Premises Liability: Everything You Need to Know
September 09, 2019 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPPremises liability is a relatively simple concept: landowners, lessors, and occupiers of land must keep their property safe and avoid causing harm to others. Premises liability lawsuits can arise from an array of circumstances including a slip and fall by an individual, a construction site accident, or an accident at occurs on a residential or commercial property. Under California law, everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property. California Civil Code 1714 (a). When an individual is injured on a property, the person harmed generally brings a lawsuit based upon a theory of negligence. Under this theory, an injured Plaintiff must prove the following:
- The defendant owned, leased, occupied, or controlled the property;
- The defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property;
- The plaintiff was harmed; and
- The defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm.
California Civil Jury Instructions 1000.
When evaluating a negligence claim under the theory of premises liability, there are several key elements for both a Plaintiff and a Defendant to consider. First, the landowner, occupier, or lessor of a premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the use or maintenance of the premises to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968). Essentially, a landowner or occupier is required to take steps to keep individuals on the property free from harm.
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Prompt Payment More Likely on Residential Construction Jobs Than Commercial or Public Jobs
May 02, 2022 —
LevelsetNEW ORLEANS, May 02, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- In construction, no line of work guarantees prompt and in-full payments, but contractors working on residential jobs say their rate of prompt payment is significantly better than commercial or public jobs, according to the
2022 Levelset Cash Flow and Payment Report. However, the report revealed that residential construction jobs require increased communication to improve the chance of prompt payment when compared to commercial or public jobs.
Contractors working on residential projects are more than twice as likely as those working on public projects to report getting paid within 30 days, with residential construction contractors saying they are paid in 30 days or less 48% of the time and public construction contractors saying that only happens 21% of the time.
Significantly slow payments of 60 days or more are three times more likely on public construction projects than on residential construction projects, according to the survey participants. Residential contractors say it happens rarely, just 6% of the time, while public project contractors say it happens nearly one out of five times (18%).
For more information about the report and a detailed summary of findings, please visit: www.levelset.com/survey
About Levelset
Levelset's mission is to empower contractors to always get what they earn. Levelset's products help millions in the construction industry each year to make payment paperwork and compliance easier, get cash faster, monitor the risk on jobs and contractors, and better understand payment processes and rules. The results are faster payments, access to capital, and fewer surprises. Founded in 2012, Levelset is based in New Orleans, Louisiana, with offices in Austin, Texas, and Cairo, Egypt, and is owned and operated by Procore Technologies, Inc. For more information, visit www.levelset.com.
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Lien Claimant’s Right to Execute against Bond Upheld in Court of Appeals
February 10, 2012 —
Douglas Reiser, Builders Council BlogStonewood v. Infinity Homes is a simple construction dispute over a matter of about $9,000.00. But sometimes these tiny little disputes turn into expensive legal battles over mere procedural quivering. In Stonewood, a small subcontractor won a big victory yesterday when the Divison 1 Court of Appeals upheld its judgment against a lien release bond posted by an owner.
Infinity Homes contracted with Stonewood Design to lay tile in one of its customer’s homes. Stonewood did the work, but Infinity withheld roughly $9,000.00 of the contract sums for what it alleged were trade damages left on the tile. The two parties were unable to come to an agreement over payment and Stonewood proceeded with a lien under RCW 60.04. It then filed an action to enforce the lien against the homeowner, Infinity and its bonding company.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Lakewood Introduced City Ordinance to Battle Colorado’s CD Law
September 24, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to The Denver Post, the Lakewood City Council “introduced an ordinance that would make it more difficult for homeowners associations to sue developers for construction defects and give builders more opportunity to fix problems before litigation begins.” A hearing and final vote is scheduled for October 13th.
"If there are defects, we want to get them fixed rather than dragging this through the courts for years," Lakewood Mayor Bob Murphy told The Denver Post. Murphy believes the ordinance will bring “more diverse housing options to Lakewood, especially around stations along the Regional Transportation District’s West Rail Line.” Lakewood’s City Planner Travis Parker also declared that the defects law is to blame for the lack of condos in the area.
However, some believe that “Lakewood is overstepping its bounds as a home-rule city,” according to The Denver Post. "What they're trying to do is use an ordinance to circumvent state law in order to make it impossible for homeowners to seek redress against builders for defects," Molly Foley-Healy an attorney who serves as legislative liaison for the Community Associations Institute's Legislative Action Committee told the Post. “Mayor Murphy needs to incentivize quality construction in Lakewood instead.”
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Nevada Supreme Court Holds That Insureds Can Use Extrinsic Evidence to Prove Duty to Defend
February 28, 2022 —
Bethany L. Barrese - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThe recent Nevada Supreme Court ruling in Zurich American Insurance Company v. Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company1 benefits insureds seeking to establish an insurer’s duty to defend. As a matter of first impression, the court clarified that insureds have the burden to prove that an exception to a policy exclusion applies in order to trigger the insured’s duty to defend. However, while the policyholder may use extrinsic evidence to establish the insurer’s duty to defend, the insurer may not use extrinsic evidence to deny that duty.
The facts of the underlying claim are set in the 2000s when the insured subcontractors worked to build thousands of homes in Nevada. The subcontractors were insured by Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) during that period. After the homes were complete, the subcontractors switched from Zurich to Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company (“Ironshore”). Between 2010 and 2013, homeowners brought claims against the subcontractors alleging that the properties were damaged due to construction defects. The subcontractors tendered the claims to Zurich as the insurer at the time of construction. Zurich then sought defense and indemnification from Ironshore. Ironshore denied coverage under a “continuing and progressive” policy exclusion, claiming that the property damage occurred due to faulty work that predated the Ironshore policy. Notably, an exception to the exclusion applied if “sudden and accidental” property damage occurred within the Ironshore policy period. Given that the underlying lawsuits did not include specific allegations describing when or how the property damage occurred, Ironshore and Zurich disagreed on whether the exception to the exclusion was triggered..
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Bethany L. Barrese, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMs. Barrese may be contacted at
BBarrese@sdvlaw.com
A Loud Boom, But No Serious Injuries in World Trade Center Accident
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Wall Street Journal reports that nearly twenty tons of steel fell forty stories at the World Trade Center site on February 16. One person was checked by medical personnel. One person who works in the Financial District said it was “almost like thunder.” Frank Pensabene, one of the ironworkers on the site said that after “loud boom,” “all hell broke loose.” The steel beams and cables fell onto a flatbed truck, which was not occupied at the time.
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Insurance Policy Language Really Does Matter
August 19, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorThe debate continues on whether a subcontractor’s faulty work constitutes property damage and an occurrence such that the insurer must cover the claim. The most recent court to weigh in on this issue is the New Jersey appellate court (one step down from the New Jersey Supreme Court) in Cypress Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, LLC.
In this case, the condominium association sued the general contractor, who also acted as the developer, and subcontractors for faulty workmanship. The condominium association also sued the insurer for the general contractor, demanding payment of consequential damages caused by a subcontractor’s faulty work. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that the subcontractor’s faulty work was not property damage and thus not an occurrence under the Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policy, so no coverage.
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the claims for consequential damages caused by faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence as defined in the policy. This was a shift from earlier opinions in New Jersey.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
