Environmental Roundup – May 2019
July 09, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelFederal Courts of Appeal
Dam Claims Collapse
On May 7, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided the case of Navelski, et al. v. International Paper Company. After a major storm, a dam constructed by International Paper to serve the operations of its local paper mill, was breached, releasing millions of gallons of water into a nearby creek resulting in the flooding of many homes located downstream from the creek. IP was sued by the homeowners in a class action, alleging negligence and strict liability for conducting an abnormally dangerous activity. The trial court dismissed the strict liability claim, and the jury found IP was not negligent in the operation of the dam. On appeal, the court upheld the jury verdict, agreeing that the verdict was supported by the evidence heard by the jury. The appeals court also agreed that the strict liability claim was properly dismissed as a matter of law because the operation of this dam was not an abnormally dangerous activity under Florida law. The plaintiffs had also argued that the jury should not have been advised that the home county, Escambia County, has applied for a FEMA grant which apparently made the case that some of the downstream homes were naturally prone to flooding. A redacted version of the application was allowed to be shown to the jury, but the appeals court held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the court ruling was prejudicial.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Insured's Lack of Knowledge of Tenant's Growing Marijuana Means Coverage Afforded for Fire Loss
August 17, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the insurer regarding a claim for fire loss. Mosley v. Pacific Sec. Ins, Co., 2020 Cal. App LEXIS (Cal. Ct. App, May 26, 2020).
The Mosleys rented their property to Pedro Lopez. Six months later, the property was damaged by fire. Lopez had tapped a main power line into the attic to power his energy-intensive marijuana growing operation. The illegal power line caused the fire.
Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (PSIC) insured the property under an HO-3 Standard Homeowners policy. Paragraph E of the policy provided,
We do not insure for loss resulting from any manufacturing, product or operation, engaged in:
- The growing of plants; or
- The manufacture, production, operation or processing of chemical, biological, animal or plant materials.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Existence of “Duty” in Negligence Action is Question of Law
February 06, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a negligence action, the issue of whether a duty applies is a question of law. See Limones v. School Dist. of Lee County, 161 So.3d 384, 389 (Fla. 2015) (“[T]he existence of a duty is a legal question because duty is the standard to which the jury compares the conduct of the defendant.”); McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992) (“Since duty is a question of law, an appellate court obviously could reverse based on its purely legal conclusion that no such duty existed.”). Thus, the trial court determines, as a matter of law, whether a legal duty of care applies in a negligence action.
Florida law recognizes the following four sources of duty: (1) statutes or regulations; (2) common law interpretations of those statutes or regulations; (3) other sources in the common law; and (4) the general facts of the case.
See id.
Oftentimes it is the fourth source – the general facts of the case – that comes into play to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Wilke Fleury Attorney Featured in 2022 Best Lawyers in America and Best Lawyers: Ones To Watch!
September 13, 2021 —
Wilke Fleury LLPWilke Fleury congratulates attorneys David Frenznick, Adriana Cervantes, Matthew Powell and Dan Egan on their inclusion in the 2022 Edition of Best Lawyers in America!
Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. Almost 108,000 industry-leading lawyers are eligible to vote (from around the world), and they have received over 13 million evaluations on the legal abilities of other lawyers based on their specific practice areas around the world. For the 2021 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America©, 9.4 million votes were analyzed.
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Wilke Fleury LLP
Colorado Abandons the “Completed and Accepted Rule” in Favor of the “Foreseeability Rule” in Determining a Contractor’s Duty to a Third Party After Work Has Been Completed
January 17, 2013 —
Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCIn a recent case, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that a contractor had a duty to a third party to warn it of a dangerous condition, even after the contractor had completed its work and the owner had accepted the contractor’s work. Collard v. Vista Paving Corp., -- P.3d --, 2012 WL 5871446 (Colo. App. 2012). While not an earth shattering or entirely new concept, the decision rendered in Collard directly accepted the foreseeability rule at the expense of the completed and accepted rule. Id.
In Collard, the City of Grand Junction (“the City”) hired Vista Paving Corp. (“Vista”) to construct two road medians according to the City’s plans and designs. On July 9, 2007, Vista began work on the medians. According to its contract with the City, Vista was responsible for traffic control during construction of the medians. On July 19, 2007, Vista completed its construction of both medians. On that date, the City’s project inspector conducted his final inspection of Vista’s work. The City’s inspector then told Vista that its work had been completed and that Vista was authorized to leave the site. Vista requested permission to remove the traffic control devices to which the City’s inspector agreed. Vista removed all of its traffic control devices.
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Brady IandiorioMr. Iandiorio can be contacted at
iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
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Fourth Circuit Confirms Scope of “Witness Litigation Privilege”
November 21, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn October 26, in the case of Day v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the common law “Witness Litigation Privilege” protects an expert witness in a Black Lung Benefits Act benefits proceeding against civil claims that allege a federal RICO violation and Maryland state law claims for fraud, tortious interference, negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment attended the testimony of the expert witness.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
The Problem with One Year Warranties
June 10, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorContractors often ask if they should include a one year warranty in their subcontracts. I tell them that they can, but it may be more effective to include a one-year correction period. If a contractor does include a warranty in the contract, it may actually extend the time in which a contractor may be sued. I recommend instead a Correction Period.
Typical Construction Warranties
Form construction contracts, like the AIA forms, often times contain warranty language. The AIA A201, General Conditions, contains a warranty section that covers materials, but it does not address how long the work is warranted:
“3.5 WARRANTY
The Contractor warrants to the Owner and Architect that materials and equipment furnished under the Contract will be of good quality and new unless the Contract Documents require or permit otherwise. The Contractor further warrants that the Work will conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents and will be free from defects, except for those inherent in the quality of the Work the Contract Documents require or permit.”
Instead, the AIA A201, section 13.7, limits the time by which claims must be brought to 10 years or the applicable statute of limitations.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
