The Need to Be Specific and Precise in Drafting Settling Agreements
December 30, 2013 —
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCThe case of Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Corp., 2013 WL 452374 (D. Colo. February 6, 2013) is instructive as an example of both the confusion and resulting escalation of litigation that can result from a lack of clarity in settlement negotiations. This is particularly true where parties settle outside of their insurance coverage, and/or without notifying their insurer(s), which have denied coverage.
The case involved coverage litigation following settlement of a multi-party construction defect case involving the Rivergate multi-family residential development in Durango, Colorado. The condominium owners association sued, among others, the developer (Rivergate Lofts Partners, hereafter “RLP”) and the general contractor (Genex Construction, LLC, hereafter “Genex”). This follow-on case involved the insurers for RLP (“Hartford”) and Genex (“Bituminous”). The coverage dispute was complicated by the Bituminous allegations that Hartford insured Genex in its alleged role as a manager for RLP, as part of Hartford’s insurance of RLP more generally.
The underlying facts were that Hartford denied insurance coverage and defense to Genex/Bituminous. The underlying construction defect case went to mediation, with the COA, RLP, and Genex all in attendance with their respective insurer representatives, and coverage counsel. While the evolving facts of that mediation were later disputed as to their motives, intentions, and the contemporaneous knowledge of the parties, the facts reflected in documents were fairly clear.
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W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. can be contacted at
mann@hhmrlaw.com
California Supreme Court Rights the “Occurrence” Ship: Unintended Harm Resulting from Intentional Conduct Triggers Coverage Under Liability Insurance Policy
June 13, 2018 —
Scott S. Thomas - Payne & Fears Legal AlertSUMMARY
In a ruling that bodes well for policyholders, the California Supreme Court provides much-needed clarity on the question of when a so-called "intentional act" may give rise to insurance coverage under a liability insurance policy. In Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. v. Ledesma & Meyer Construction Co., Case No. S23765 (Cal. June 4, 2018), the Court holds that an employer's potential liability for negligent hiring, after its employee allegedly abused a 13-year old student, is the result of an "occurrence" and is thus covered under the employer's liability insurance policy.
COURT OPINION
The court's opinion dispels the misguided notion that an intentional act resulting in unintended harm is never an "occurrence" and can never trigger coverage. What matters, according to the Court, is that, from the insured's point of view, the consequences of its conduct are "unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned" - even if the conduct is intentional. And in a concurring opinion, Justice Liu rightfully questions the legitimacy of the notion that intentional conduct cannot trigger coverage, even when it produces an unintended result, unless, in the words of a 1989 appellate court decision, some "additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs that produces the damage." As Justice Liu explains, this intervening "happening" may be something as simple as the insured's mistaken belief that he was acting in self-defense, or that the victim had consented to the insured's conduct. This much-needed clarification restores vitality to the fundamental principle that injuries are "accidental" when they are "unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned," regardless of their cause.
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Scott S. Thomas, Payne & FearsMr. Thomas may be contacted at
sst@paynefears.com
Insured Versus Insured Clause Does Not Bar Coverage
September 17, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Fifth Circuit considered whether coverage was barred under the policy's insured versus insured provision. Kinsale Ins. Co. v. Georgia-Pacific, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12976 (5th Cir. July 27, 2015).
Georgia-Pacific hired Advanced Services, Inc. for demolition work at Georgia-Pacific's idled plywood plant. A fire occurred at the plant, damaging equipment Advanced had leased from H&E Equipment for the demolition work.
Several lawsuits followed. One was brought by H&E against Advanced. Advanced filed a third-party demand for indemnification against Georgia-Pacific for any damages Advanced was required to pay H&E.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys
April 28, 2014 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).
In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Let it Shine: California Mandates Rooftop Solar for New Residential Construction
May 16, 2018 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogCalifornia. Birthplace of the Frisbee, skateboard, television, canned tuna and (yup) fortune cookies has added another first to the list: California has become the first state in the nation to mandate the use of solar panels for new residential construction.
On May 9, 2018, the California Energy Commission (CEC) unanimously approved the state’s 2019 Building Energy Efficiency Standards. The 2019 Energy Efficiency Standards update the California Building Standards Codes found at Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations which are updated every three years. The 2019 Energy Efficiency Standards go into effect on January 1, 2020.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Formal Request for Time Extension Not Always Required to Support Constructive Acceleration
April 25, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesDoes a constructive acceleration claim require the contractor to always request an extension of time which is then denied by the owner? While this is certainly the preference and the contractor should be requesting an extension of time as a matter of course for an excusable delay, the answer is NO! in certain circumstances. This is conveyed in the factually detailed case discussed below where a formal request for an extension of time was not required for the contractor to support its constructive acceleration claim.
But first, what is constructive acceleration:
Constructive acceleration “occurs when the government demands compliance with an original contract deadline, despite excusable delay by the contractor.” The Federal Circuit in Fraser defined the elements of constructive acceleration as follows:
(1) that the contractor encountered a delay that is excusable under the contract; (2) that the contractor made a timely and sufficient request for an extension of the contract schedule; (3) that the government denied the contractor’s request for an extension or failed to act on it within a reasonable time; (4) that the government insisted on completion of the contract within a period shorter than the period to which the contractor would be entitled by taking into account the period of excusable delay, after which the contractor notified the government that it regarded the alleged order to accelerate as a constructive change in the contract; and (5) that the contractor was required to expend extra resources to compensate for the lost time and remain on schedule.
Nova Group/Tutor-Saliba v. U.S., 2022 WL 815826, *42 (Fed.Cl. 2022) quoting Fraser Constr. Co. v. U.S., 384 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
South Carolina Supreme Court Asked Whether Attorney-Client Privilege Waived When Insurer Denies Bad Faith
September 18, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Fourth Circuit certified the following question to the South Carolina Supreme Court: Does South Carolina law support application of the "at issue" exception to the attorney-client privilege such that a party may waive the privilege by denying liability in its answer? In Re: Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17910 (4th Cir. June 28, 2018).
Mt. Hawley insured Contravest Construction Company under an excess commercial liability policy from July 21, 2003 to July 21, 2007. During this period, Contravest constructed a development in South Carolina. In 2011, the Owners Association sued Contravest for alleged defective construction. Mt. Hawley denied tenders to defend or indemnify. Contravest ultimately settled the case.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
2018 Update to EPA’s “Superfund Task Force Report”
September 04, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently released its Superfund Task Force Recommendations 2018 Update (the Update). The Superfund Task Force was established by former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt to “provide recommendations on an expedited timeframe on how the agency can restructure the cleanup process, realign incentives of all involved parties to promote expeditious remediation, reduce the burden on cooperating parties, incentivize parties to remediate sites, encourage private investment in cleanups of sites and promote the revitalization of properties across the country.” Over the years, thousands of sites have been listed on EPA’s National Priority List (NPL) of Superfund sites, but the process by which listed sites are cleaned up and finally removed from the NPL has been agonizingly slow. The process is governed by the National Contingency Plan rules. The Update states that, as of July 3, 2018, there are 1,346 sites listed on the NPL, and overall, 399 sites have been removed from the NPL.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
