Breaking News: Connecticut Supreme Court Decides Significant Coverage Issues in R.T. Vanderbilt
December 16, 2019 —
Patricia B. Santelle & Ciaran B. Way - White and Williams LLPOn October 4, 2019 (almost two years after granting certification), the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s rulings on four key coverage issues in R.T. Vanderbilt Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, et al. The coverage dispute in Vanderbilt concerns underlying actions alleging that talc and silica mined and sold by the insured contained asbestos and/or caused asbestos-related disease. The case has been proceeding in phases, two of which have been tried to date, resulting in the matter on appeal.
(1) “Continuous Trigger” Theory of Coverage Applies: The Court affirmed and adopted the Appellate Court’s opinion applying a “continuous trigger” for the underlying claims at issue, and agreed that the trial court properly excluded testimony from medical experts the insurers had proffered to prove that the asbestos disease process did not support a continuous trigger.
(2) The “Unavailability of Insurance” Exception to Time-on-Risk Pro Rata Allocation Applies: The Court affirmed and adopted the Appellate Court’s ruling that (a) damages and defense costs should not be allocated to any period in which insurance was “unavailable” in the market, (b) the insurers bear the burden of proving that coverage for asbestos liabilities was available to the policyholder after the date asbestos exclusions were added to the policies and (c) the insured bears the burden of proving that it was unable to obtain asbestos coverage prior to 1986 (when such insurance was generally available). The Appellate Court recognized that, in certain circumstances, there could be an “equitable exception” to the unavailability rule if the insured continued to manufacture products containing asbestos after 1986 with the knowledge that such products were hazardous and uninsurable (circumstances which the court found were not present in this case).
Reprinted courtesy of
Patricia B. Santelle, White and Williams LLP and
Ciaran B. Way, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Santelle may be contacted at santellep@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Way may be contacted at wayc@whiteandwilliams.com
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Ackman Group Pays $91.5 Million for Condo at NYC’s One57
April 15, 2015 —
David M. Levitt and Oshrat Carmiel – BloombergA group including billionaire investor Bill Ackman paid $91.5 million for a duplex penthouse at Extell Development Co.’s One57 condominium tower, one of New York City’s most expensive home purchases ever.
The purchase of unit 75 in the luxury skyscraper overlooking Central Park closed on March 27, according to property records filed Thursday. The buyer was listed as 57157 Co. LLC, a single-purpose entity that Ackman controls.
The 13,554-square-foot (1,259-square-meter), six-bedroom home spans the 75th and 76th floors of the 90-story skyscraper. Ackman last year told the New York Times it was “the Mona Lisa of apartments.” Monthly common charges on the unit were estimated at $23,595, according to documents Extell filed with the state attorney general’s office.
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David M. Levitt, Bloomberg and
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Subcontractors Have a Duty to Clarify Ambiguities in Bid Documents
August 19, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorSeveral months ago, I wrote about an escalator subcontractor that sued a general contractor, demanding payment for work completed based on approved shop drawings. The trial court agreed with the subcontractor, but the general contractor appealed. Ten months later, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the subcontractor had a duty to bring to the general contractor’s attention major discrepancies or errors they detect in the bid documents.
“The subcontractor failed to disclose ambiguities in the plans and must suffer the peril.”
Construction Difficulties
The subcontractor installed 32 inch escalators throughout the project, but the plans called for 40 inch escalators. The general contractor and subcontractor could not reach agreement on how the dispute should be resolved. The subcontractor sued the general to get paid for replacing the escalators and the general sued to subcontractor for concessions it had to pay to the owner.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Understanding California’s Pure Comparative Negligence Law
November 13, 2023 —
Yaron Shaham - Kahana FeldIn order for a plaintiff to prove a defendant is negligent, the plaintiff must prove the defendant (1) owed a duty to plaintiff, (2) breached that duty, (3) the breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the resulting monetary damage. However, for both plaintiffs and defendants it is not an all or nothing game in California. This is because California is a pure Comparative Negligence state.
California’s Comparative Negligence law provides that even if a plaintiff is deemed 99% at fault, the plaintiff can still recover 1% in damages from a defendant. Thus, even if a plaintiff is deemed to be more than 50% (or even 99%) at fault for the incident, the plaintiff could still recover some monetary amount, or the defendant will still have to pay plaintiff, depending on how you see it. In most instances, a jury decides what percentage of fault to assign to each party.
Just as a plaintiff must prove he/she/its negligence case against a defendant, if the defendant claims plaintiff was partially responsible for the incident, the defendant must prove plaintiff was also negligent and said negligence contributed to plaintiff’s injuries. The total amount of monetary responsibility distributed among all defendants and plaintiffs must equal 100%. As crazy as it may sound, a plaintiff found to be 99.9% at fault, is still entitled to recover 0.01% from a defendant in California.
