Stacking of Service Interruption and Contingent Business Interruption Coverages Permitted
December 10, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found that stacking of interruption coverages was allowed based up the language of the policy. Lion Oil Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148261 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 2, 2015).
The insured's oil line was ruptured, causing an interruption of crude oil delivery service. The insured held policies issued by National Union.
The policies included multiple time element extensions. One extension related to Service Interruption which promised to insure against loss for:
Service Interruption: electrical, steam, gas, water, sewer, incoming or outgoing voice, data, or video, or an other utility or service transmission lines and related plants, substations and equipment situated on or outside of the premises.
Both parties agreed that the service interruption provision was unambiguous and that the court should give effect to the plain language of the policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Do Not Pass Go! Duty to Defend in a Professional Services Agreement (law note)
April 03, 2019 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaRecently a client asked me to review a contract for his Firm. The Owner, who had prepared the draft, had inserted a rather stringent “duty to defend” clause.
As I told my client, a duty to defend clause is not a good idea for a couple of reasons. First, if you agree to provide a defense, what that means is that you are footing the bill for the Owner if the Owner is sued by another party. Think about that for a minute. You are paying legal fees for someone else’s legal defense. You may or may not be able to direct the litigation or have a say in who is hired. Can you say open check book?
Secondly, and more importantly, the duty to defend is almost never insurable. What that means is that your professional liability carrier will not be footing the bill—your Firm will be doing it. This is not a case of adding the Owner as an additional insured, so do not confuse the two. Agreeing to a duty to defend is an extremely burdensome, and potentially costly, mistake.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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The Unthinkable Has Happened. How Should Contractors Respond?
May 11, 2020 —
Bruce Orr - AEC BusinessAny construction veteran expects the economy to contract and expand. However, the global pandemic presents contractors with a challenge unlike any in recent memory.
How should they respond in an environment of such uncertainty? For some perspective, I chatted with Dr. John Killingsworth, a construction management professor at Colorado State University who has conducted extensive research on how contractors can weather economic downturns.
BRUCE ORR: John, let’s say you’re in IT or are a c-suite executive at a contracting firm. This event has occurred. What are some of the questions you should be asking right now?
JOHN KILLINGSWORTH: For starters, we have to acknowledge that the uncertainties are so tremendous that many contractors have no choice but to be reactive in the short term. They’re literally not sure whether particular job sites will be open or closed tomorrow or whether they’ll go to work next week. They’re also looking at predictions—from highly qualified statisticians, public health officials and others—that are just all over the map due to the limited nature of the data we have at hand.
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Bruce Orr, AEC BusinessMr. Orr may be contacted at
bruce@pronovos.com
Maryland Legislation Prohibits Condominium Developers from Shortening Statute of Limitations to Defeat Unit Owner Construction Defect Claims
May 16, 2018 —
Nicholas D. Cowie - Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogNew Maryland legislation prevents developers from shortening the time period within which condominium associations and their unit owner members can assert claims for hidden construction defects in newly constructed condominium communities. The legislation known as HB 77 and SB 258 passed both houses of the Maryland General Assembly and was signed into law by Governor Lawrence J. Hogan on April 24, 2018 (see photo above). Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq. is the author of the legislation, which will be codified as Section 11-134.1 of the Maryland Condominium Act, effective October 1, 2018.
This article discusses how this new legislation ends the practice by which some condominium developers attempted to use condominium documents to shorten the normal statute of limitations in order to prevent condominium associations and their unit owner members from having a fair opportunity to assert their warranty and other legal claims for latent construction defects.
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq., Cowie & MottMr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
Ahlers Cressman & Sleight Rated as One of the Top 50 in a Survey of Construction Law Firms in the United States
July 22, 2019 —
Jonathan Schirmer - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCThe magazine, Construction Executive, recently rated the top construction law firms in the United States. We are pleased to announce that our firm was rated as number one in Oregon and Alaska and number two in the state of Washington behind Perkins Coie, LLP. In its inaugural ranking, Construction Executive reached out to hundreds of law firms nationwide with a dedicated construction practice to determine who the industry leaders were. Ahlers Cressman & Sleight ranked 22nd overall in the United States among all construction law firms.
This survey considered revenues from each of the law firm’s construction practices, the number of lawyers in the firm’s construction practice, the percentage of the firm’s total revenues derived from construction practice, the number of states in which the firm is licensed to practice and the year in which the construction practice was established.
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Jonathan Schirmer, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Schirmer may be contacted at
jonathan.schirmer@acslawyers.com
Sierra Pacific v. Bradbury Goes Unchallenged: Colorado’s Six-Year Statute of Repose Begins When a Subcontractor’s Scope of Work Ends
November 03, 2016 —
Luke Mecklenburg – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIt’s official: the October 20, 2016 deadline to petition for certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals on its decision in Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc. v. Bradbury has passed, so it appears that decision will stand.
In Sierra Pacific, the Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression that the statute of repose for a general contractor to sue a subcontractor begins to run when a subcontractor’s scope of work is substantially complete, regardless of the status of the overall project. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc. v. Bradbury, 2016 COA 132, ¶ 28, ___ P.3d ___. The Court of Appeals interpreted the statute of repose in C.R.S. section 13-80-104, which requires that “all actions against any architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer, or inspector performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of any improvement to real property” must be brought within six years of substantial completion of that improvement. C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(a). Recognizing that “an improvement may be [to] a discrete component of an entire project” under Shaw Construction, LLC v. United Builder Services, Inc., 296 P.3d 145 (Colo. App. 2012), the Court of Appeals determined that “a subcontractor has substantially completed its role in the improvement at issue when it finishes working on the improvement.” Sierra Pac., 2016 COA at ¶¶ 20, 28. In doing so, it rejected Sierra Pacific’s argument that the statute could be tolled under the repair doctrine “while others worked to repair [the subcontractor’s] ‘improper installation work and flawed repair work.’” Id. at ¶ 29. Because six years had undisputedly passed since the subcontractor completed its scope of work when Sierra Pacific filed suit against it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment under Section 13-80-104(1)(a).
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Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
Death, Taxes and Attorneys’ Fees in Construction Disputes
July 18, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogAccording to Benjamin Franklin there are two certainties in this world:
Death and taxes. Let me humbly add a third if you’re ever involved in non-contingency civil litigation: Attorneys’ fees.
As such, when it comes to legal disputes, sophisticated parties know that it’s not just about winning but the cost of winning. While winning is never certain – remember Poor Richard’s proverb above – what is certain is that it will most likely cost you to find out whether you’ve won or lost. That’s why the ability to recover (or at least threaten the recovery of attorneys’ fees – that’s a separate discussion altogether) in litigation and arbitration is so important.
A few facts:
- According to the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) in their 2013 report, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings From a Survey of Trial Lawyers, the median cost of litigation (i.e., attorneys’ fees) for contract disputes, of which most construction disputes would fall under, was $90,575 from case initiation through post-trial disposition.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
