Drawing the Line: In Tennessee, the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply to Contracts for Services
December 11, 2023 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Commercial Painting Co. v. Weitz Co. LLC, No. W2019-02089-SC-R11-CV, 2023 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Weitz), the Supreme Court of Tennessee (Supreme Court) considered whether the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages arising out of a contract with the defendant for construction services. The court held that the economic loss doctrine only applies to product liability cases and does not apply to claims arising from contracts for services. This case establishes that, in Tennessee, the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort claims in disputes arising from service contracts.
In Weitz, defendant, Weitz Co. LLC (Weitz), was the general contractor for a construction project and hired plaintiff Commercial Painting Co. (Commercial) as a drywall subcontractor. Weitz refused to pay Commercial for several of its payment applications, claiming that the applications were submitted untimely and contained improper change order requests. Commercial filed a lawsuit against Weitz seeking over $1.9 million in damages, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, and interest and attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act of 1991. Weitz filed a counterclaim for $500,000 for costs allegedly incurred due to Commercial’s delay and defective workmanship. In response, Commercial amended its complaint to add claims for fraud, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, rescission of the contract and $10 million in punitive damages. Commercial alleged that Weitz received an extension of the construction schedule but fraudulently withheld this information from Commercial and continued to impose unrealistic deadlines.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Texas Supreme Court Rules That Subsequent Purchaser of Home Is Bound by Original Homeowner’s Arbitration Agreement With Builder
May 29, 2023 —
Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.In a new opinion
Lennar Homes of Texas Land and Construction, Ltd., et al. v. Kara Whiteley, Cause No. 21-0783, 66 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 8740, issued May 12, 2023, the Texas Supreme Court partially reversed two lower court decisions and held that an arbitration provision contained in the original homeowner’s contract with the builder was binding on a subsequent homeowner. In the decision, the court found that Kara Whiteley—the second owner of the home in Galveston, Texas—was bound to arbitrate her construction defect claims with Lennar by virtue of the doctrine of “direct-benefits estoppel.” The rationale was based on the fact that Whitely was seeking benefits emanating from Lennar’s contract with the original homeowner.
The residence in question was first purchased from Lennar in May 2014. Whiteley purchased the home in July 2015. The original contract documents included several arbitration provisions—one in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, one in the Limited Warranty issued by Lennar, and one in the general warranty deed. Whiteley sued Lennar in Galveston County District Court alleging mold growth and other defects at the property. Lennar moved for arbitration and its motion was granted. The parties arbitrated the case and Lennar received an award in its favor. Lennar then moved the District Court to confirm the arbitration award, and Whiteley filed a cross-motion to vacate the award, arguing that Lennar’s original motion to compel arbitration should not have been granted. The District Court agreed with Whiteley, vacating the arbitration award. Lennar appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s vacatur, and Lennar appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Ms. Altsuler may be contacted at
kaltsuler@pecklaw.com
Coverage for Injury to Insured’s Employee Not Covered
June 10, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe employee exclusions in the employer's CGL and Umbrella policies barred coverage. Piatt v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 Mo. LEXIS 32 (Mo. April 28, 2015).
Linda Nunley was killed while working for Missouri Hardwood Charcoal, Inc. The kiln's large steel door had been removed and was leaning upright against another kiln when it blew over and crushed Ms. Nunley. Her family filed a wrongful death suit against Junior Flowers, the company's sole owner, director, and executive officer. The complaint alleged that Flowers was negligent in ordering employees to lean the kiln doors upright, even though he knew it was unsafe. The complaint further alleged that Flowers breached a personal duty of care owed to Ms. Nunley and that his actions were "something more" that a breach of the company's duty to provide a safe workplace.
Flowers requested a defense under CGL and Umbrella policies issued by Lumbermen's. The policies insured Missouri Hardwood and its executive officers, but excluded liability for a work-related injury to an "employee of the insured." The policies also had a "separation of insureds" provision, stating that the insurance applied "separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought." Lumbermen's denied coverage.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
First Circuit Limits Insurers’ Right to Recoup Defense Costs or Settlement Payments
April 02, 2024 —
Eric Hermanson, Austin Moody & Victoria Ranieri - White and Williams LLPWeighing in on an issue that has divided courts nationwide, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has ruled that an insurer under Massachusetts law has no right to recoup defense costs, or amounts the insurer pays in settlement – even if the insurer reserves rights prior to payment and obtains a ruling, after the fact, that no defense or indemnity was owed. Berkley Natl. Ins. Co. v. Atlantic-Newport Realty LLC, No. 22-1959, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 4115 (1st Cir. Feb 22, 2024) (“Granite Telecomm"). However, the First Circuit rested its ruling on narrow procedural grounds, which may prolong the controversy rather than resolve it.
