The Colorado Supreme Court affirms Woodbridge II’s “Adverse Use” Distinction
December 20, 2021 —
Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogLast year, I posted regarding the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision in Woodbridge II, which concluded that the “adverse use” element for prescriptive easement claims only requires the claimant to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2. Thus, Woodbridge II concluded, the claimants acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. Id. That decision was up for review by the Colorado Supreme Court at the time of my prior post. It has now been affirmed, thereby settling an arguable appellate decision split created by Woodbridge II. See Lo Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 2021 CO 56 (“Woodbridge”).
“Like the division below, and for much the same reasons,” the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in Woodbridge “that under Colorado law, a claimant’s acknowledgement or recognition of the owner’s title during the claimant’s asserted prescriptive period does not interrupt the prescriptive use or undermine the claimant’s adverse use.” Woodbridge, ¶ 2. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Gabriel’s opinion agreed with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning “that although Woodbridge recognized that it did not hold title, no evidence indicated that it had acted in subordination to the owner’s title.” Id. ¶ at 13. The Court further agreed with Woodbridge II’srejection of Lo Viento’s “permissive use” argument because “the permission offered … was conditional and Woodbridge never agreed to any of the conditions set forth therein.” Id. On that basis, Woodbridge confirmed that “a claimant seeking to establish a prescriptive easement need not show that it asserted exclusive ownership of the property during the prescriptive period,” but only “that its use was without permission or otherwise unauthorized and that it interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Id. at ¶ 23.
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Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & WilmerMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
Alexis Crump Receives 2020 Lawyer Monthly Women in Law Award
August 31, 2020 —
Alexis Crump - Lewis BrisboisLos Angeles Partner Alexis G. Crump has been recognized with a 2020 Lawyer Monthly "Women in Law Award." In receiving this honor, Ms. Crump joins an elite group of women from around the world who have influenced the legal profession with their experience and expertise.
Lawyer Monthly’s "Women in Law Awards" emerged as one of the first industry awards to celebrate the achievements and contributions made by women working globally in the legal sector and in business. Recognizing women at all levels of seniority, the publication seeks to acknowledge the challenges that female legal professionals regularly overcome to serve their clients and perform at their best.
“It is an honor to be recognized alongside so many outstanding and accomplished women. I look forward to continuing to support my colleagues in their work and participating in the global network of female attorneys,” Ms. Crump said.
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Alexis Crump, Lewis BrisboisMs. Crump may be contacted at
Alexis.Crump@lewisbrisbois.com
Arkansas Federal Court Fans the Product Liability Flames Utilizing the Malfunction Theory
September 14, 2020 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistTo establish a product liability claim in Arkansas, the plaintiff must prove that the product was supplied in a defective condition, which rendered it unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition was the proximate cause of the claimed damage or injury. Ordinarily, a plaintiff relies upon direct evidence of a product defect to establish its product liability claim. However, in some cases, the product sustains so much damage that it is impossible for a plaintiff to obtain direct evidence of a defect.
The malfunction theory allows a plaintiff in a product liability action to establish a defect through circumstantial evidence, when direct evidence of a defect no longer exists. In order to utilize the malfunction theory, a plaintiff must present evidence that an unspecified product defect was the most likely cause of the damage/accident and rule out all other possible causes of the damage/accident. In Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Broan-Nutone, No. 5:18-CV-5250, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117116, the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas ruled that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence under “the malfunction theory” to defeat a summary judgment motion in a product liability action involving a bathroom fan that was destroyed in a fire.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively
October 28, 2011 —
In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.
Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
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Five Frequently Overlooked Points of Construction Contracts
October 18, 2021 —
Craig H. O'Neill - White and Williams LLPThere is no shortage of articles addressing the key points of construction contracts. Just enter that phrase into any internet search engine and you will find plenty. It should go without saying that a construction contract should be in writing, it should clearly identify the scope of work to be performed and the sums to be paid for that work, and it should address the parties’ rights and responsibilities with regard to termination or suspension of the contract, correcting defective work, and handling claims and disputes—just to name a few. Of course, these items should receive their due consideration. Too often, however, other important aspects of the construction contract get shortchanged. This article aims the spotlight on five often overlooked aspects of construction contracts.
Project Schedules
Surprisingly, many construction contracts pay little attention to a central component of any construction project: the project schedule. Many contracts provide the dates of commencement and substantial completion but not much else. With the frequent use of project management techniques such as the Critical Path Method (CPM) and the associated software, it is easier than ever to identify which tasks should be prioritized and identify potential areas of delay. The owner’s contract with the general contractor should clearly define the scheduling methods used and provide measures to keep the parties informed of the progress of the work. By including basic scheduling requirements in the contract documents—such as the submission of “Baseline Project Schedules” (consistent with the contract time provisions), “Schedule Progress Updates” (comparing the progress of the work against the Baseline Project Schedule), and “Schedule Recovery Plans” (when Schedule Project Updates indicate projected delays)—the parties can avoid or reduce disputes over project delays that often lead to litigation.