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Yaron Shaham, Kahana FeldMr. Shaham may be contacted at
yshaham@kahanafeld.com
Where Breach of Contract and Tortious Interference Collide
January 11, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsClaims for breach of contract are numerous in the construction law world. Without these claims we construction attorneys would have a hard time keeping the doors open. A 2021 case examined a different sort of claim that could arise (though, “spoiler alert” did not in this case) during the course of a construction project. That type of claim is one for tortious interference with business expectancy.
In Clark Nexsen, Inc. et. al v. Rebkee, the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia gave a great explanation of the law of this type of claim in analyzing the following basic facts:
In 2018, Clark Nexsen, Inc. (“Clark”) and MEB General Contractors, Inc. (“MEB”) responded to Henrico County’s (“Henrico”) Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for the design and construction of a sport and convocation center (the “Project”). Henrico initially shortlisted Clark and MEB as a “design-build” team for the Project, but later restarted the search, issuing a second RFP. Clark and MEB submitted a second “design-build” proposal, but Henrico selected Rebkee Co. (“Rebkee”) for certain development aspects of the Project. MEB also submitted proposals to Rebkee, and Rebkee selected MEB as the design-builder for the Project. MEB, at Rebkee’s request, solicited proposals from three design firms and ultimately selected Clark as its design partner. From December 2019 to May 2020, Clark and MEB served as the design-build team to assist Rebkee in developing the Project. In connection therewith, Clark developed proprietary designs, technical drawings, and, with MEB, several cost estimates. In February 2020, MEB submitted a $294,334.50 Pay Application to Rebkee for engineering, design, and Project development work. Rebkee never paid MEB. Henrico paid MEB $50,000.00 as partial payment for MEB’s and Clark’s work. MEB then learned that Rebkee was using Clark’s drawings to solicit design and construction proposals from other companies. On July 23, 2020, Rebkee told MEB that Henrico directed it to cancel the design-build arrangement with MEB and Clark and pursue a different planning method. MEB and Clark sued and Rebkee for, among other claims, tortious interference with a business expectancy. Rebkee moved to dismiss the tortious interference claim.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Subcontractor Sued for Alleged Defective Work
June 11, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Louisiana Record reported that “[a] construction company is suing a subcontractor for alleged defective work on two construction projects” in New Orleans, Louisiana.
New Beginnings Enterprises and J. Fernando Arriola are “accused of providing defective labor and materials, failing to properly supervise construction on the properties, failing to obtain inspections required under building codes, failing to construct dwellings in accordance with plans and specifications and failing to perform agreements in a workmanlike manner,” according to the Louisiana Record.
Plaintiffs including Bartel Construction LLC seek $209,500 in damages “as additional sums for defective and incomplete work, lost profits, consequential damages and attorney’s fees.”
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Does Stricter Decertification Mean More “Leedigation?”
August 04, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsRecently, my friend and fellow construction attorney/consultant, Chris Cheatham (@chrischeatham) posted the news that USGBC will be more stringent on the de-certification front. This statement relates to the continued energy performance of LEED certified buildings and increases the likelihood that energy performance (as opposed to mere reporting) could lead to de-certification.
I have discussed on several occasions the potential legal risks relating to green building. One of the big potential sources for such litigation (or “leedigation” as coined by Mr. Cheatham) is the possible de-certification of a previously certified building. With this latest statement by USGBC the specter of such de-certification seems even stronger.
Couple this potential with the fact that anyone can challenge the certification of a building at any time and contractors, subcontractors and other construction professionals face potential liability for the performance of a building in ways well beyond their control.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Court Upholds Plan to Eliminate Vehicles from Balboa Park Complex
June 10, 2015 —
Kristen Lee Price and Lawrence S. Zucker II – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego, et al. (No. D063992, filed 5/28/15), the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District upheld a controversial plan to eliminate vehicles from various plazas in historic Balboa Park. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal considered a question of first impression involving the interpretation of San Diego Municipal Code section 126.0504.
Balboa Park, designated a National Historic Landmark in 1940, is a large urban park in the center of San Diego. The City of San Diego (“City”) recently approved a proposed plan (“Project”) to eliminate vehicles from the plazas within the Balboa Park complex and to return the plazas to purely pedestrian zones. Subsequently, a community group named Save Our Heritage Organisation (“SOHO”) filed a petition for a writ of mandate alleging, among other things, the City erroneously approved the Project. SOHO contended Municipal Code section 126.0504 mandated two key findings be made before the Project could be approved: (1) that the intended purpose of the property would not be adversely affected; and (2) without the proposed project, the property would not be put to a “reasonable beneficial use.” SOHO argued that although the City made the requisite findings, those findings lacked substantial evidentiary support. The trial court agreed with SOHO and directed the City to rescind the site development permit.
The City argued on appeal that Municipal Code section 126.0504 vested it with “discretion to make a qualitative determination of whether an existing use of the property, even if deemed beneficial, is also a reasonable use of that property under all of the facts and circumstances applicable to the particular property in question.” The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kristen Lee Price, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Price may be contacted at kprice@hbblaw.com; Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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