New OSHA Vaccination Requirements For Employers With 100 Or More Employees (And Additional Advice for California Employers)
November 19, 2021 —
Laura Fleming & Rana Ayazi - Payne & FearsUpdate 11.8.21: On Nov. 6, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a stay of the OSHA ETS, stating that the OSHA ETS may have “grave statutory and constitutional issues.” The stay is not a final ruling on the validity of the ETS but temporarily halts its implementation nationwide. OSHA has until Nov. 8, 2021 at 5:00 PM to respond and the petitioners have until Nov. 9, 2021 at 5:00 PM to reply to OSHA’s response. The Fifth Circuit will then issue its ruling likely late this week or early next week.
On Sept. 9, 2021, President Joe Biden announced his COVID-19 Action Plan. The Action Plan called on the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to develop a rule requiring all employers with 100 or more employees to ensure their workforce is fully vaccinated or require any workers who remain unvaccinated to produce a negative test result on at least a weekly basis before coming to work.
On Nov. 4, 2021, OSHA released the rule in the form of an Emergency Temporary Standards (“OSHA ETS”). Here are ten things you need to know about the OSHA ETS:
- How To Count To 100: (1) The applicable number is the total number of employees employed on November 5, 2021—this is the headcount that will be used for the duration of the OSHA ETS. (2) The count must be done at the employer level not the individual location level. (3) Part-time employees do count towards the total number of employees. (4) Employees who work from home do count towards the total number of employees. (5) Independent contractors do not count towards the total number of employee.
Reprinted courtesy of
Laura Fleming, Payne & Fears and
Rana Ayazi, Payne & Fears
Ms. Fleming may be contacted at lf@paynefears.com
Ms. Ayazi may be contacted at ra@paynefears.com
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“You Can’t Climb a Tile Wall”
February 03, 2025 —
Daniel Lund III - Lexology… or, in certain circumstances, walk on a tile floor.
A Louisiana appellate court reversed a trial court’s summary judgment in favor of a project architect in a case involving liability for a slip-and-fall incident at a pool area and a casino in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The plaintiff alleged that travertine tile on which she slipped was unsuitable for wet areas, thus failing to meet the necessary safety standards.
The architect – the professional of record for the original design of the casino – attempted to deflect responsibility by arguing that a landscape architect which specified the travertine was an independent contractor and thus solely liable for any issues related to the tile. Ultimately, however, the court held that the absence of a contract between the architect and landscape architect left unresolved questions about the nature of their relationship and the degree of control the former exercised over the work of the latter.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
For Breach of Contract Claim, There Needs to be a Breach of a Contractual Duty
November 15, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesRemember this law (and I mean: remember this law!):
“An essential element of a claim for breach of contract is the existence of a material breach of a contractual duty.” JD Development I, LLC v. ICS Contractors, LLC, 2022 WL 4587083, *3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (citation and quotation omitted).
This law is important because how can another party breach of a contract if there is no contractual duty you claim they breached? This question, and, of course, the answer, should not be overlooked from a strategic standpoint because it may dictate what claims you assert, how you assert those claims, and how you present your case from a theme and evidentiary standpoint.
JD Development provides an example of why this law is important and how this can play out.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
2017 Colorado Construction Defect Recap: Colorado Legislature and Judiciary Make Favorable Advances for Development Community
January 24, 2018 —
Kaitlin Marsh-Blake – Gordon & Rees Construction Law Blog Last March, the Colorado General Assembly introduced House Bill 17-1279 concerning the requirement that a unit owners’ association obtain approval through a vote of unit owners before filing a construction defect action. The bill, passed in May, requires a home owners’ association to first notify all unit owners and the developer or builder of a potential construction defect action, call a meeting where both the HOA and developer or builder have an opportunity to present arguments and potentially remedy the defect, and obtain a majority vote of approval from the unit owners to pursue a lawsuit before bringing a construction defect action against a developer or builder. The bill amends C.R.S. § 38-33.3-303.5, which previously only required substantial compliance with the above-mentioned actions. Moreover, the previous version of C.R.S. § 38-33.3-303.5 did not require the HOA to perform these actions prior to a suit being filed. HB 17-1279 also removed the provision of C.R.S. § 38-33.3-303.5 that made it only applicable to buildings of five or more units.
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Kaitlin Marsh-Blake, Gordon & ReesMs. Marsh-Blake may be contacted at
kmarsh-blake@grsm.com
Washington State Enacts Law Restricting Non-Compete Agreements
September 23, 2019 —
Ellie Perka - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCWashington State has enacted a new law that means big changes for employers. The new law, in effect on January 1, 2020, will dramatically limit the enforcement of non-compete agreements in our state and imposes tough penalties on employers found to be in violation.
