Creeping Incrementalism in Downstream Insurance: Carriers are Stretching Standard CGL Concepts to Untenable Limits
October 17, 2023 —
Eric M. Clarkson - Saxe Doernberger & VitaIn the construction sector, the importance of closely vetting downstream parties’ insurance has never been more critical. The markets have been hardening with no seeming end in sight and carriers are looking for any way to get an edge. Owners and general contractors need to be on the lookout for ever broader carrier-specific expansions of standard insurance provisions that are perilous for risk transfer. We are seeing more and more terms that go against the intent of ISO standard which is what is almost universally required in construction contracts.
One area where carriers are deviating from standard concepts is within pre-existing injury or damage exclusions in Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policies. It is almost a universal requirement that downstream parties provide additional insured coverage to owners and general contractors on ISO form CG 00 01. Generally, ISO standard language provides coverage for sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage. One of the few main requirements to trigger coverage is that the injury or damage must occur during the policy period. Over the years, ISO standard language has evolved to exclude injury or damage if an insured or certain persons knew that it had occurred before the policy period. Additionally, injury or damage is deemed to have been known to have occurred under certain circumstances.
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Eric M. Clarkson, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMr. Clarkson may be contacted at
EClarkson@sdvlaw.com
Modified Plan Unveiled for Chicago's Sixth-Tallest Tower
February 15, 2018 —
Jeff Yoders – ENRThe Chicago Plan Commission on Jan. 18 approved a $700-million development that, as presented, would include the city’s sixth-tallest building.
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Jeff Yoders, Engineering News-RecordMr. Yoders may be contacted at
yodersj@enr.com
EPA and the Corps of Engineers Repeal the 2015 “Waters of the United States” Rule
January 13, 2020 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe pre-publication version of the final rule to be promulgated by EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) to repeal the 2015 redefinition of the Clean Water Act’s term “Waters of the United States” which is the linchpin of these agencies’ regulatory power under the CWA, was made available on September 12, 2019. The rule should be published in the Federal Register in the next few weeks, and it will be effective 60 days thereafter. Many challenges are expected to be filed in the federal courts.
The 2015 rule was very controversial, and petitions challenging the rule were filed in many federal district courts, several courts of appeal, and finally in the Supreme Court (see NAM v. Department of Defense), which held that all initial challenges must be filed in the federal district courts. The upshot of these challenges is that, at this time, the 2015 rule has been enjoined in more than half the states while the other states are bound by the 2015 rule, a situation which is frustrating for everyone.
In addition to repealing the 2015 rule, the agencies also restored the pre-2015 definition had had been in place since 1986. As a result, the pre-2015 definition of waters of the U.S. will again govern the application of the following rules: (a) the ACOE’s definition of “waters of the U.S.” at 33 CFR Section 328.3; (b) EPA’s general Oil Discharge rule at 40 CFR Section 110; (c) the SPCC rules at 40 CFR Part 112; (d) EPA’s designation of hazardous substances at 40 CFR Part 116; (e) EPA’s hazardous substance reportable quantity rule at 40 CFR Part 117; (f) the NPDES permitting rules at 40 CFR Part 122; (g) the guidelines for dredged or fill disposal sites at 40 CFR Part 230; (g) Exempt activities not requiring a CWA 404 permit (guidelines for 404 disposal sites at 40 CFR Part 232); (h) the National Contingency Plan rules at 40 CFR Part 300; (i) the designation of reportable quantities of hazardous substances at 40 CFR Part 302; and (j) EPA’s Effluent Guidelines standards at 40 CFR Part 401.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
August 06, 2019 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistArkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Defining Construction Defects
February 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFJoseph M. Junfola has started a series at PropertyCasualty360.com on construction defect, and as is appropriate with an in-depth look, he starts by defining the central terms. What is a construction defect? What is a construction defect claim?
Junfola notes that "there is no one uniform definition in all jurisdictions," and so he looks at the commonalities to "fashion at least a working definition." Nevada says that a construction defect "includes a defect in the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or an addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance." According to Florida it is "a deficiency in, or a deficiency arising of, the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, observation of construction, or construction, repair, alteration, or remodeling of real property."
He continues that a construction defect claim is "a claim for damages, i.e. money, arising out of a defect in construction, including defective design, faulty workmanship, and defective materials," but he notes that this is typically pursuant to the discovery of the problem within a given time.
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PSA: Virginia DOLI Amends COVID Workplace Standard
October 18, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs the governmental response to COVID-19 evolves, so do the various standards that apply to employers. Effective September 8, 2021, the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry superseded its earlier permanent workplace standard with a new standard.
In many ways, the new standard simplifies compliance because it gets rid of what I believed to be overly confusing workplace classifications into risk levels and simply applies the new standard to all workplaces regardless of how they would have been classified. Some key points to keep in mind regarding the new standard are the following (with the recommendation that all employers read and understand the text of the standard):
- Masks: All unvaccinated employees must wear masks in all public, common, or shared workspaces with certain exceptions. These exceptions include when an employee is alone in a room/office, when eating, certain medical conditions, and where it is important that the mouth can be seen (such as communication with the deaf). Vaccinated employees need not mask up unless working in a high or substantially transmission area per the CDC Data Tracker.
- Vaccination Requirement: As of now, the DOLI does not require employee vaccinations. However, employers will need to have a way to determine vaccination status to comply with other parts of the standard.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Arizona Supreme Court Holds a Credit Bid at a Trustee’s Sale Should Not be Credited to a Title Insurer Under a Standard Lender’s Title Policy To the Extent the Bid Exceeds the Collateral’s Fair Market Value
March 01, 2017 —
Richard H. Herold - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThe Arizona Supreme Court recently addressed what impact, if any, a lender’s credit bid at an Arizona trustee’s sale has on an insurer’s liability under Sections 2, 7 and 9 of the standard’s lender’s title policy (“Policy”), holding in Equity Income Partners, LP v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 241 Ariz. 334, 387 P.3d 1263 (February 7, 2017) as follows:
1. Section 2 of the Policy, entitled “Continuation of Insurance,” not Section 9, entitled “Reduction of Insurance; Reduction or Termination of Liability,” applies when a lender acquires property at a trustee sale by “either a full- or partial-credit bid” since Section 2 directly addresses the existence and amount of coverage in such circumstances. Id. at 1267.
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Richard H. Herold, Snell & WilmerMr. Herold may be contacted at
rherold@swlaw.com
Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFIn the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.” The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
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