And the Cyber-Beat Goes On. Yet Another Cyber Regulatory Focus for Insurers
April 15, 2015 —
Robert Ansehl – White and Williams LLPRegulators and government agencies are sharpening their focus on the issues surrounding cyber risk. The number of pronouncements are too numerous to recite in a single client alert but the overarching message is clear – be prepared or be subject to attack. Attacks not only will come from hackers, customers, consumers and, ultimately the plaintiffs’ bar, but the regulators themselves. Vulnerability lies not only with cyber attacked companies but increasingly with the companies’ officers and directors who fail to adequately safeguard data.
On March 26, 2015, the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) announced that it would be expanding its information technology examination procedures to focus on cyber risk. This effort was a follow-up to its February 8, 2015 announcement of new cyber assessments (See "Not Just Another Client Alert about Cyber-Risk and Effective Cybersecurity Insurance Regulatory Guidance," March 24, 2015). Not to be outdone, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) proposed a comprehensive and mandatory filing for property casualty insurers that would give regulators a full range of information and data on cyber risk exposures issued by carriers in the insurance market. This proposal comes on the heels of President Obama’s proposal, just two months ago, to create the Cyber Threat Intelligent Integration Center (CTIIC), a new federal agency designed to fight cyber attacks, provide collaboration and encourage information sharing between the Federal government and private industry.
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Robert Ansehl, White and Williams LLPMr. Ansehl may be contacted at
ansehlr@whiteandwilliams.com
Drawing the Line: In Tennessee, the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply to Contracts for Services
December 11, 2023 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Commercial Painting Co. v. Weitz Co. LLC, No. W2019-02089-SC-R11-CV, 2023 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Weitz), the Supreme Court of Tennessee (Supreme Court) considered whether the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages arising out of a contract with the defendant for construction services. The court held that the economic loss doctrine only applies to product liability cases and does not apply to claims arising from contracts for services. This case establishes that, in Tennessee, the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort claims in disputes arising from service contracts.
In Weitz, defendant, Weitz Co. LLC (Weitz), was the general contractor for a construction project and hired plaintiff Commercial Painting Co. (Commercial) as a drywall subcontractor. Weitz refused to pay Commercial for several of its payment applications, claiming that the applications were submitted untimely and contained improper change order requests. Commercial filed a lawsuit against Weitz seeking over $1.9 million in damages, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, and interest and attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act of 1991. Weitz filed a counterclaim for $500,000 for costs allegedly incurred due to Commercial’s delay and defective workmanship. In response, Commercial amended its complaint to add claims for fraud, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, rescission of the contract and $10 million in punitive damages. Commercial alleged that Weitz received an extension of the construction schedule but fraudulently withheld this information from Commercial and continued to impose unrealistic deadlines.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Indemnification Provisions Do Not Create Reciprocal Attorney’s Fees Provisions
November 21, 2018 —
CDJ STAFFIn a good, recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit in International Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Americabe-Moriarity, JV, 2018 WL 5306683 (11th Cir. 2018), held that Florida Statute s. 57.105(7) cannot be used to shift attorney’s fees in a contractual indemnification clause in a dispute between a general contractor and subcontractor’s performance bond surety, when the dispute does not involve an actual indemnification claim stemming from a third-party.
In this case, a prime contractor terminated a subcontractor and looked to the subcontractor’s performance bond surety to pay for the completion work. The subcontractor had a standard AIA A312 performance bond that requires the prime contractor to comply with the terms of the bond, as well as the incorporated subcontract, in order to trigger the surety’s obligations under the bond. The surety filed an action for declaratory relief against the prime contractor arguing that the prime contractor breached the terms of the performance bond through non-compliance thereby discharging the surety’s obligations. The trial court agreed and the surety moved for attorney’s fees.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Nebraska’s Prompt Pay Act for 2015
January 21, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorContinuing with our theme of Ready for 2015, this blog serves as a reminder of your rights and obligations under Nebraska’s Prompt Pay Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 45-1201-1211.
As you may recall, Nebraska’s legislature amended the Prompt Pay Act in 2014. The most significant changes are highlighted below.
Attorney’s Fees May be Recovered. The most significant change in the Prompt Pay Act allows contractors to recover damages if they pursue a claim under the Act. And, this is not reciprocal in that the defendant may not recover fees.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Environmental Roundup – April 2019
May 06, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelBesides showers, this April brought a number of notable new environmental decisions issued by the federal courts. Before your mind turns to May and its flowers, here’s a summary:
1.
DC Circuit. On April 23, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit decided the case of State of New York, et al. v. EPA. In the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, the Congress established the Northeast Ozone Transport Region, composed of the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, the District of Columbia and a portion of Virginia. Recently, several of these states requested EPA to expand this region to include the “upwind states” of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, West Virginia, and the remaining portions of Virginia. Doing so would assist the “downwind” states in complying with EPA’s 2008 Ozone standard. EPA rejected this request, which was then appealed to the DC Circuit by the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. Because of its unique properties, ozone created by emissions in the upwind states can be transported to the downwind states, thus allegedly hampering their ability to cope with EPA ozone standards. The court agreed that EPA has the authority to expand the Northeast Transport Ozone Transport Region, but it also has the ability to exercise its reasonable discretion not to do so. In addition, the agency’s decision to rely instead on the remedies available to it in in the Clean Air Act’s “Good Neighbor” provision was reasonable and adequately justified, and the court accordingly upheld the agency’s decision. The court also noted that other remedies may be available to the downwind states, just not this one.
2.