While the new law does not take effect for many months, businesses should nonetheless act quickly and before year’s end to evaluate practices and, if necessary, revise existing and future non-compete agreements to ensure compliance. Under the new law, if an employee successfully proves a company’s non-compete agreement is unenforceable, then the employer will be required to pay the greater of $5,000 or an employee’s actual damages, plus the employee’s attorneys’ fees (and its own, in defending the non-compete), expenses and costs incurred in challenging the agreement.
Brief Summary of Changes
Washington Courts have typically disfavored restrictive covenants but usually enforced a non-competition agreement that protected an employer’s legitimate business interests and was reasonable in scope, geographic reach, and duration. The Legislature halted this trend through passage of Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1450.
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Ellie Perka, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMs. Perka may be contacted at
ellie.perka@acslawyers.com
Fifth Circuit -- Damage to Property Beyond Insured’s Product/Work Not Precluded By ‘Your Product/Your Work Exclusion’
January 24, 2022 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Marianne Bradley - White and Williams LLPOn January 11, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Siplast, Incorporated v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 795 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022), finding that an insurer had a duty to defend its insured in a construction defect case where the underlying complaint alleged damage to property beyond the product and work of the insured.
Siplast, Inc. (Siplast) had contracted with the Archdiocese of New York (the Archdiocese) to install a roof membrane system at a high school in the Bronx, New York. Id. at *1. As part of the contract, Siplast guaranteed that the roof membrane system would remain in a watertight condition for at least twenty years. Id. at *2. If it did not, Siplast would repair the roof membrane system at its own expense. Id.
Several years after the installation, the Archdiocese observed water damage in the ceiling tiles at the high school. Id. The Archdiocese contacted Siplast, who attempted to repair the damage and prevent further leaks; however, leaks and resultant damage continued to occur. Id. Siplast subsequently refused to make any more improvements to the roof. Id.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Marianne Bradley, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Bradley may be contacted at bradleym@whiteandwilliams.com
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Privacy In Pandemic: Senators Announce Covid-19 Data Privacy Bill
May 11, 2020 —
Kyle Janecek & Jeffrey Dennis – Newmeyer Dillion"Data! Data! Data!. . . I can't make bricks without clay." This classic statement from Sherlock Holmes in The Adventure of the Copper Beeches takes on a new meaning in the COVID-19 pandemic. With the plans to begin contact tracing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic slowly moving towards the forefront, a valid and important issue presents itself: how do we treat and protect the data we so desperately need to trace, track, and address the pandemic? U.S. Senators Wicker, Thune, Moran, and Blackburn introduced a possible solution to this problem with the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act, as announced on April 30, 2020. So what does the Act entail? What information is protected? What action would businesses need to take towards individuals, such as consumers or even employees, in order to comply with this new legislation?
WHAT IS THE COVID-19 CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The Act is meant to address the concern regarding data collection and privacy due to large companies, like Google and Apple, adjusting the software within their devices to facilitate digital contact tracing. The Act can be broken up into three parts - the treatment of information; the privacy notice requirements; and the transparency requirements.
First, the Act prohibits the collection, processing, or transfer of certain categories of data without notice and the affirmative express consent of the individual, in order to:
- Track the spread of COVID-19,
- Trace the spread of COVID-19 through contact tracing, or
- Determine compliance with social distancing guidelines without the requisite notice to individuals and their express consent.
To accomplish this, the Act also restricts entities in their ability to collect excessive information, stating that an entity cannot collect information beyond what is reasonably necessary to conduct any of the three COVID-19 related purposes listed in the statute. The entity must also provide reasonable administrative, technical, and physical data security policies and practices to protect the information collected. Furthermore, in the event that the entity stops using the information for any of the three COVID-19 purposes, it must delete or de-identify the information it has collected.
Next, the Act describes the requirements for notice to individuals. In order to legally collect, process or transfer the information, the entity needs to provide the consumer with prior notice of the purpose, processing, and transfer of the data through their privacy policy within 14 days of the enactment of the law. This policy would have to:
- Disclose the consumer's rights in a clear and conspicuous manner prior to or at the point of collection,
- Be available in a clear and conspicuous manner to the public,
- Include whether the entity will transfer any of the information it collects in order to track or trace COVID-19 or determine compliance with social distancing,
- Describe its data retention policy, and
- Generally describe its data security measures.
Notably, many of these are already requirements common to many privacy policies, including the disclosure regarding the transfer of an individual's information.
