reprinted courtesy of
Louis "Dutch" Schotemeyer, Newmeyer Dillion and
Molly L. Okamura, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Schotemeyer may be contacted at dutch.schotemeyer@ndlf.com
Ms. Okamura may be contacted at molly.okamura@ndlf.com
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N.J. Governor Signs Bill Expanding P3s
September 04, 2018 —
Nick Steingart - Construction ExecutiveGovernment entities in New Jersey that enter into public-private partnerships to help finance public construction projects are now required to utilize a project labor agreement (PLA) and pay state prevailing wages, among other requirements. Previously, P3s were only available to state and county colleges, but did not contain prevailing wage or PLA mandates.
The new law, Senate Bill 865, allows the state and its subdivisions, including counties, municipalities and school districts, to enter into agreements with private funding sources provided they follow the additional mandates such as abiding by the state’s prevailing wage law and utilizing a union-only PLA for construction of the project.
Reprinted courtesy of
Nick Steingart, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Mr. Steingart may be contacted at
steingart@abc.org
No Coverage for Co-Restaurant Owners Who Are Not Named In Policy
August 24, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Federal District Court denied two plaintiffs' claims for breach of the policy and for bad faith because they were not insureds under the policy. Tu v. Dongbu Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115200 (N.D. Calif. July 24, 2017).
Dongbu, a Hawaii insurance company, issued a two-year policy to Plaintiff Ken Tu for his business. He was the only named insured under the policy.
The waste system at Plaintiffs' restaurant failed, causing fumes to impact neighboring tenants and waste to contaminate the underlying soil. Plaintiffs were forced to close the restaurant. A claim was tendered for damage and repair, loss of business income, and other insured losses. Dongbu denied coverage.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
New York Office Secures Appellate Win in Labor Law 240(1) Fall in Basement Accident Case
March 20, 2023 —
Nicholas P. Hurzeler & Gregory S. Katz - Lewis BrisboisNew York, N.Y. (March 14, 2023) – New York Appellate Partner Nicholas P. Hurzeler and Managing Partner Gregory S. Katz recently prevailed when the New York Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the dismissal of a Labor Law 240(1) claim involving an accident that occurred in the basement of a house under construction. Balfe v. Graham, ___ AD3d ___ (2d Dept. 2023), decided March 8, 2023.
In this matter, the plaintiff was installing ductwork in the basement of a house that had been stripped down to its foundation when he stepped backwards into an open hole that had been dug out of a concrete floor to accommodate the installation of an ejector pump. The lower court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim based on Labor Law 240(1), and he appealed. The plaintiff argued that he fell into an unprotected opening that should have been covered or barricaded. He further claimed the accident qualifies as a typical “falling worker” case within the scope of Labor Law 240(1), citing the depth of the hole needed to accommodate the ejector pump, and the size of the pump. Under the case law, a worker who falls into an uncovered opening on a construction site will typically be covered by Labor Law 240(1).
Reprinted courtesy of
Nicholas P. Hurzeler, Lewis Brisbois and
Gregory S. Katz, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Katz may be contacted at Greg.Katz@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Hurzeler may be contacted at Nicholas.Hurzeler@lewisbrisbois.com
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