DC Circuit. The Court also decided on April 23, 2019 the case of Air Transport Association of America v. Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA held that the payments made by the City of Portland’s airport’s utility city charges for offsite stormwater drainage and Superfund remediation was not an “impermissible diversion” of airport revenues or in violation of the “Anti-Head Tax Act,” which is codified at 49 USC Section 40116(b) and which prohibits collecting a tax on persons travelling in air commerce. Here, the charges are assessed against the airport for the use by the airport of the city’s water and sewage services. The Superfund assessment is based on the fact that the Willamette River which runs through downtown Portland could make the city a Superfund potentially responsible party, and the cty is assessing all rate payers—including the airport—a Superfund assessment. The airport is federally funded and is owned and operated by the Port of Portland, and the Port pays a combined sewer, stormwater /water bill with multiple line items including these contested items. The court notes that federal law, in particular 49 USC Section 47107(k)(2), authorizes airport revenues to be used for the operating costs of the airport receiving federal funding, and the FAA could reasonably determine that these general expenses are authorized airport “operating costs” even though the city services are provided outside the boundaries of the airport.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Housing Starts in U.S. Drop to Lowest Level in Three Months
February 23, 2016 —
Michelle Jamrisko – BloombergNew-home construction in the U.S. unexpectedly cooled in January, indicating there is a limit to how much gains in residential real estate will boost growth at the start of 2016.
Housing starts dropped 3.8 percent to a 1.1 million annualized rate, the weakest in three months, from a 1.14 million pace the prior month, a Commerce Department report showed Wednesday in Washington. The median forecast of 76 economists surveyed by Bloomberg was 1.17 million. Permits, a proxy for future construction, were little changed.
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Michelle Jamrisko, Bloomberg
Comparing Contracts: A Review of the AIA 201 and ConsensusDocs - Part II
March 28, 2018 —
Michael Sams and Amanda Cox – Construction Executive, A publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All Rights Reserved.Part II of this three-part series compares and analyzes important contract sections in the AIA 201 (2007 and 2017 versions) and ConsensusDocs (2014 and 2017 versions), including Schedule/Time, Consequential Damages/LDs, Claims and Disputes/ADR.
Part I covered Financial Assurances, Design Risk, Project Management and Contract Administration. Part III will cover Insurance and Indemnification and Payment.
SCHEDULE/TIME
Relevant Sections:
- 2007 & 2017 A201: Section 3.10.1
- 2014 & 2017 ConsensusDocs: Section 6.2
AIA:
- Section 3.10.1 of the 2007 A201 requires that the Contractor promptly after being awarded the Contract, prepare and submit a construction schedule providing for Work to be completed within the time limits required in the Contract Documents.
- This schedule shall be revised at appropriate intervals.
- The 2017 edition breaks down the schedule to contain date of commencement, interim milestone dates, date of substantial completion, apportionment of Work by trade or building system, and the time required for completion of each portion of the Work.
- Under section 3.10.2 of the 2007 and 2017 versions, if the Contractor fails to provide a submittal schedule, the Contractor is not entitled to any additional compensation or a time extension based on the Owner’s or the Architect’s slow processing of submittals, regardless of how long they take.
ConsensusDocs 200:
- The 2017 Contract replaces the term Contract Time and instead requires a “Schedule of the Work…formatted in detailed precedence-style critical path method that (a) provides a graphic representation of all activities and events, including float values that will affect the critical path of the Work and (b) identifies dates that are critical to ensure timely and orderly completion of the Work.”
- The Constructor must submit an initial schedule to the Owner only before, “first application for payment” and thereafter on a monthly basis. (Section 6.2.1).
- The Owner is allowed to change the sequences provided in the schedule as long as it does not “unreasonably interfere with the Work.” (Section 6.2.2).
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael Sams , Kenney & Sams and
Amanda Cox, Kenney & Sams
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The Right to Repair Act (Civ.C §895 et seq.) Applies and is the Exclusive Remedy for a Homeowner Alleging Construction Defects
February 07, 2018 —
Craig Wallace – Smith Currie McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (01.18.18) ____ Cal.4th _____ (2018 WL 456728)
The California Supreme Court confirmed that the Right to Repair Act (CA Civil Code § 895, et seq. and often referred to by its legislative nomenclature as “SB800”) applies broadly to any action by a residential owner seeking recovery of damages for construction defects, regardless of whether such defects caused property damages or only economic losses. This includes the right in the Act of the builder to attempt repairs prior to the owner filing a lawsuit.
Background
Homeowners sued builder for construction defects. Included in their causes of action was a cause of action for violation of the Right To Repair Act. The Act requires that before filing litigation, a homeowner must give the builder notice and engage in a nonadversarial prelitigation process which gives the builder a right to repair the defects. The builder asked the court to stay the homeowners’ action so the prelitigaiton process could be undertaken. Rather than give the builder the repair right, the homeowners dismissed the particular cause of action from their case, leaving only other so-called common law and warranty causes of action. The common law claims sought recovery for property damage caused by the defects. The builder nonetheless asked to the Court to stay the action so it could exercise its right to repair.
The trial court, relying on
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98, denied builder’s request to stay the action. The
Liberty Mutual Court concluded that certain common law construction defect claims fell outside the purview of the Act. Builder appealed. The Court of Appeal disagreed with
Liberty Mutual, so did not follow it, granted the builder’s request for a stay, and directed that the homeowners afford the builder the right to repair the claimed defects as provided under the Act.
The California Supreme Court affirmed, disapproving
Liberty Mutual and the subsequent cases relying on it.
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Craig Wallace, Smith CurrieMr. Wallace may be contacted at
swwallace@smithcurrie.com
