Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

More Reminders that the Specific Contract Terms Matter

January 24, 2022 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
If there is a theme I have pounded upon here at Construction Law Musings in the over 13 years of posting, it is that the specific terms of your construction contracts will make a huge difference. While there have been reminders galore, a case from the Eastern District of Virginia presented another wrinkle on this theme. The wrinkle? A factoring company. In CJM Financial, Inc. v. Leebcor Services, LLC et. al., the Court examined this scenario (though it went into more detail than I will here): Leebcorp hired a subcontractor, Maston Creek Services to provide certain construction services under two separate contracts. Maston then hired CJM, a factoring company, and assigned CJM its receivables and the right to collect those receivables. We wouldn’t be discussing this case if all had worked out as planned, so you likely anticipate at least some of what came next. The short story is that Matson failed to pay some of its suppliers and Leebcorp exercised its termination rights under those contracts when Matson refused to cure. In the interim, CJM had paid part of certain payment applications to Matson in compliance with the factoring agreement. When Leebcorp failed to pay CJM for Matson’s work, CJM exercised its assigned rights to collect the receivables and sued Leebcorp for breach of contract. In response, Leebcorp counterclaimed for, among other counts including civil conspiracy, breach of contract based on Matson’s failure to perform. CJM moved to dismiss the counterclaims. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Structural Defects in Thousands of Bridges in America

November 06, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
Writing under the pseudonym “Babbage,” a technology blogger at The Economist takes note of some of the depressing facts about America’s infrastructure. Babbage notes that most of the United States’ transportation infrastructure was “built in a furious burst of road construction during the 1950s and 1960s.” Citing a report from the American Society of Civil Engineers, President Obama recently warned that “we’ve got about $2 trillion of deferred maintenance.” Some of this deferred maintenance can cost lives. The 2007 collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis killed 13 people and injured 145 others. The cost of fixing structural defects in the nation’s bridges was estimated at $32 billion in 2004. In that year, about 66,500 bridges were deemed structurally defective. Another 84,000 were termed “structurally obsolete,” meaning they could be used, but with restrictions on vehicle weight and speed. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of

Construction Defect Specialist Joins Kansas City Firm

January 13, 2014 — CDJ STAFF
David Schatz, whose practice specializes in construction disputes and defects, has joined the Kansas City, Missouri firm Spencer Fane Britt & Brown LLP in their litigation practice group. Mr. Schatz’s expertise also includes banking and finance, banking litigation, commercial disputes, insurance, surety, employment, contract claims, and personal injury. Pat Whalen, Chairman of Spencer Fane Britt & Brown, said that Schatz “brings great experience across a range of industries, but many of us in Kansas City are particularly pleased by his construction and general litigation credentials, which will fit will with the resources we’re building in those areas.” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of

Hurricane Ian: Discussing Wind-Water Disputes

October 10, 2022 — Randy J. Maniloff - White and Williams LLP
“Most of the Florida homes in the path of Hurricane Ian lack flood insurance, posing a major challenge to rebuilding efforts, new data show. In the counties whose residents were told to evacuate, just 18.5 percent of homes have coverage through the National Flood Insurance Program, according to Milliman, an actuarial firm that works with the program.” That’s how a September 29th article on The New York Times website begins. When it comes to insurance coverage for hurricanes, the oft-stated maxim is that homeowner’s policies cover damage caused by wind but not flood waters. Such a low take-up rate for flood insurance policies would seemingly create an incentive for those affected by Hurricane Ian to argue, when feasible, that their property damage, despite appearing to have been caused by flood, was also caused by wind. [And, of course, businesses looking to make business interruption claims, under commercial property policies, will be in the same boat.] Further, even when someone has a homeowner’s policy and a flood policy, there may still be a reason to argue that the loss was caused by wind, as homeowner’s policies often have greater limits than flood policies. [As an important aside, when hurricane damages are covered, homeowner’s policies can have a significant deductible, perhaps up to 10% of a home’s insured value.] Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Randy J. Maniloff, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Maniloff may be contacted at maniloffr@whiteandwilliams.com

