San Diego’s NFL Stadium Dream Counts on Munis for Chargers’ Home
June 10, 2015 —
James Nash and Darrell Preston – BloombergSan Diego, still dealing with the legacy of a pension crisis that led politicians to consider bankruptcy a decade ago, may throw taxpayer money behind municipal bonds for a football-stadium bidding war.
The city and the National Football League’s Chargers are negotiating on a proposed $1.3 billion coliseum to keep the team from leaving for Los Angeles. A plan backed by a city panel would have San Diego pay $121 million of the new stadium’s debt, even though it still owes $52 million for the Chargers’ current home. San Diego County would chip in, too.
The quest to keep the team has triggered a debate over whether to finance professional football as the city deals with $2 billion of deferred maintenance brought about in part by mounting pension costs. The city’s retirement system has a shortfall just as large, which led voters three years ago to approve reducing benefits for city workers.
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James Nash, Bloomberg and
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Recycled Water and New Construction. New Standards Being Considered
September 15, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThe second a series of stockholder meetings will be held on August 30, 2016 in Sacramento, California to consider proposed amendments to the state building code for the installation of recycled water systems for newly constructed single-family, multifamily, commercial and public buildings.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Reversing Itself, West Virginia Supreme Court Holds Construction Defects Are Covered
July 31, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiThe West Virginia Supreme Court previously held that construction defects were not covered under a CGL policy. The Court, however, reversed itself in Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 2013 W.Va. LEXIS 724 (W.V. June 18, 2013).
The underlying complaint against the general contractor alleged various defects in the plaintiff’s recently constructed house, including an uneven concrete floor, water infiltration through the roof and chimney joint, a sagging support beam, and numerous cracks in the drywall walls and partitions throughout the house. Erie Insurance denied coverage. The insured general contractor sued, but the trial court found that faulty workmanship was not sufficient to give rise to an “occurrence.”
The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed its prior rulings determining there was no coverage for construction defects. The court recognized its prior position was in the minority, as is Hawaii's position on coverage for construction defects. See Group Builders Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw. 142, 148, 231 P.3d 67, 73 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010). Now joining the majority position, the West Virginia Supreme Court found that defective workmanship causing property damage was an “occurrence” under a CGL policy. Further, the homeowner had demonstrated that she sustained "property damage" as a result of the allegedly defective construction of her home.
The trial court also determined that the business risk exclusions barred coverage. Again, the West Virginia Supreme Court disagreed.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Fence Attached to Building Covered Under Dwelling Provisions
March 01, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Texas Supreme Court determined that a damaged fence attached to the insureds' dwelling was covered under the dwelling provisions, not the "other structure" portion of the policy. Nassar v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2017 Tex. LEXIS 113 (Tex. Jan. 27 ,2017).
The insureds' owned six acres of property. Hurricane Ike caused significant damage to the property on September 13, 2008. The insureds submitted a claim to Liberty Mutual under their homeowners' policy. Liberty Mutual paid several claims, but disputes arose over the value of various items of damaged property, including the fencing on the property. The insured's fencing spanned over 4,000 linear feet, including a white picket fence at the northeast corner of the dwelling, an ornamental iron fence in front of the dwelling, numerous cross fences, garden fences, and a larger, perimeter fence.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
A Survey of New Texas Environmental Laws
December 30, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThis is a brief survey of many of the environmental and regulatory laws passed by the Texas Legislature and signed by the Governor in the 86th Regular Session of the Legislature, which ended in May 2019. Altogether, more than 1,300 laws were enacted in this session, including a surprising number of environmentally related bills. Most of these new laws take effect on September 1, 2019. This survey places them in the following broad categories: Air, Water; Waste; Disaster (principally because of the effects of Hurricane Harvey); and Miscellaneous.
(Special thanks to Jay Bowlby, a summer intern in our Houston office, who made a significant contribution to this survey.)
1.
Air
HB 1627—amends Section 386.001(2) of the Health and Safety Code to remove several counties from the list of counties with deteriorating air quality subject to the Texas Emissions Reductions Plan.
HB 1346—relates to the diesel emissions reductions incentives and gives the TCEQ flexibility in administering this program.
HB 2726—concerns amended air quality permit applications. The law provides that construction of a project may proceed, at the applicant’s own risk, after the TCEQ Executive Director has issued a draft permit including the permit amendment. However, this provision does not apply to a permit amendment affecting a concrete batch plant located within 888 yards of a residence.
HB 3725—creates the Texas Emissions Reduction Plan Trust Fund, which will be held by the Comptroller and administered by the TCEQ, which also administers the TERP program.
SB 698—authorizes the TCEQ to provide expedited processing of certain Texas Clean Air Act permit applications by increasing the agency’s permitting staff.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Insurer’s “Failure to Cooperate” Defense
November 14, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe “failure to cooperate” defense is a defense an insurer may raise when its insured fails to cooperate with it in the defense of the claim against the insured. If an insurer takes this position, it will typically be denying both defense and indemnification obligations, meaning the insured could be forfeiting coverage that otherwise exists through his/her/its failure to cooperate with the insurer. This defense by the insurer is not absolute as recently explained by the Fourth District in Barthelemy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2379a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) discussing the elements of this failure to cooperate defense.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Ten Years After Colorado’s Adverse Possession Amendment: a brief look backwards and forwards
September 25, 2018 —
Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn response to national outrage over an infamous adverse possession case in Boulder, Colorado, in which a lawyer and a judge intentionally took their neighbors’ undeveloped land through adverse possession, the Colorado legislature amended the state’s adverse possession statute (C.R.S. § 38-41-101) to make the claim significantly harder to prove. It did this because it believed “there were insufficient ‘obstacles’ to establishing a claim for adverse possession under the existing law.”[1] Effective July 1, 2008, the amendment created a heightened burden of proof, additional element requirements, and the possibility of a losing defendant recovering money from successful plaintiffs for the value of the land they took and the taxes the defendant had paid on that land.
The Boulder case eventually settled, but the resulting statutory amendments have drastically changed the landscape of Colorado’s adverse possession law. Ten years later, this blog post takes a brief look at the amended statute, the impact it has had, and questions that have yet to be resolved.
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Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & WilmerMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com