The insureds in Granite Telecomm owned a company cafeteria. They were sued by a food service worker who suffered a foot infection after being exposed to bacteria during a sewage backup. They sought coverage from their insurer, Berkley. Berkley argued that coverage was barred by a fungus and bacteria exclusion in the policy. The insureds disagreed. They threatened suit under M.G.L. ch. 93A, and demanded that Berkley defend the case.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric Hermanson, White and Williams LLP,
Austin Moody, White and Williams LLP and
Victoria Ranieri, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Ranieri may be contacted atranieriv@whiteandwilliams.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Contractor Gets Benched After Failing to Pay Jury Fees
April 11, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogTrial by jury is a fundamental right under the U.S. and California Constitutions. However, to avail yourself of this right, you not only have to declare that in advance that you intend to try your case to a jury but post jury fees as well. In TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra, a contractor who failed to timely post jury fees, discovered on the day of trial that it waived the right to insist on a jury trial when the defendant pulled an “I gotcha” and waived his right to a jury trial.
The TriCoast Case
In May 2014, Nathaniel Fonnegra house was damaged by fire. The following month, Fonnegra entered into a construction contract with TriCoast Builders, Inc. to repair the property. Dissatisfied with the work, Fonnegra terminated the contract, and TriCoast in turn filed a complaint against Fonnegra for unpaid work.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
How is Negotiating a Construction Contract Like Buying a Car?
March 01, 2017 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsI know, you’re probably looking for a punchline, and likely thinking something along the lines of “only a construction attorney would be sitting in his office and come up with such an analogy,” but I really do think it’s a good one.
When you are buying a car, you look for priorities. Is the color what you want? Is the motor a hybrid or a v-6? Does it have Android Auto? What is the fuel mileage? All of these things may be more or less important to you. If you can get your priorities for a price that is attractive, you will likely let some other less important items, e. g. trunk space or rear seat leg room, slide and purchase the car anyway. Furthermore, you may use these minor items as negotiating points to either get one of the priorities or a lower price. Of course the dealership will want to get its priorities, likely a sale and a profit, when negotiating and will have certain items that it won’t move on just as you have terms that you won’t move on.
Much like when you walk onto the car lot, and particularly as a subcontractor looking at a contract from a general contractor, or a GC looking at the contract from the owner of a project, a construction contract presented to you is the starting point. When looking at the contract, be sure to have some non-negotiable items in mind when taking a critical eye to the terms of that contract. Some of these terms may be more or less negotiable depending on your experience with the other party to the construction contract. For instance, striking a pay if paid clause may be less important with a paying party with whom you have a 10 year history without payment problems. On the other hand, if it is your first contract with the other party, a stricter list may be required. So, much like a dealer that you know will stand behind its cars, you may be more willing to take more “risk” in entering a construction contract with a trusted/known owner or GC.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
RCW 82.32.655 Tax Avoidance Statute/Speculative Building
August 29, 2018 —
Scott R. Sleight - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC BlogWith land prices increasing, developers are looking for opportunities to save on development costs, including cost saving tax strategies. Thus, we have seen increasing interest in development strategies that offer tax savings. One strategy is speculative building: Owners of property who self-perform construction avoid sales tax and B&O tax on the self-performed scope. See Blog Article Posted April 9, 2013, titled What Is A Speculative Builder? In addition, the Department of Revenue has provided an explanation of speculative building.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Scott R. Sleight, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Sleight may be contacted at
scott.sleight@acslawyers.com
Contractor’s Unwritten Contractual Claim Denied by Sovereign Immunity; Mandamus Does Not Help
September 22, 2016 —
David R. Cook Jr. – AHHC Construction Law BlogIn a very well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the denial of a contractor’s unwritten-contract claim against a county based on sovereign immunity. Based on an alleged oral contract, Contractor built a sewer pumping station for the County in exchange for an interest in the station’s pumping capacity. When the County denied Contractor’s demand for an interest, he filed suit.
As noted in many prior posts, the Georgia constitution reaffirms sovereign immunity of the state – which the courts interpret to include counties. One common exception in the public works area is the Constitution’s “ex contractu clause,” which waives sovereign immunity for claims based on written contracts. Of course, a precondition to the waiver of sovereign immunity is the existence of a written contract – which Contractor did not have.
Applying these rules, the court affirmed the denial of Contractor’s claims based on contract and quasi contract. In the absence of a written contract, there can be no contractual claim against the County. The same rule applies for quasi-contractual claims.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David R. Cook, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com