In addition, an individual must give their affirmative express consent to such collection, processing and transfer. In other words, an individual must "opt-in" to having their information collected. This would be done through a checked box or electronic signature, as the law prohibits entities from inferring consent through a failure by the individual to take an action stopping the collection. Furthermore, the individual would also need the ability to expressly withdraw their consent, with the entity then having to cease collection, processing, or transfer of the information within 14 days of the revocation. In essence, due to the restriction on transferal, this may result in businesses opting to delete or de-identify data upon a revocation.
Finally, the entity would have to abide by certain reporting and transparency requirements, namely a monthly public report stating how many individuals had information collected, processed or transferred, and describing the categories of the data collected, processed or transferred by the entity and why. This is akin to the California Consumer Privacy Act's treatment of categories of information, though it would require this information to be released on an ongoing, monthly basis.
WHAT DATA IS COVERED?
Notably, the Act only affects a very limited scope of data. The Act covers geolocation data (exact real-time locations), proximity data (approximated location data), and Personal Health Information (any genetic/diagnosis information that can identify someone). This could cover information like Bluetooth communication or real-time tracking based on a cell phone's geolocation features. Notably, Personal Health Information does not include any information that may be covered under HIPAA or the broader categorization of "Biometric" data (i.e. retinal scans, finger prints, etc). Furthermore, and more generally, "publicly available information" is excluded, which includes information from telephone books or online directories, the news media, "video, internet, or audio content" as well as "websites available to the general public on an unrestricted basis." The latter of which potentially would push any and all information made available through social media (i.e. Facebook or Twitter) into the definition of "publicly available information."
HOW IS IT ENFORCED?
Generally, the law would be enforced by the FTC, under the provisions regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices, similar to other enforcement actions arising out of privacy policies. Notwithstanding, state attorney generals may also bring actions to enforce compliance and obtain damages, civil penalties, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of the residents of the state.
WHAT SHOULD MY COMPANY DO?
If your entity plans on collecting information for tracking COVID-19, measuring social distancing compliance, or contact tracing, it is advisable to include language in your privacy policy now. This could be as simple as adding an additional provision within your privacy policy stating that the entity will retain information to conduct one of the three COVID-19 purposes as laid out in the statute. In addition, this also means that should the entity collect and use employee information for contact tracing, tracking the spread of COVID-19 or ensuring compliance with social distancing measures, it will need to disclose some of the specifics of that process to the employees and have them opt-in for the process. Finally, for contact tracing purposes, any individual that shares their diagnosis will have to opt-in for the entity to legally collect, process, and transfer that information to others.
While the time to reach compliance is unknown, it is more important than ever to form a compliance plan for privacy legislation if you do not already have a plan in place. If you decide to prepare with us, our firm has created a 90 day California Consumer Privacy Act compliance program (which can be expedited) where our team will collaborate with you to determine a scalable, practical, and reasonable way for you to meet your needs, and we will provide a free initial consultation. For further inquiries or questions related to COVID-19, you can consult with a Task Force attorney by emailing NDCovid19Response@ndlf.com or contacting our office directly at 949-854-7000.
Kyle Janecek is an associate in the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice, and supports the team in advising clients on cyber related matters, including policies and procedures that can protect their day-to-day operations. For more information on how Kyle can help, contact him at kyle.janecek@ndlf.com.
Jeff Dennis (CIPP/US) is the Head of the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice. Jeff works with the firm's clients on cyber-related issues, including contractual and insurance opportunities to lessen their risk. For more information on how Jeff can help, contact him at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com.
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Court Makes an Unsettling Inference to Find that the Statute of Limitations Bars Claims Arising from a 1997 Northridge Earthquake Settlement
April 15, 2015 —
David W. Evans and Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Britton v. Girardi (No. B249232 – Filed 4/1/2015), the Second Appellate District upheld the trial court’s dismissal due to the statute of limitations based on an inference it drew from a letter attached to the complaint, while reaffirming its prior application of the limitations period in Probate Code section 16460 for fraud claims in the related case of Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2/27/2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105.
In Britton, just as in Prakashpalan, the plaintiffs sued the attorneys who had represented them in connection with claims against their insurer arising out of the Northridge earthquake. In 1997, the attorneys had settled that litigation for more than $100 million. The plaintiffs allege that the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty by (1) failing to provide an accounting for the settlement, (2) failing to obtain their informed consent to the settlement, and (3) concealing their misappropriation of the settlement funds. They claim that they did not discover this wrongdoing until nearly fifteen years later, in 2012, when the Prakashpalans contacted them about their settlement. Significantly, the plaintiffs attached as an exhibit to the complaint a page of the November 3, 1997 letter to the Prakashpalans (rather than the plaintiffs), which stated that a retired judge who presided over the settlement had determined the allocations and the attorneys could not distribute the proceeds until the plaintiffs signed the “Master Settlement Agreement” by which the plaintiffs agreed to its terms and to give up all claims against the insurer.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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