Suing a Local Government in Land Use Cases – Part 2 – Procedural Due Process

February 16, 2017 — Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions
n my last post I discussed suing a local government for a substantive due process violation. In this post, I discuss a the right to procedural due process. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects prohibits the government from depriving an individual or business of life (in the case of an individual), liberty, or property without due process of law. Unlike the somewhat abstract and subjective concept of substantive due process, procedural due process is direct and objective. Generally, if an individual or business maintains a property or liberty interest, a local government must afford that individual or business notice that the government intends to deprive them of a liberty or property interest and a reasonable opportunity to be heard to contest the proposed deprivation. Unless there is an emergency, the notice and opportunity to be heard must be given before the government deprives an individual or business of a liberty of property interest. This is known as a pre-deprivation hearing. Because of the clear contours of the right, procedural due process violations are typically easier to prove than substantive due process violations. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLC
Mr. Zimolong may be contacted at wally@zimolonglaw.com

Ninth Circuit Upholds Corps’ Issuance of CWA Section 404 Permit for Newhall Ranch Project Near Santa Clarita, CA

April 11, 2018 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog
On April 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the challenges to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) decision to issue a Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 404 permit to the Newhall Land and Farming Company (Newhall), which is planning a large residential and commercial project in Los Angeles County near Santa Clarita, CA (the Newhall Ranch project). The Newhall Ranch project, which involves the discharge of dredge and fill materials into the Santa Clara River, has been scaled back and modified, and the Ninth Circuit held that it is consistent with the CWA, the Corps’ regulations and procedures, as well as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Ninth Circuit provides an excellent primer on the Section 404 permitting process. The case is Friends of the Santa Clara River v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

Illinois Legislature Enables Pre-Judgment Interest in Personal Injury Cases

February 01, 2021 — Justin Zimmerman - Lewis Brisbois
On January 13, 2021, the Illinois General Assembly passed HB 3360, which will enable pre-judgment interest of 9% in personal injury cases. The legislation was sponsored by Madison County, Illinois-area representative Jay Hoffman (D-Belleville) and Illinois state senator Dan Harmon (D-Oak Park). Under current Illinois law, plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest in personal injury cases because the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s damages cannot be calculated in advance and liability is uncertain (compared, for example, to a breach of contract claim). If signed by the governor, personal injury actions in Illinois will be subject to 9% per annum pre-judgment interest accruing “on the date the defendant has notice of the injury from the incident itself or a written notice." Notably, the bill will also impact pending litigation as interest begins to accrue on the effective date of the legislation for cases already filed. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Justin Zimmerman, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Zimmerman may be contacted at Justin.Zimmerman@lewisbrisbois.com

Woodbridge II and the Nuanced Meaning of “Adverse Use” in Hostile Property Rights Cases in Colorado

November 23, 2020 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Earlier this year, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued an opinion addressing at length “whether the requirement that the use be ‘adverse’ in the adverse possession context is coextensive with adverse use in the prescriptive easement context.” See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2, cert. granted, No. 20SC292, 2020 WL 5405376 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2020). As detailed below, the Woodbridge II court concluded that the meanings of “adverse” in these two contexts are not coextensive—while “hostility” in the adverse possession context requires a claim of exclusive ownership of the property, a party claiming a prescriptive easement is only required to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Thus, the Woodbridge II court reasoned a claimants’ acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. This significant ruling is at odds with a prior division’s broad statement, while considering a prescriptive easement claim, that “[i]n general, when an adverse occupier acknowledges or recognizes the title of the owner during the occupant’s claimed prescriptive period, the occupant interrupts the prescriptive use.” See Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. App. 2006). Perhaps for that reason, Woodbridge II is currently pending certiorari review before the Colorado Supreme Court in a case that should provide some much-needed clarity on what constitutes “adverse use” in the context of a prescriptive easement. As we await the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision, I thought it worthwhile to provide a brief analysis of the Woodbridge II court’s deep dive into the nuances of “adverse use” in this field of Colorado law. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

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