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Craig H. O'Neill, White and Williams LLPMr. O'Neill may be contacted at
oneillc@whiteandwilliams.com
Minimum Wage on Federal Construction Projects is $10.10
November 26, 2014 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorThe Department of Labor issued its final regulations to implement President Obama’s Executive Order raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour for workers on federal construction projects. The new minimum wage will not be effective until January 1, 2015, and will apply to most workers and most federal projects.
Covered Contracts
Executive Order 13658 applies to four major categories of contractual agreements:
- procurement contracts for construction covered by the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) that exceed $2,000;
- service contracts covered by the Service Contract Act (SCA) that exceed $2,500;
- concessions contracts, including any concessions contract excluded from the SCA by the Department of Labor’s regulations at 29 CFR 4.133(b); and
- contracts in connection with Federal property or lands and related to offering services for Federal employees, their dependents, or the general public.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Is There Direct Physical Loss Under A Property Policy When COVID-19 is Present?
April 06, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMost property policies provide coverage for property damage only when there is "direct physical loss" to covered property. Early indications are that COVID-19 remains on surfaces. The duration can last from a few hours to three weeks, depending on the type of surface material. If an employee is infected and the store or restaurant must closed because the virus may rest on surfaces within the building, is there direct physical loss, even though the building structure itself is unharmed?
To answer this question, cases from jurisdictions outside Hawaii may provide guidance. In a case from Louisiana, the homeowner had to move out of her home when excessive levels of organic lead were discovered in the kitchen, living room, master bedroom, and attic. Widder v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 82 So. 3d 294 (La. Ct. App. 2011). The insurer denied coverage because there was no direct physical loss. The trial court agreed; since the home was still intact, no direct physical loss had occurred, so there was no coverage under the policy. The appellate court reversed. It compared the presence of inorganic lead in the home to cases that found a direct physical loss from the existence of Chinese drywall, from which gaseous fumes were released, rendering the home unusable or uninhabitable. Physical damage was not necessary.
What if smoke from a nearby wildfire fills an outdoor theater, forcing cancellation of performances and loss of business income? This was the situation in Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n v. Great Am. Inc. Co., 2016 U.S. DIst. LEXIS 74450 (D. Ore. Jun 7, 2016). Wildfires in the area caused smoke, soot, and ash to accumulate on the surface of seats and concrete ground of the open-air theater. The air quality was poor, but no federal, state or local agency ordered cancellation of the performances. Further, the theater did not suffer any permanent or structural damage to its property. The insurer denied coverage, contending that the loss or damage must be structural to the building itself. After all, the smoke in the air at the theater did not require any repairs to the structure of the property. The court disagreed. The theater sustained "physical loss or damage to property" when the wildfire smoke infiltrated the theater and rendered it unusable for its intended purpose. The decision in Oregon Shakespeare Festival was eventually vacated by a joint stipulation of the parties. Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n v. Great Am. Ins.Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33208 (D. Ore. March 6, 2017), but the reasoning is still sound.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Connecticut Court Clarifies a Limit on Payment Bond Claims for Public Projects
May 15, 2023 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneIn All Seasons Landscaping, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., No. DBD-CV21-6039074-S, 2022 WL 1135703 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 4, 2022) the plaintiff, a subcontractor on a state project, commenced a lawsuit against the surety who issued a payment bond on the project two years after the subcontractor last performed any original contract work on the project. The defendant surety moved to dismiss the action based on the one-year statute of limitation in Connecticut General Statute § 49-42. The plaintiff countered that it complied with that deadline because it also performed warranty inspection work after the contract was completed and within the limitation period in section 49-42. The issue of whether warranty work or minor corrective work can extend the limitations period in section 49-42 had not previously been addressed by a Connecticut court.
Section 49-42(b) governs the limitation period on payment bond claims on public projects. It provides in relevant part that “no … suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the last date that materials were supplied or any work was performed by the claimant.” Section 49-42 provides no guidance on what “materials were supplied or any work was performed” by the claimant means, nor is there any direct appellate-level authority in Connecticut on this issue. What is clear under well-established law in Connecticut is that the time limit within which suit on a payment bond must be commenced under Section 49-42 is not only a statute of limitation but a jurisdictional requirement establishing a condition precedent to maintenance of the action and such limit is strictly enforced. If a plaintiff cannot prove its suit was initiated within this time constraint, the matter will be dismissed by the court as untimely.
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Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com
